创业板公司大股东与高管减持内幕交易行为研究

发布时间：2018-02-27 18:16

本文关键词： 内幕交易创业板减持事件研究　出处：《重庆大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：本文首先针对内幕交易的相关内容、概念等进行了介绍，对内幕交易的相关研究和理论进行了综述总结，并分析了内幕交易的特征。从内幕交易对股票市场运行风险、信息效率、股票市场的流动性以及股票价格这几个方面对内幕交易对股票市场的影响作了综述和理论介绍。文献研究表明内幕交易会损害证券市场公开、公平、公正的交易原则，降低资源配置效率，增加了市场交易风险，提高了上市公司的融资成本和经营风险。其次对创业板上市公司大股东和高管减持行为的相关研究和理论成果作了介绍和总结。对创业板大股东和高管减持的动机从公司控制权结构、大股东掏空及支持行为、公司财务绩效、宏观经济政策与市场趋势这几个方面的研究成果进行了总结和回顾。然后从信息不对称、信息披露、盈余管理这三方面对减持行为与内幕交易的研究作了总结分析。统计了2009年至2013年创业板上市公司的减持事件，从多个层面对减持行为进行了统计分析。发现创业板公司大股东和高管的减持行为比较普遍，随着创业板公司的增多而愈加严重。从对高管减持的不同职务、途径等方面进行对比分析发现，高管在少量增持的情况下大量减持，，并选择大宗交易和竞价交易两种交易方式进行减持，减持过程中还通过与自己不同家族关系的人员，以及辞职的方法进行减持。体现出高管对交易行为的可操纵性和对市场的情况的准备把握。选择事件研究法对10年首批创业板公司解禁以来的到13年期间的所有在交易所公布的减持公告进行了实证研究。从累积超长收益率、公告效应的指标计算结果分析创业板市场大股东和高管减持行为的内幕交易情况。发现创业板公司股东在减持过程体现出精准的择时能力，减持行为存在严重的内幕交易情况。在实证研究的基础上分析了和探讨了创业板市场大股东和高管减持的动因以及内幕交易的成因。指出创业板上市公司在公司治理结构上还存在一定缺陷，公司在发展过程中背离了上市初衷，业绩与预期相差较远，在个人利益的驱动下，大股东和高管选择减持套利。由于内幕交易的隐秘性且获取证据的难度较大，大股东和高管在减持的过程出现了严重的内幕交易行为。最后针对以上分析对完善证券交易监管对策提出了一些建议。建议公司加强公司治理和完善高管激励机制，完善上市公司信息披露制度，加强监管部门的监管力度提高监管效果等。
[Abstract]:This paper first introduces the relevant contents and concepts of insider trading, summarizes the relevant research and theory of insider trading, and analyzes the characteristics of insider trading. The information efficiency, the liquidity of stock market and the stock price are reviewed and introduced in this paper. The literature research shows that insider trading can damage the openness and fairness of the stock market. Fair trade principle, reduce the efficiency of resource allocation, increase the market transaction risk, Secondly, this paper introduces and summarizes the related research and theoretical results of the behavior of large shareholders and senior executives of gem listed companies. The control structure of the machine slave company, This paper summarizes and reviews the research results of the major shareholders' tunneling and supporting behavior, corporate financial performance, macroeconomic policy and market trend. The three aspects of earnings management summarize and analyze the behavior of reduction and insider trading. From 2009 to 2013, the reduction events of gem listed companies are counted, and the reduction behavior is analyzed from many aspects. It is found that the behaviors of large shareholders and senior executives of gem companies are relatively common. With the increase of gem companies, it becomes more and more serious. From the comparative analysis of the different positions and ways of reducing the holding of senior executives, it is found that under the circumstances of a small increase in holdings, senior executives reduce their holdings in a large number. They also choose two trading methods, bulk trading and bidding, to reduce their holdings. In the process of reducing their holdings, they also adopt different family relationships with themselves. As well as the method of resigning to reduce holdings. It shows that executives have a good grasp of the manipulability of trading behavior and the preparation of market conditions. An empirical study of all the stock reduction announcements published on the exchange during the period of 13 years since the release of the first gem in the past 10 years was conducted using the event study method. The result of index calculation of notice effect analyzes the insider trading of the behavior of large shareholders and senior executives in the gem market. It is found that the shareholders of gem companies show accurate timing ability in the process of reducing their holdings, and there are serious insider trading situations in the behavior of reduction. On the basis of the empirical research, this paper analyzes and discusses the motivation of the reduction of large shareholders and executives and the causes of insider trading in the gem market, and points out that there are still some defects in the corporate governance structure of the listed companies in the gem. In the process of development, the company deviates from the original intention of listing, and its performance is far from expected. Driven by personal interests, major shareholders and executives choose to reduce arbitrage. Because of the secrecy of insider trading and the difficulty of obtaining evidence, Major shareholders and executives in the process of reduction of serious insider trading behavior. Finally, some suggestions are put forward to improve the supervision of securities exchange. It is suggested that the company should strengthen corporate governance, improve the incentive mechanism of executives, and improve the information disclosure system of listed companies. Strengthen the supervision of the regulatory authorities to improve the effectiveness of supervision and so on.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51

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