我国上市商业银行公司治理与经营绩效关系的实证分析

发布时间：2018-03-17 16:30

本文选题：上市商业银行　切入点：公司治理　出处：《重庆工商大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：二十世纪九十年代以来，金融危机频频发生并冲击着世界经济的发展，1997年爆发的亚洲金融危机以及2008年的金融危机给世界金融业和实体经济带来巨大的负面影响，世界金融业一次有一次的遭受重创，世界性的银行破产和国际间银行的兼并重组不断涌现，银行破产和重组不只是外部力量作用的结构，这也表明银行业内部存在很大缺陷，银行公司治理水平低下，风险控制意识不足等等导致的银行资产质量恶化而引发破产。在我国商业银行是金融体系的核心组成部分，商业银行综合绩效的好坏不仅影响金融体系的稳定，对整个国家宏观经济的稳健运行与发展也具有重大的影响。在近期的金融危机中，虽然我国银行业在抵御风险能力上表现的很出色，但是银行业未来前景不容乐观，面对国家允许银行破产以及房地产可能存在泡沫风险，加上商业银行内部公司治理也存在许多问题，比如国有股权一股独大、董事会和监事会治理缺乏效用以及高级管理人员注重短期激励而忽视长期激励等等，这些都对商业银行的长期健康发展产生潜在威胁。所以对全面认识我国商业银行公司治理情况，找出改善银行内部公司治理的途径，对提升银行竞争力和生存能力都将具有重要的理论和实践意义。基于此，本文首先对国内外相关研究文献归纳和总结，其次对公司治理方面的相关理论分别进行归纳论述，然后对我国银行业特殊性及现状进行分析，最后，选取我国上市商业银行2007-2012年6年间共86个样本数据，，从银行公司治理中的股权结构、董事会特征、监事会特征和高管薪酬四个方面对上市商业银行绩效进行回归分析，以此来研究公司治理与银行经营绩效的关系。另外，在高管股权激励方面，我国只有五家银行正在实行高管持股，而这几家银行高管股权激励制度也不够完善，高管持股因为发展还不成熟，所以对银行绩效的影响可能还不明显，但是为了研究高管持股对这五家银行经营绩效产生何种影响，本文另选高管持股方面指标对银行绩效进行试探性回归分析。实证研究结果表明：我国上市商业银行股权集中度与银行经营绩效负相关；第二大股东与第一大股东持股比例的比值与经营绩效呈显著负相关关系；董事会规模和董事会会议次数与银行经营绩效呈显著负相关关系，独立董事比例与银行经营绩效呈显著正相关；监事会规模和监事会会议次数与银行经营绩效不相关；高管薪酬与银行绩效不存在相关关系；高管总人数与银行经营绩效负相关，高管持股占总股数的比值与银行经营绩效负相关。
[Abstract]:Since 1990s, the financial crisis has occurred frequently and impacted the development of the world economy. The Asian financial crisis that broke out in 1997 and the financial crisis in 2008 have brought great negative effects to the world financial industry and the real economy. Once in a while, the world's financial industry has suffered a heavy blow. Bank failures and mergers and reorganization of international banks have sprung up all over the world. Bank bankruptcy and restructuring are not only structures of external forces. This also shows that there are great defects in the banking industry. The low level of corporate governance and the lack of awareness of risk control lead to the deterioration of bank asset quality and lead to bankruptcy. In China, commercial banks are the core components of the financial system. The comprehensive performance of commercial banks not only affects the stability of the financial system, but also has a significant impact on the steady operation and development of the whole country's macro-economy. Although China's banking industry has performed very well in its ability to resist risks, the future prospects of the banking sector are not optimistic. In the face of the state allowing banks to go bankrupt and the possibility of bubble risks in real estate, In addition, there are also many problems in the internal corporate governance of commercial banks, such as the dominance of state-owned equity shares, the lack of effectiveness of the governance of the board of directors and the board of supervisors, and the emphasis placed by senior managers on short-term incentives while neglecting long-term incentives, and so on. All these have a potential threat to the long-term and healthy development of commercial banks. Therefore, to comprehensively understand the corporate governance situation of commercial banks in China and find ways to improve the internal corporate governance of banks, It will be of great theoretical and practical significance to enhance the competitiveness and viability of banks. Based on this, this paper first summarizes and summarizes the relevant research literature at home and abroad, then summarizes the related theories of corporate governance, and then analyzes the particularity and current situation of China's banking industry. This paper selects 86 sample data of Chinese listed commercial banks from 2007 to 2012 to analyze the performance of listed commercial banks from four aspects: ownership structure, board characteristics, supervisory board characteristics and executive compensation. In addition, in the aspect of executive equity incentive, only five banks in China are carrying out executive shareholding, and these banks are not perfect in the system of executive equity incentive. The influence of executive ownership on bank performance may not be obvious because of the immature development, but in order to study the impact of executive ownership on the performance of these five banks, The empirical results show that the ownership concentration of listed commercial banks in China is negatively correlated with bank performance. The ratio of the second largest shareholder to the largest shareholder has a significant negative correlation with the operating performance, while the size of the board of directors and the number of board meetings have a significant negative correlation with the bank operating performance. The proportion of independent directors was significantly positively correlated with bank performance; the size of board of supervisors and the number of board of supervisors meetings were not related to bank performance; executive compensation had no correlation with bank performance; the total number of senior executives was negatively correlated with bank performance. The ratio of executive stock to total stock is negatively correlated with bank performance.
【学位授予单位】：重庆工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.33;F271;F272.5

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