金融监管制度与机会主义行为机理研究

发布时间：2018-05-18 20:33

本文选题：金融监管 + 机会主义　；参考：《当代经济科学》2012年03期

【摘要】：由于金融市场的信息不对称和外部性难以根本消除,致使机会主义行为难以避免。金融监管制度的演变即是保障存款人利益、预防和化解金融风险维护金融系统稳定的过程,也是对金融机构和监管机构及相关代理人机会主义行为规避和治理的过程。本文以委托代理模型为起点,分析金融机构经营信息已知和未知两种状态下监管机构和金融机构各自的效用函数,通过引入监管制度和代理人风险偏好变量分析其对机会主义行为的影响。研究发现:信息状态转变会引起监管契约从强制型契约向合作关系型契约转变,机会主义表现形式也随之变化;不对称信息下绩效挂钩的监管收入激励模式会同时增加监管者和金融机构代理人的机会主义倾向;信息结构变化要求监管制度也应发生变化才能适应监管有效性要求。
[Abstract]:Because the information asymmetry and externality of financial market are difficult to eliminate, opportunistic behavior is difficult to avoid. The evolution of financial supervision system is not only the process of protecting depositors' interests, preventing and defusing financial risks and maintaining the stability of financial system, but also the process of evading and managing opportunistic behaviors of financial institutions, regulators and related agents. Taking the principal-agent model as the starting point, this paper analyzes the utility functions of the regulators and financial institutions under the two states of known and unknown operating information of financial institutions. The influence of regulatory system and agent risk preference variable on opportunistic behavior is analyzed. It is found that the change of information state will lead to the change of supervision contract from compulsory contract to cooperative contract, and the opportunism will also change. Under asymmetric information, the incentive model of performance linked regulatory income will increase the opportunistic tendency of regulators and agents of financial institutions at the same time; the change of information structure requires that the regulatory system should also be changed to adapt to the requirements of regulatory effectiveness.
【作者单位】：北京理工大学管理与经济学院;北京理工大学人文学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“管理权力视角下股权激励与经理人机会主义行为研究”(71172171) 北京理工大学博士论文基金支持
【分类号】：F832.1

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