民营银行准入退出机制研究

发布时间：2018-06-17 22:17

本文选题：民营银行 + 产业经济学　；参考：《西南财经大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：民营银行一直是金融学界讨论的热点问题,许多学者已经对其概念,进入路径与退出机制做了大量的研究。在我国的民营经济的快速发展过程中,中小企业融资难这一问题一直横亘其中。由于正规的融资途径受到阻塞,我国的地下金融发展非常迅速。但由于其长期处于我国监管体制之外,期间必然伴随着违法行为,需要政府对其予以疏导。我国在加入世界贸易组织以后,外资银行在我国已经取得了国民地位,我国自身的民营银行急需进入,与国有银行和外资银行一同发展。在上述背景下,我国民营银行的市场准入与退出机制的构建迫在眉睫。本文运用产业经济学中的产业组织理论,从民营银行市场准入与退出壁垒入手,通过定性与定量的方式,探究我国银行业在民营银行准入退出监管中的问题,通过对国际经验的借鉴,对我国的民营银行的准入退出机制做出构想,共分为七章进行研究。第一章为绪论部分,通过研究相关文献,认为民资进入银行业的动机必然是利润,但是由于银行业的特殊性,随意的进出并不利于整体银行业的发展。因此,需要有一定的壁垒使民资进出有一定的成本,进而在以下章节对民营银行的准入退出机制进行探讨。第二章是论文的理论与相关概念。首先对民营银行的定义,进入退出壁垒的概念做出界定范围。本文认为民营银行的定义应该强调股权成分,以及由产权带来的经营权,收益权等各种权利归属于民资。因此,民营银行是由非国有资本全额或控股,经营权和收益权等各项产权依法归属于资本所有者的商业银行。本文按照鲍莫尔的进入壁垒定义剔除了结构性进入壁垒中规模经济和产品差异化因素,以及绝对成本优势中的固定成本,并将制度性进入壁垒容纳进来。第三章运用结构法的SCP范式和非结构法的PR模型对我国银行业结构中的市场集中度和市场中竞争程度进行实证检验。利用卖方集中比率得出的结果发现,2002年到2012年这十一年间,我国的银行业市场从垄断竞争Ⅱ型发展到垄断竞争Ⅳ型。我国的银行业市场集中度有了明显的降低。而运用非结构法的PR模型对我国银行业市场竞争程度进行实证检验,得出的H统计值显示我国处于垄断竞争市场的区间。进而对国有以及股份制商业银行分别进行分析,发现我国银行业的竞争程度有了明显的增加,且国有银行竞争程度大于股份制银行。综合分析民营银行生存的市场环境,非结构法与结构法得出的结论相同。我国2002年至2012年这十一年来,随着市场集中度的降低,竞争程度有了大幅的提高,并随之提高了银行的绩效水平。国有银行的高竞争度并不等同于高效率,股份制商业银行的垄断竞争更多表现在地域性上。相比与行业本身的以固定资产为主要组成部分的结构性壁垒,我国的制度性壁垒更加大,也更具有操作的空间。第四章回顾了我国民营银行市场准入的制度变迁。从我国民营资本进入银行业的发展开始,到现在民营银行的试点工作,可以看出我国在不断放松民营银行的制度壁垒。但是我国还存在一系列的隐形制度壁垒。我国政府需要针对政府部门的设租行为做出相应的对策,以避免政治漏洞造成隐形制度壁垒。第五章通过案例分析方法来分析我国银行业退出的实践,其中国有大型商业银行不适用市场的退出方式。在对其他银行的兼并、关闭、解散和破产的实践中,暴露出我国银行业市场退出机制的一些问题,从中寻找我国银行业市场退出机制的不足。第六章为国外成功经验借鉴。着重分析美国、德国银行业市场准入机制,发现：首先,各国普遍、长期的存在市场准入壁垒,其壁垒强度和准入机制安排主要取决于一国银行业市场发展阶段,以及当时的经济发展情况。其次,银行业准入机制的调整应该是由金融需求推进,自下而上自然发展的结果,而不是监管部门从上到下的下达指令。适当的准入机制来自于银行与银行监管部门的自然博弈过程。最后,准入壁垒的降低伴随退出机制的强化,准入壁垒的升高伴随银行退出的减少。银行业准入壁垒降低,银行业市场逐步开放的阶段,就需要市场退出机制的不断强化。对于问题银行市场退出机制考察,发现这些国家,其一,拥有完善的法律体系,可以保证银行业市场退出时有法可依；其二,在法律框架下授权专门的组织机构实施银行业的监管；其三,多元化的手段与退出方式；其四,市场化的存款保险制度；存款保险制度对我国民营银行的意义主要在于：在一定的经济条件下,保护存款人利益,维护公众对银行的信心,同时强化对银行的监管。其五,正确的市场退出最终目标。市场经济发达的国家通过存款保险担保和一些优惠措施吸引经营较好的金融机构投标,对退出银行进行合并、重组,取缔经营不善的被合并银行的同时,增强了合并银行的经营实力,拓展了市场份额,进而达到提高银行业经营效率的总体目标。第七章对我国民营银行市场准入-退出机制进行构想。首先,在经济特别是民营经济特别发展的地区,在对金融有旺盛需求的地区,在现有金融机构无法满足需求的地区试点开设民营银行。在开始的阶段,可以考虑在财政方面给予一定的支持政策。这样可以充分的利用新设民营银行的示范效应,还能为以后的存量改革起到标杆的作用。其次在试点银行逐渐走上正轨的同时,开展部分城市商业银行的改制,允许民资大量入股,在地方政府的支持下完成对银行的股权改制。最后在市场退出机制逐渐成熟的情况下,可以考虑针对部分有拯救价值的问题银行实施市场化的退出,允许民营银行对其兼并。对于我国民营银行准入机制的框架设计,本文认为在准入时机的选择上取决于政府对宏观经济形式的把握和整体经济目标的实现。在市场准入的速度控制上应持审慎态度：一个层面是对民营银行的开放保持谨慎的开放次序；另一层面可以适当少数引入民营银行进行试点。在民营银行市场准入主体要求上,除了最低资本金规定之外,还要具备现在法人治理结构,控制单一股权比例,防范内部人控制风险和关联贷款风险。在民营银行市场退出机制设计上,需要建立健全相关法律,对退出的执行机构进行明确授权,完善最后贷款人制度,建设存款准备金制度,健全破产清算制度。此外,健全民营市场准入-退出相关配套措施,首先,完善监管法律体系；其次,建立风险预警体系；最后,推进利率市场化。
[Abstract]:Private banks have always been a hot issue in the financial circles. Many scholars have done a lot of research on their concept, entry path and exit mechanism. In the process of rapid development of private economy in China, the problem of financing difficult for small and medium-sized enterprises has been all the time. The development is very rapid, but because of its long-term supervision system in China, it is bound to be accompanied by illegal behavior, and it needs the government to guide it. After joining the world trade organization, foreign banks have gained national status in our country. Our own private banks are in urgent need of entry, together with state-owned banks and foreign banks. Under the above background, the construction of the market access and exit mechanism of private banks in China is imminent. This paper, using the industrial organization theory in industrial economics, starts with the market access and exit barriers of private banks, and explores the problems of China's banking industry in the exit and exit supervision of private banks through qualitative and quantitative methods. After drawing lessons from international experience, this paper makes a conception of the entry and exit mechanism of private banks in China, which is divided into seven chapters.
The first chapter is the introduction part. Through the study of relevant literature, it is believed that the motivation of the civil capital to enter the banking industry is necessarily profit, but due to the particularity of the banking industry, the random import and export is not conducive to the development of the whole banking industry. Therefore, there is a certain barrier to the cost of the private capital in and out of the private bank, and then the access to private banks in the following chapters The exit mechanism is discussed.
The second chapter is the theory and related concepts of the paper. First, the definition of private banks is defined and the concept of entry barriers is defined. This article holds that the definition of private banks should emphasize the ownership composition, the management right brought by the property rights, and the right to income belonging to the civil capital. Therefore, the private banks are from the full amount of non-state-owned capital. In accordance with Baumol's definition of entry barriers, this paper exclude the factors of scale economy and product differentiation in structural entry barriers, and the fixed cost in the absolute cost advantage according to Baumol's entry barrier definition, and accommodates the barriers to institutional entry.
The third chapter empirically tests the market concentration and the market competition in the banking structure of China by using the SCP paradigm of structural method and the PR model of unstructured law. The result of the seller concentration ratio shows that from 2002 to 2012, China's banking market has developed from the monopoly competition type II to the monopoly competition. China's banking market concentration has been obviously reduced, and the PR model of non structural law is used to test the competition degree of China's banking market, and the H statistics show that China is in the monopoly competition market. Then the state-owned and joint-stock commercial banks are analyzed, and the competition of China's banking industry is found. There is a significant increase in the degree of contention, and the competition degree of the state-owned banks is greater than that of the joint-stock banks. A comprehensive analysis of the market environment for the existence of private banks is the same. In the eleven years from 2002 to 2012 in China, with the decrease of the market concentration, the degree of competition has been greatly improved, and then the silver has been raised. The high competition degree of the state-owned banks is not equal to the high efficiency. The monopoly competition of the joint-stock commercial banks is more in the region. Compared with the structural barriers to the fixed assets of the industry itself, the institutional barriers of our country are greater and have more operating space.
The fourth chapter reviews the institutional change of the market access of private banks in our country. From the beginning of the private capital entering the banking industry and the pilot work of the private banks, we can see that our country is constantly relaxing the institutional barriers to the private banks. However, there is a series of hidden institutional barriers in our country. The corresponding measures should be taken to prevent the political loopholes from causing the invisible institutional barriers.
The fifth chapter analyzes the practice of the withdrawal of China's banking industry through the case analysis method, and the large commercial banks in China do not apply the exit mode of the market. In the practice of merger, closure, disbandage and bankruptcy of other banks, some problems of the withdrawal mechanism of our banking market are exposed and the exit mechanism of China's banking market is found. The inadequacy of the system.
The sixth chapter is for the successful experience of foreign countries. It focuses on the analysis of the market access mechanism of the banking industry in the United States and Germany. First, the market access barriers exist for a long time. The strength of the barriers and the arrangement of access mechanism mainly depend on the development stage of the silver industry in a country, and the economic development at that time. Secondly, the banking admittance machine The adjustment of the system should be the result of the development of the financial demand and the natural development from the bottom to the bottom, but not the instructions from the top to the bottom. The appropriate access mechanism comes from the natural game process between the bank and the bank supervision department. In the end, the reduction of the barriers to access is accompanied by the strengthening of the withdrawal system, and the increase of access barriers is accompanied by the bank retreat. The reduction of banking entry barriers and the gradual opening of banking market require the continuous strengthening of market withdrawal mechanism.
On the inspection of the withdrawal mechanism of the problem bank market, it is found that these countries, first, have a perfect legal system, can guarantee the law of the banking market withdrawing, and secondly, authorize special organizations to implement banking supervision under the legal framework; thirdly, the diversified means and ways of withdrawal; and fourth, the market based deposit insurance. The significance of the deposit insurance system for private banks in China is to protect the interests of the depositors, maintain the public confidence in the banks and strengthen the supervision of the banks under certain economic conditions. At the same time, it strengthens the management strength of the merged banks and expands the market share, thus achieving the overall goal of improving the operation efficiency of the banking industry.
In the seventh chapter, the market access and exit mechanism of private banks in China is conceived. First, in the region where the economy is particularly developing, the private banks can be opened in areas where the financial institutions are in high demand, and in the areas where the existing financial institutions are unable to meet the needs. To support the policy, we can make full use of the demonstration effect of the new private banks, and can play the role of benchmarking for the future stock reform. Secondly, when the pilot banks gradually get on the right track, the reform of commercial banks in some cities will be carried out to allow a large amount of private capital into stock, and the ownership reform of the banks is completed under the support of the local government. In the end, when the market exit mechanism is gradually mature, we can consider a market withdrawal for some banks with saving value and allow private banks to annex.
With regard to the framework design of the access mechanism of private banks in China, the choice of access time depends on the government's grasp of the macro economic form and the realization of the overall economic goal. The speed control of market access should be prudent. One level is to keep the open order of the open bank and the other level. In addition to the requirements of the private banks, in addition to the minimum capital provisions, the private banks should have the present corporate governance structure, control the single share proportion, prevent the insider control risk and the associated loan risk. All relevant laws, make clear authorization to the executing agency for exit, perfect the system of lender of last resort, build deposit reserve system, improve the system of bankruptcy liquidation. In addition, improve private market access - exit related measures, first, perfect the regulatory legal system; secondly, establish risk early warning system; finally, promote interest rate marketization.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.1

【参考文献】