奖励型众筹创新项目激励效用及利润博弈研究
本文关键词:奖励型众筹创新项目激励效用及利润博弈研究 出处:《中国科学技术大学》2017年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
更多相关文章: 创新 创新项目 众筹 激励效用 期望理论 利润博弈
【摘要】:在互联网推动经济发展的全球浪潮下,我国的经济形势已然面临创新发展驱动新格局。互联网金融行业的迅速发展为"大众创业、万众创新"提供了新思路。以众筹促融资已成为有效拓宽金融体系服务创新创业的新渠道。众筹模式因其具有低门槛、多样性、创新性和参与性等特点,通过整合社会分散财力资源,成为实现投筹资双方共同获利的一种有效的新型投融资模式。众筹模式主要包括奖励型众筹、股权型众筹、债权型众筹、公益型众筹等等。在实际运行过程中,由于众筹模式还处在新兴发展阶段,一半以上的众筹项目筹资都将面临失败的风险。如何提高众筹项目融资成功率已成为亟待解决的研究热点。目前比较成功的众筹平台有Kickstarter、众筹网、京东众筹等,而这些平台主要是在运行奖励型众筹项目。因此本文选取奖励型众筹,分别从前期和中期阶段对众筹筹资成功率的相关影响因素进行了两阶段模型研究。首先在第一阶段模型中,针对两大参与主体投资方和筹资方各自的特征,依据成本收益理论,建立激励效用模型,考虑项目质量和折扣系数两大因素的变化对众筹双方的期望效用的影响作用。研究结果表明:在三种不同的假设条件下,项目质量和折扣系数这两大因素通过影响众筹双方期望效用,对双方主体均有一定的激励效用存在,并提出存在双方效用最优化状态的合理猜想。随后在第二阶段模型中探讨了如何达到双方效用最优化状态,并通过分析众筹情境中不同信息条件下投资方和筹资方两方的利润博弈过程,基于产量、产品投放度、折扣系数和创新度四个解释变量,对双方利益及决策的影响进行探究,最终促使投资方和筹资方进行相应的策略选择。研究结果表明:在完全信息条件下和不完全信息条件下,投资方和筹资方最终都能达到均衡状态,并获取各自最大收益,同时提出创新合作是一种双赢策略。本文的研究成果丰富了众筹相关研究成果,从提高奖励型众筹项目成功率的视角,构建了激励效用模型,同时创新性地选取利润博弈方法,探究了投筹资双方创新合作的双赢策略选择,最终提出创新合作是一种双赢策略,为众筹市场中的投筹资方提供了新思路,对进一步深入研究众筹具有创新意义和参考价值。
[Abstract]:Under the global tide of promoting economic development by the Internet, the economic situation of our country has already faced a new pattern of innovation and development, and the rapid development of the Internet financial industry has become "mass entrepreneurship". Mass innovation "provides a new way of thinking. Promoting financing by means of crowdfunding has become a new channel to effectively broaden the financial system's service innovation and entrepreneurship. The crowdfunding model is characterized by its low threshold, diversity, innovation and participation." Through the integration of social decentralized financial resources, it becomes an effective new mode of investment and financing, which includes incentive crowdfunding, equity crowdfunding, creditor's rights crowdfunding. Public welfare crowdfunding and so on. In the actual operation process, because the mode of crowdfunding is still in a new stage of development. More than half of the crowdfunding projects will face the risk of failure. How to improve the success rate of crowdfunding projects has become a research hotspot to be solved. At present, the more successful crowdfunding platform is Kickstarter. . Crowdfunding network, JingDong crowdfunding, and so on, and these platforms are mainly in the operation of incentive crowdfunding projects. In the first stage of the model, aiming at the characteristics of the two main players, the investors and the financing parties, the paper studies the influencing factors of the success rate of crowdfunding in the early and middle stages. According to the cost-benefit theory, the incentive utility model is established. Considering the influence of the two major factors of project quality and discount coefficient on the expected utility of both parties, the results show that: under three different assumptions. By influencing the expected utility of both parties, the project quality and discount coefficient have a certain incentive utility to both parties. A reasonable conjecture about the existence of the optimal state of utility between two parties is put forward, and then in the second stage model, how to achieve the optimal state of utility of both parties is discussed. And through analyzing the profit game process of investors and fund-raising parties under different information conditions in crowdfunding situation, based on the output, product delivery, discount coefficient and innovation four explanatory variables. To explore the interests of both sides and the impact of decision-making, and finally to promote the investors and financing parties to carry out the corresponding strategy choice. The research results show that: under the condition of complete information and incomplete information conditions. Both the investor and the financier can achieve the equilibrium state and obtain their own maximum income. At the same time, the innovative cooperation is a win-win strategy. The research results of this paper enrich the research results of crowdfunding. From the perspective of improving the success rate of incentive crowdfunding projects, the incentive utility model is constructed, and the profit game method is innovatively selected to explore the win-win strategy choice of innovative cooperation between investment and financing parties. Finally, it is put forward that innovation cooperation is a win-win strategy, which provides a new way of thinking for investors in crowdfunding market, and has innovative significance and reference value for further research on crowdfunding.
【学位授予单位】:中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F724.6;F832.4
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