EPR模式下的废旧电子产品再制造销售激励研究

发布时间：2018-01-15 05:33

  本文关键词：EPR模式下的废旧电子产品再制造销售激励研究　出处：《华东师范大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

  更多相关文章： EPR模式 销售激励 废旧电子产品 回收再制造

【摘要】：在可持续发展号召下,资源供求矛盾使得发展循环经济迫在眉睫。随着消费者的消费观念日益改善,电子再制造产品的市场规模快速增长。制造商通过对电子再制造产品的销售激励,不仅能提高电子再制造产品销量以促进废旧电子产品回收再制造,更能为自身创造更多的利润。在电子电器行业,制造商责任延伸制度(Extended Producer Responsibility)已经是当今社会的发展热点,以美国和日本为代表的先进EPR管理实践证实可以极大地提升废旧电子产品的回收再利用效率。本文立足于EPR模式,也就是制造商回收再制造再销售模式,探究制造商如何对电子再制造产品进行销售激励以实现自身利润最大化。根据管理学、产业经济学、博弈论的相关知识,构建了无销售激励的基准模型和引入销售激励的四个扩展模型,得出了制造商在考虑销售渠道和薪酬模式的四种情形下对新品和电子再制造产品的最优销售激励,并分析了销售激励对制造商利润的影响。本文按照新品和再制造品的销售渠道模式是独立渠道模式或者统一渠道模式、制造商对销售人员的薪酬激励函数是线性薪酬模式或者折线型薪酬模式来区分这四种情形。通过模型求解和算例验证,本文得到主要结论:(1)制造商对新品的销售激励力度始终大于对再制造产品的销售激励力度。线性薪酬模式和折线型薪酬模式下的销售激励力度相等。(2)制造商的销售激励力度在独立销售渠道模式和统一销售渠道模式下是不相同的,在统一渠道下,制造商会对销售人员设计更高的佣金回报。(3)当制造商部分再制造时,折线型薪酬模式的销售量配额M与电子再制造产品的折旧程度相关。折旧程度越大(回收产品越新),M的取值就越大;折旧程度越小,M的取值就越小。制造商的销售量配额设置得不宜过大。(4)当制造商生产的电子产品是高成本的,新品和再制造产品放在独立渠道销售对制造商更有利;当生产的电子产品是低成本的,新品和再制造产品放在统一渠道销售对制造商更有利。(5)销售激励不是在任何时候都能提高制造商利润,当新品成本处于0cN≤1/2范围内,若制造商采用独立销售渠道模式,销售激励反而会削弱制造商利润。其余情形下,销售激励都能促进制造商利润获得提高。(6)销售激励不仅能提高新品产量,也能提高电子再制造产品的产量。综上所述,在EPR模式下,制造商对新品和电子再制造产品进行合理的销售激励会有效地提高利润。本文为制造商根据自身产品特点选择合理的渠道模式和薪酬模式提供了理论支持。
[Abstract]:Under the call of sustainable development, the contradiction between supply and demand of resources makes the development of circular economy imminent. The market scale of electronic remanufacturing products is growing rapidly. Manufacturers can not only increase the sales volume of electronic remanufacturing products but also promote the recycling and remanufacturing of used electronic products by encouraging the sales of electronic remanufacturing products. More can create more profits for themselves. In the electronics industry. The extended Producer responsibility system has become a hot spot in the society. The advanced EPR management practice represented by the United States and Japan proves that it can greatly improve the recycling efficiency of used electronic products. This paper is based on the EPR model. That is to say, the manufacturer remakes and resells the product, and explores how the manufacturer encourages the electronic remanufacturing product to maximize their profit. According to the relevant knowledge of management, industrial economics and game theory. The benchmark model of no sales incentive and the four extended models of introducing sales incentive are constructed. The optimal sales incentives for new products and electronic remanufactured products are obtained under the four situations of considering the sales channel and compensation model. It also analyzes the impact of sales incentives on manufacturers' profits. According to the new and remanufactured sales channel model is the independent channel model or unified channel mode. The compensation incentive function of the manufacturer to the salesperson is a linear compensation model or a broken line compensation model to distinguish these four cases. The main conclusion of this paper is: 1) the manufacturer's incentive to new products is always greater than that to remanufactured products. The linear compensation model and the broken line compensation model have equal sales incentives. 2) the sales incentives of manufacturers are different under the independent sales channel model and the unified sales channel mode. Under the unified channel, the manufacturer designs a higher commission return for the salesperson. 3) when the manufacturer partially remanufactures. The sales quota M of the broken line salary model is related to the depreciation degree of the electronic remanufactured product. The greater the depreciation degree is, the greater the value of the new product is. The smaller the depreciation, the smaller the value of M. The manufacturer's sales quota should not be set too large) when the manufacturer produces electronics at a high cost. New and remanufactured products are sold through independent channels to the benefit of manufacturers; When manufactured electronics are low-cost, new and remanufactured products are sold in a single channel that is better for manufacturers.) sales incentives do not always increase manufacturers' profits. When the cost of the new product is in the range of 0CN 鈮，

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