利益侵占、风险补偿与控制权私利:实验的证据

发布时间：2018-05-04 23:42

本文选题：大股东侵占 + 风险补偿　；参考：《经济管理》2012年06期

【摘要】：基于控制权私利的理论阐释,结合我国上市公司广泛存在的内部人控制现象,本文从大股东利益侵占效应和控制权风险补偿效应双重视角出发,构建了控股股东攫取控制权私利的行动决策模型,揭示了大股东侵占、控制权风险补偿与控制权私利之间的内在联系与实现机理。研究发现,控制权私利不仅反映了控股股东对中小投资者的利益侵蚀效应,也隐含了其为谋求公司控制权地位而承担额外风险的风险补偿收益。模型分析还表明,当考虑控制权风险补偿后,控制权私利与控股股东现金流权呈现非线性U型关系;与企业股权制衡度和外部资本市场完善程度呈现负相关关系。之后的实验研究为上述模型分析结论提供了支持性经验证据。
[Abstract]:Based on the theoretical explanation of the private interests of control rights, combined with the phenomenon of insider control widely existing in listed companies in China, this paper sets out from the dual perspective of the expropriation effect of major shareholders' interests and the compensation effect of control right risk. This paper constructs an action decision model for controlling shareholders to seize control rights, and reveals the internal relationship and realization mechanism between large shareholders' encroachment, risk compensation of control rights and private interests of control rights. It is found that the private benefits of control not only reflect the effect of controlling shareholders on the interests of small and medium-sized investors, but also imply the risk compensation benefits that the controlling shareholders bear extra risks in order to seek the position of control. The model analysis also shows that the self-interest of control and cash flow right of controlling shareholders are nonlinear U-shaped when considering the compensation of control risk, and negatively correlated with the degree of equity balance and the degree of perfection of external capital market. The subsequent experimental studies provide supporting empirical evidence for the above conclusions of the model analysis.
【作者单位】：重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“控制权配置、制度环境与国企高管腐败:理论与实证研究”(71102063) 教育部博士点基金项目“控制权配置、相机治理机制与企业价值:基于控制权动态转移视角”(20100191120041) 教育部人文社科基金项目“可转债融资对内部公司治理和企业价值的影响及机理研究”(09YJC630243)
【分类号】：F832.51;F224

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