政府权力、营利性扩张与通货膨胀

发布时间：2018-03-31 03:37

本文选题：政府权力　切入点：营利性扩张　出处：《经济理论与经济管理》2012年10期

【摘要】：本文从政府权力视角,设立分权制度下中央、地方两级政府的目标函数,分别在大政府范畴的预算约束条件下求解其最优选择和长期稳态路径。本文的结论是,长期稳态价格水平不仅取决于中央、地方两级政府的债务规模、税收与支出,而且还受到国有企业投资的影响;中央政府的投资、债务、利润与货币增长之间相互推进,地方政府为扩大投资竞争融资来源具有强烈的货币增长需求,这倒逼货币供给增加;通货膨胀主要原因之一就是政府权力软约束下的营利性投资扩张。因此,治理通货膨胀的必要条件是,设计一种政府与治理通货膨胀具有共融利益的制度,减少政府营利性的准公共投资,增加事关国计民生的纯公共支出。
[Abstract]:In this paper, from the perspective of government power, the objective functions of central and local governments are established under the decentralized system, and the optimal choice and long-term steady-state path are solved under the condition of budget constraints in the large government category, respectively. The conclusion of this paper is as follows:. The long-term steady-state price level depends not only on the size of the debt, taxes and expenditures of the central and local governments, but also on the investment of state-owned enterprises, the mutual promotion of central government investment, debt, profits and currency growth. Local governments have a strong demand for money growth to expand their competitive sources of investment financing, which forces the money supply to increase. One of the main reasons for inflation is the expansion of profitable investment under the soft constraints of government power. The necessary condition of controlling inflation is to design a system in which the government and inflation have the same benefits, to reduce the government's profitable quasi-public investment, and to increase the pure public expenditure which is related to the national economy and the people's livelihood.
【作者单位】：西南财经大学中国金融研究中心;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(11JJD790035) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(JBK1207024)
【分类号】：F123.1;F822.5;F224

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