中国上市商业银行高管薪酬与经营绩效的相关性研究

发布时间：2018-04-25 14:03

本文选题：上市商业银行 + 高管薪酬　；参考：《复旦大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：金融危机过后,各国经济缓慢复苏,但是企业高管们的薪酬不降反升。在这困难时期,高管们肩负着企业重新走向繁荣的艰巨任务,此时是要与企业共度难关还是要继续加薪以激励高管构成了一对矛盾。现代企业的竞争更多地体现为人才的竞争,特别是具有特异人力资本的人才的竞争,如高级管理人才的竞争,而给高级管理人才高薪是抢占高管的一个重要的激励方式,金融业高管薪酬一直处于行业领先地位,同时在金融行业中,银行业高管薪酬又是最高的,所以银行业高管薪酬更是人们热议的话题。金融业高管的薪酬虽然在不断地进行改革,但是矛盾丛生,突出表现为薪酬与业绩、风险不匹配。因此,设计出合理有效的高管薪酬激励机制势在必然,然而要设计出良好的薪酬激励机制首先就要研究银行业高管薪酬与经营绩效之间的关系。本文运用经济激励理论对我国上市商业银行高管薪酬的现状进行分析,并从公司治理角度出发提出我国上市商业银行高管薪酬存在的问题。之后,选取14家上市商业银行从2007到2012年这6年的面板数据作为研究对象,实证分析上市商业银行高管薪酬与银行经营绩效、资产规模、股权集中度、风险管理能力和公司治理变量之间的关系。本文通过对我国上市商业银行的高管薪酬现状和实证研究分析后,发现我国的高管薪酬基本上形成了固定工资加绩效工资的模式,但是薪酬激励机制仍然不够合理,仅仅与净利润和每股收益指标挂钩,并且缺乏长期激励措施,因此建议建立起以绩效工资为基础的综合绩效评价体系和长期激励机制,同时要不断完善公司治理结构,建立行之有效的董事会、监事会和管理层的相互制约机制,解决在中国国有银行存在的所有者缺位问题。
[Abstract]:Economies have recovered slowly after the financial crisis, but executives' pay has risen instead of falling. In these difficult times, when executives face the daunting task of returning to prosperity, it is a contradiction whether to tide over difficulties with companies or to continue to raise wages to motivate them. The competition of modern enterprises is more embodied in the competition of talents, especially the competition of talents with special human capital, such as the competition of senior management talents, and the high salary of senior management talents is an important incentive way to seize the senior management. Executive compensation in the financial sector has always been in the industry leading position, and in the financial industry, the banking executive pay is the highest, so the banking executive pay is a hot topic. Although the financial industry executive compensation is carrying on the reform unceasingly, but the contradiction is numerous, the outstanding performance is the salary and the performance, the risk does not match. Therefore, it is inevitable to design a reasonable and effective executive compensation incentive mechanism. However, in order to design a good compensation incentive mechanism, it is necessary to study the relationship between executive compensation and business performance. In this paper, the current situation of executive compensation of listed commercial banks in China is analyzed by using economic incentive theory, and the problems of executive compensation of listed commercial banks in China are put forward from the angle of corporate governance. Then, the panel data of 14 listed commercial banks from 2007 to 2012 are selected as the research object, and the empirical analysis of executive compensation and bank performance, asset size, equity concentration degree of listed commercial banks. The relationship between risk management ability and corporate governance variables. By analyzing the current situation and empirical research of executive compensation of listed commercial banks in China, this paper finds that the executive compensation of our country has basically formed the pattern of fixed salary plus performance wage, but the incentive mechanism of compensation is still not reasonable. Only linked to net profit and earnings per share, and lack of long-term incentives, it is recommended to establish a comprehensive performance evaluation system based on performance pay and long-term incentive mechanism, and to constantly improve the corporate governance structure. To establish an effective mechanism of mutual restriction between board of directors, board of supervisors and management, to solve the problem of the absence of owners in Chinese state-owned banks.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.33;F272.92

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