可转换债券与公司无效投资的双向治理——来自我国证券市场的经验证据

发布时间：2018-03-27 23:32

本文选题：可转换债券　切入点：投资不足　出处：《中山大学学报(社会科学版)》2012年03期

【摘要】：过度投资和投资不足是我国上市公司投资过程中亟待解决的问题。以迈尔斯(Myers,1977)、斯蒂奇(Siddiqi,2009)和史来弗与魏施尼(Shleifer and Vishny,1989)的分析框架为基础,构建的理论模型着重于分析可转债对公司无效投资行为的双向制约作用。结果表明,可转债能够实现对公司无效投资的双向治理。在理论分析的基础上,以2000—2008年间我国可转债发行公司为样本对可转债发行与公司投资效率改善之间的关系进行检验,经验证据支持理论模型的推断:可转债能够根据公司上年的无效投资类型调整其治理方向,并始终驱动发行公司的投资行为向最优投资值靠近。这意味着,在保持必要监管的基础上适度放开对于公司使用可转债进行融资的政策限制,积极发展债券市场,将有助于提高我国上市公司的整体投资效率。
[Abstract]:Overinvestment and underinvestment are the problems that need to be solved in the process of investment of listed companies in China. Based on the analytical framework of Myersof Myersn 1977, Siddiqiu 2009 and Shleifer and Vishny 1989), The theoretical model is focused on the two-way restriction of convertible bonds on corporate invalid investment behavior. The results show that convertible bonds can achieve the two-way governance of corporate ineffective investment. The relationship between convertible bond issuance and the improvement of investment efficiency is tested with the sample of China's convertible bond issuing companies from 2000 to 2008. Empirical evidence supports the theoretical model's inference that convertible bonds can adjust their governance direction according to the invalid investment types of the company in the previous year, and always drive the issuing company's investment behavior towards the optimal investment value. On the basis of maintaining the necessary supervision, we should appropriately liberalize the policy restrictions on the use of convertible bonds to finance companies, and actively develop the bond market, which will help to improve the overall investment efficiency of listed companies in China.
【作者单位】：中山大学管理学院;中山大学国际商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“可转换债券融资下的委托代理与公司价值研究”(70872116) 教育部人文社会科学青年项目“基于委托代理视角的可转债治理机制研究”(12YJc630112) 中山大学青年教师起步计划(3281401)
【分类号】：F832.51;F224

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