基于现行保荐制度下创业板股票发行监管的博弈分析

发布时间：2018-05-12 04:16

本文选题：保荐制 + 新股发行　；参考：《山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2012年02期

【摘要】：股票发行制度直接影响股票市场。最优发行制度应该既有利于促进市场的繁荣,也能够有效抑制违法行为的产生。我国创业板股票市场现行的保荐代表人制度,自设立初始就由于制度架构的不完善和缺乏针对性成为投资者和监管机构共同关注的焦点。对现行制度展开分析,通过建构一个纳入监管机构主要监管策略的不完美动态博弈模型,并模型化创业板下监管机构对保荐代表人的业务要求,在监管机构合理应用既有制度的条件下,设计最优监管策略来规范保荐代表人的行为,同时提出解决问题的可行方案。监管机构应加大对问题上市公司的处罚力度,至少要与其高额的承销收益相匹配,或采取放慢审批速度的方式保证上市公司的质量。同时,政府相关部门不应忽视对监管机构的激励,多元化的激励措施将会在现行制度下提高监管机构的工作效率和监管水平。
[Abstract]:The stock issue system directly affects the stock market. The optimal issuing system should not only promote the prosperity of the market, but also effectively suppress the occurrence of illegal activities. Since the establishment of the current sponsor representative system in the gem stock market, investors and regulators have been concerned about it because of the imperfection and lack of pertinence of the system structure. Based on the analysis of the current system, this paper constructs an imperfect dynamic game model which is incorporated into the main regulatory strategies of the regulatory body, and models the business requirements of the sponsor representative under the gem. Under the condition of the reasonable application of the existing system, the optimal supervision strategy is designed to standardize the behavior of the sponsor representative, and the feasible scheme to solve the problem is put forward at the same time. Regulators should increase penalties on troubled listed companies, at least match their high underwriting earnings, or adopt a slower approval process to ensure the quality of listed companies. At the same time, the relevant government departments should not ignore the incentive to the regulatory body, the diversified incentive measures will improve the working efficiency and regulatory level of the regulatory body under the current system.
【作者单位】：山东大学经济研究院;
【分类号】：F832.51

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