基于贷款监督技术的农户融资机制研究

发布时间：2018-04-15 19:18

本文选题：道德风险 + 贷款监督　；参考：《农业技术经济》2012年11期

【摘要】：本文基于农村信贷市场的道德风险模型,运用合约理论,比较分析了借贷合约中引入监督机制后,不同贷款监督技术的效率及其对农户融资条件的影响。研究结果表明,只要贷款监督是有效的,则纯粹的中介监督、代理监督均可以降低最低担保品,有利于融资;而在直接监督贷款情形下,监督能否改善融资条件将取决于监督资本的超额回报同监督技术有效性之间的相对大小;同伴监督下的贷款更有利于抵押担保能力弱的借款人融资;而且在贷款监督基础上,引入提议更有利于农户融资。因此,农村融资制度的改进,应由政府外生主导型向民间内生型转变,进而积极引导纯粹的民营资本进入农村金融领域,充分发挥各类新型农民专业合作组织在农村融资活动中的作用。
[Abstract]:Based on the moral hazard model of rural credit market, this paper makes a comparative analysis of the efficiency of different loan supervision techniques and their influence on farmers' financing conditions after the introduction of supervision mechanism in loan contracts by using contract theory.The results show that as long as the loan supervision is effective, the pure intermediary supervision and agency supervision can reduce the minimum collateral, which is beneficial to financing.Whether the supervision can improve the financing conditions will depend on the relative magnitude between the excess return of the supervised capital and the effectiveness of the supervision technology; the loans under the peer supervision are more favorable to the borrowers with weak mortgage guarantee ability; and on the basis of the loan supervision,Introduction of proposals is more conducive to farmers financing.Therefore, the improvement of rural financing system should be changed from the government exogenous dominant type to the private endogenous type, and then actively guide the pure private capital into the rural financial field.Give full play to the role of various new types of farmers' professional cooperative organizations in rural financing activities.
【作者单位】：西南大学经济管理学院;北京航空航天大学可靠性与系统工程学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金项目“农村信贷合约履约机制与农村信贷制度创新研究”(编号:12BJY098),国家社科基金项目“非正规金融在完善农村金融体系中的功能及机制研究”(编号:08BJY146)
【分类号】：F832.4

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