创新型中小企业与商业银行的演化博弈及信贷稳定策略研究

发布时间：2018-04-05 09:44

本文选题：创新型中小企业　切入点：融资约束　出处：《经济评论》2012年01期

【摘要】：创新型中小企业融资难由来已久,特别是在以间接融资为主的金融环境下如何明晰银企关系,形成与之匹配的信贷策略,是化解企业融资约束的关键。本文首先建立银企演化博弈的理论框架,对创新型中小企业与商业银行的信贷行为演化过程及演化稳定性标准进行探讨,并从创新风险与监管奖惩两个维度构建银企演化博弈模型,分析两类群体在长期信贷博弈中的演化稳定策略。结果表明,银企双方均对高收益策略有模仿倾向,但创新型中小企业在与银行的长期合作中会对少数企业的违约行为具有抵御性;研发创业期企业所受融资约束最高,当且仅当创新成功率高于最小下限时,商业银行才考虑与企业发生信贷关系;政府、信用担保等外部力量与内生要素的相互制衡对实现银企信贷稳定状态具有重要作用。
[Abstract]:Innovative SME financing has a long history, especially how to clarify the relationship between banks and enterprises in the financial environment dominated by indirect financing, and form a matching credit strategy, which is the key to resolve the financing constraints of enterprises.This paper first establishes the theoretical framework of the evolution game between banks and enterprises, and probes into the evolution process of credit behavior and the criteria of evolution stability of innovative small and medium-sized enterprises and commercial banks.From the two dimensions of innovation risk and regulatory rewards and punishments, the evolution game model of banks and enterprises is constructed, and the evolutionary stability strategies of the two groups in the long-term credit game are analyzed.The results show that both banks and enterprises have the tendency to imitate the high-yield strategy, but the innovative SMEs will resist the default behavior of a few enterprises in the long-term cooperation with the bank.If and only when the success rate of innovation is higher than the minimum limit, the commercial banks will consider the credit relationship with enterprises. The checks and balances between external forces and endogenous factors such as government and credit guarantee play an important role in realizing the credit stability of banks and enterprises.
【作者单位】：山东大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“基于企业基因的创新型中小企业成长研究”(项目编号:11BJY078) 教育部人文社科研究规划基金项目“中国低碳自主创新模式选择与对策研究”(项目编号:10YJA630211)的资助
【分类号】：F276.3;F832.4;F224.32

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