汶川地震灾后农房重建贷款违约风险形成机理与影响因素分析
本文选题:汶川地震 切入点:农房重建贷款 出处:《四川农业大学》2014年硕士论文
【摘要】:2008年汶川大地震发生以后,随着救灾任务转移到灾后恢复重建工作上来,在党和政府的大力倡导和支持下,各银行业金融机构倾力投入到灾后重建,大大加强对灾区恢复重建资金的投放力度,有效支持灾后恢复重建工作的及时、有序推进。灾后农房重建贷款的投放是在政府行为的强力影响下展开的,政策意味浓厚,而政府行为目标和信贷金融机构期望收益目标存在较大分歧,这将直接导致农房重建贷款的到期履约存在很多不确定性,例如灾后贷款农户还款的道德风险问题,重建农户的灾后还款能力以及灾后重建中政府政策作用等,这些因素都将对农房重建贷款的顺利回收产生重要影响。灾后发放的农房重建贷款的期限大部分都在3至5年,随着受灾农房重建贷款都已基本到期,参与灾后农房重建的信贷金融机构正面临着农房重建贷款回收难的巨大考验。本文在综合国内外对银行贷款违约风险形成机理及其影响因素的研究现状的基础上,以汶川地震灾后农房重建贷款为研究对象,通过对汶川地震灾区的四个极重灾县(市)和一个重灾县级市的323户样本农户的灾后农房重建贷款情况的问卷调查和访谈,利用调查样本数据分析了汶川地震灾后农房重建贷款的发放和管理现状;以及利用Logit回归模型对重建贷款违约风险的影响因素进行实证分析:最后根据实证分析结果和结论提出相应的政府完善特大灾害后农房重建援助方式的对策建议。本文研究得出的结论主要包括:(1)政府灾后重建贷款政策显著加大农房重建贷款违约风险。政府对农房重建贷款政策会对农房重建贷款的偿还造成不利影响,尤其是对农户贷款取消抵押担保,而进行信用贷款的政策,这显著加大了灾后农房重建贷款的违约风险。(2)灾区贷款农户的受灾损失也会增加灾后农房重建贷款的违约风险。严重的地震灾害往往会给农户造成较大的人员伤亡和财产损失,地震带来的损失会降低农户对农房重建贷款的偿还能力,更主要的是这种受灾损失会导致农户产生严重的受灾心理,从而加大对政府主导灾后农房重建的依耐性,这种受灾情绪容易引发灾后农房重建贷款的道德风险违约。(3)民间借贷降低农房重建贷款违约风险,其他银行借贷则加大其违约风险。是否邻里借贷和有无其他银行借款对农房重建贷款违约风险的作用各不相同,其中,邻里借贷对重建贷款的回收有积极作用,而其他银行贷款则会加大农房重建贷款的违约风险。根据以上研究结论,本文提出了以下几点对策建议完善政府对灾后农房重建的援助方式:(1)降低政府对农房重建贷款的影响;(2)积极改善灾后农业产业发展,促进农民增收;(3)对受灾较重的农户进行定向补助,减少农户的受灾损失;(4)鼓励民间借贷参与灾后重建工作,防止不同银行贷款间的相互影响。
[Abstract]:After the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008, as the relief task shifted to the post-disaster recovery and reconstruction work, with the strong advocacy and support of the Party and the government, the banking and financial institutions devoted themselves to the post-disaster reconstruction.We will greatly strengthen the investment of funds for disaster recovery and reconstruction, and effectively support timely and orderly progress in the work of disaster recovery and reconstruction.Under the strong influence of the government's behavior, the investment of the loan for the reconstruction of agricultural houses after the disaster is carried out with strong policy implications. However, there are great differences between the objectives of the government's behavior and the target of the expected income of the credit and financial institutions.This will directly lead to a lot of uncertainty about the maturity of the loan for the reconstruction of rural housing, such as the moral hazard of the repayment of the loan after the disaster, the reconstruction of the ability of the farmers to repay after the disaster, and the role of the government policy in the post-disaster reconstruction, and so on.These factors will have an important impact on the successful recovery of agricultural housing reconstruction loans.Most of the loans issued after the disaster are in the range of 3 to 5 years. As the loans have basically expired, the credit financial institutions involved in the reconstruction of the houses are facing the great test of the difficulty of recovering the loans for the reconstruction of agricultural houses.On the basis of synthesizing the present situation of research on the formation mechanism and influencing factors of default risk of bank loans at home and abroad, this paper takes the reconstruction loan of agricultural houses after Wenchuan earthquake as the research object.Through the questionnaire survey and interview on the loan situation of the post-disaster rural house reconstruction in the four heavily affected counties (cities) in Wenchuan earthquake disaster area and 323 rural households in one seriously stricken county city,Based on the survey sample data, this paper analyzes the present situation of granting and managing the loans for the reconstruction of agricultural houses after the Wenchuan earthquake.Finally, according to the results and conclusions of the empirical analysis, the author puts forward the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions on how to improve the ways of assistance for the reconstruction of rural housing after the catastrophic disaster by using the Logit regression model to analyze the influencing factors of the default risk of reconstruction loans.The conclusions of this paper mainly include: 1) the government's policy of post-disaster reconstruction loan significantly increases the risk of default of agricultural housing reconstruction loan.The government's policy on agricultural housing reconstruction loans will have a negative impact on the repayment of agricultural housing reconstruction loans, especially the policy of cancelling mortgage guarantees and making credit loans to farmers' loans.This significantly increases the default risk of post-disaster agricultural housing reconstruction loan.) the disaster loss of farmers in the disaster area will also increase the default risk of post-disaster agricultural housing reconstruction loan.Serious earthquake disasters will often cause greater casualties and property losses to farmers. The losses caused by earthquakes will reduce the ability of farmers to repay loans for the reconstruction of agricultural houses.What is more important is that this kind of disaster loss will cause farmers to have a serious psychological disaster, thus increasing their tolerance to the government-led reconstruction of agricultural houses after the disaster.This kind of disaster-stricken sentiment could easily lead to moral hazard of post-disaster rural housing reconstruction loan default. 3) Non-government borrowing reduces default risk of agricultural house reconstruction loan, while other bank loans increase default risk.Whether neighborhood loans and other bank loans have different effects on the default risk of agricultural housing reconstruction loans, in which neighborhood loans have a positive effect on the recovery of reconstruction loans,Other bank loans will increase the risk of default on rural housing reconstruction loans.Based on the above conclusions, this paper puts forward the following countermeasures and suggestions to improve the government's assistance to the reconstruction of agricultural houses after the disaster: (1) to reduce the impact of the government on the loans for the reconstruction of agricultural housing; (2) to actively improve the development of the agricultural industry after the disaster.To encourage farmers to increase their income and increase their income) to provide targeted subsidies to the severely affected farmers and to reduce their losses. (4) to encourage private loans to participate in the reconstruction work after the disaster, and to prevent the mutual influence between different bank loans.
【学位授予单位】:四川农业大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F832.4;F301.3
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