上市公司破产管理人指定方式及管理模式的市场效应分析

发布时间：2018-05-05 12:49

本文选题：资本市场 + 破产重整　；参考：《浙江学刊》2012年02期

【摘要】：中国《破产法》规定法院受理企业重整必须指定破产管理人,破产管理人分管理模式和监督模式两种类型。论文通过对2007年以来沪深两地上市公司重整案件破产管理人指定方式及管理模式市场反应的实证分析,结果发现,中国股票市场对上市公司破产重整案件中指定管理人事件存在较为强烈的提前反应,而且在事件公告日之后还存在着明显过度反应特征。在两类不同的破产管理人中,由政府有关部门组成清算组对股票价格的影响较为明显,其累计超额收益率水平最高,因为市场对清算组担任管理人时的上市公司重整业绩显著提升的预期;但在管理人类型中管理模式的CAR正收益比监督模式更大一些。
[Abstract]:The bankruptcy Law of China stipulates that the court must appoint the bankruptcy administrator, and the bankruptcy administrator should be divided into two types: management mode and supervision mode. Based on the empirical analysis of the way of appointing bankruptcy administrator and the market reaction of management mode in the reorganization of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen since 2007, the paper finds that, China's stock market has a strong early reaction to the event of appointed manager in the bankruptcy reorganization case of listed companies, and there are obvious overreaction characteristics after the event announcement date. Among the two different types of bankruptcy administrators, the liquidation group formed by the relevant government departments has a more obvious impact on the stock price, and its cumulative excess return level is the highest. This is because the market expects a significant improvement in the restructuring performance of listed companies when the liquidation team is the manager, but the CAR positive return of the management model in the manager type is larger than that of the supervisory model.
【作者单位】：中国人民大学经济学院;
【基金】：北京凯恩克劳斯经济研究基金会《上市公司破产管理人制度研究》课题组资助
【分类号】：F832.51;F224

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