关于在美国信用评级行业引入竞争机制的争论及启示

发布时间：2018-06-21 22:24

本文选题：信用评级 + NRSROs　；参考：《山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2012年06期

【摘要】：从2001年的"安然丑闻"到2007年的金融危机,美国信用评级行业高度集中的市场结构一直广受诟病。许多学者指出,竞争不足是导致信用评级结果缺乏准确性和可靠性的主要原因,监管者应在评级行业中引入竞争机制,从而打破行业垄断、提高行业效率。然而,也有部分学者对此持反对态度,认为"声誉机制"可以替代竞争机制,对评级机构的违规行为施加有效的约束,而增强竞争将是弊大于利。为了打破美国信用评级行业的自由竞争悖论,监管者应对新加入的评级机构进行扶持,进一步提高评级行为的透明度,并增强评级机构的法律责任。
[Abstract]:From the "Enron scandal" in 2001 to the financial crisis in 2007, the highly concentrated market structure of the U.S. credit rating industry has been widely criticized. Many scholars have pointed out that the lack of competition is the main reason for the lack of accuracy and reliability of credit rating results. Regulators should introduce competition mechanism into the rating industry so as to break the industry monopoly and improve industry efficiency. However, some scholars are opposed to this, saying that "reputation mechanism" can replace the competition mechanism, and impose effective restrictions on the irregularities of rating agencies, and enhancing competition will do more harm than good. In order to break the paradox of free competition in the U.S. credit rating industry, regulators should support new rating agencies, further improve the transparency of rating practices, and enhance the legal responsibility of rating agencies.
【作者单位】：山东大学经济研究院;山东财经大学金融学院;
【分类号】：F837.12

【共引文献】