上市公司创始人涉入情景下高管离任的实证研究

发布时间：2019-06-28 12:38

【摘要】：本文探讨了在创始人涉入企业经营管理决策情景下,市场效率导向的业绩考核机制与公司治理机制对高管离任行为的影响。本文认为,由于创始人有别于其他受聘管理者的特殊身份,这在一定程度上"扭曲"了业绩考核机制与公司治理机制的作用方向。基于1999～2007年期间创始人所负责经营的上市公司的数据,本文的经验研究得到了以下结论:第一,在创始人涉入企业经营管理决策情景下,以市场效率为导向的业绩考核机制仍旧在起作用,持续的业绩降低将导致高管离任;第二,在企业经营业绩出现持续下降的情况下,受聘高管人员相对于创始人要承担更多责任,他们更有可能被更换;第三,在创始人涉入情景下,大股东与独立董事的监督作用主要体现在约束受聘管理者而不是创始人。
[Abstract]:This paper discusses the influence of market efficiency-oriented performance appraisal mechanism and corporate governance mechanism on the outgoing behavior of executives under the situation that the founder is involved in the management decision-making of the enterprise. This paper holds that because the founder is different from the special status of other employed managers, this "distorts" the function direction of the performance appraisal mechanism and the corporate governance mechanism to a certain extent. Based on the data of listed companies operated by founders in 1999 / 2007, the empirical research in this paper draws the following conclusions: first, under the situation that founders are involved in enterprise management decision-making, the market efficiency-oriented performance evaluation mechanism is still playing a role, and the continuous reduction of performance will lead to the departure of executives; Second, in the case of continuous decline in business performance, employed executives are more likely to be replaced than founders, and third, in the context of founder involvement, the supervisory role of major shareholders and independent directors is mainly reflected in restricting the employed managers rather than the founders.
【作者单位】：上海财经大学国际工商管理学院;上海财经大学浙江学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“家族结构、组织行为与私营企业成长机制研究”(71172140),国家自然科学基金项目“家族权威与私营企业成长机制研究”(70872065) 上海财经大学研究生科研创新基金资助项目(CXJJ-2011-371)
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

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