O2O模式下考虑价格补贴的供应链优化协调研究

发布时间：2018-03-04 12:01

本文选题：O2O供应链　切入点：在线补贴　出处：《东华大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在电子商务的蓬勃发展的时代,消费者开始倾向于通过互联网购买商品和服务,O2O(online to offline)模式恰逢其时地迎合了市场的这种需求,因而作为新生力量在电子商务市场异军突起。在互联网思维的引导下,各方为了抢占网络渠道的市场份额,纷纷以在线补贴的方式来扩大在线市场规模和吸引消费者,竞相进行价格竞争。同时随着信息产业的飞速发展,信息的传播速度越来越快,不利于产品销售的负面消息会被放大传播,给供应链的平稳运行带来巨大的扰动。消费者需求的个性化使得产品和服务的生产周期越来越短,突发事件会供应链的产品需求造成巨大影响。本文综合运用了博弈论、运筹学、供应链管理理论、计量经济学等理论研究了在零售商占主导地位的O2O供应链模型框架下,供应链在无在线补贴、有在线补贴以及存在需求扰动时供应链的最优化决策与协调问题。具体研究包括三个方面的内容,如下:第一,没有在线补贴下零售商主导的O2O供应链策略研究。该内容主要研究了单一供应商和单一零售商组成的O2O供应链,供应商将商品出售给零售商,零售商通过电子渠道和零售渠道将商品销售给消费者,零售商在此供应链中占据主导地位。在没有考虑在线补贴的基础上,建立了O2O供应链在集中式和分散式两种决策模式下的基本收益模型,利用stackelberg博弈理论求解出当供应链收益最大时,供应链此时的参数最优解。其二,考虑在线补贴下的O2O供应链策略以及协调。该内容主要研究了单一供应商和单一零售商组成的供应链。考虑零售商为了争夺客户资源,对在线购买商品的用户进行价格补贴,通过求解该供应链,与基本收益模型进行对比分析,说明对在线购买客户提供一定金额的在线补贴能够使得供应链各方的收益增加,在线补贴机制优于无价格补贴机制,能够给企业带来更多利润。由于在分散决策下的零售商水平O2O供应链的“双边际”效应的影响,无法实现最优。本文通过设计收益共享契约零售商水平O2O供应链实现优化协调。其三,需求扰动下在线补贴下O2O供应链优化协调决策。该内容主要研究单一制造商和单一零售商组成的O2O供应链在发生需求扰动时的定价与生产决策问题。假定零售商的每种渠道的需求都是关于零售价格与补贴价格的线性函数,分析了需求扰动时对集中式和分散式O2O供应链的定价与决策的影响。通过求解优化问题,得到需求扰动在不同范围内取值时O2O供应链的最优定价与生产决策。
[Abstract]:In the booming era of e-commerce, consumers began to prefer to buy goods and services online via the Internet. Therefore, as a new force in the e-commerce market, under the guidance of the Internet thinking, in order to seize the market share of the network channel, all parties have used online subsidies to expand the scale of the online market and attract consumers. At the same time, with the rapid development of the information industry, the speed of information dissemination is getting faster and faster, and negative news that is not conducive to product sales will be amplified and disseminated. It brings great disturbance to the smooth operation of supply chain. The individuation of consumer demand makes the production cycle of products and services shorter and shorter, and the unexpected events will have a great impact on the product demand of supply chain. Operational research, supply chain management theory, econometrics and other theories study the supply chain without online subsidies under the framework of the O2O supply chain model, which is dominated by retailers. The problem of optimal decision making and coordination in supply chain with online subsidy and demand disturbance. The specific research includes three aspects as follows: first, The O2O supply chain strategy, which is dominated by retailers without online subsidies, is mainly studied in the O2O supply chain composed of a single supplier and a single retailer, where the supplier sells the goods to the retailer. Retailers sell goods to consumers through electronic and retail channels, and retailers dominate the supply chain. The basic income model of O2O supply chain under centralized and decentralized decision modes is established. The optimal solution of the supply chain parameters is obtained by using stackelberg game theory when the supply chain returns are maximum. Considering the O2O supply chain strategy and coordination under online subsidy. This content mainly studies the supply chain composed of single supplier and single retailer. By solving the supply chain and comparing it with the basic income model, it is shown that the online subsidy can increase the income of all parties in the supply chain, and the online subsidy mechanism is superior to the non-price subsidy mechanism. Because of the effect of "double marginal" effect of retailer level O2O supply chain under decentralized decision, Can not achieve optimal. This paper through the design of revenue-sharing contract retailer level of O2O supply chain optimization coordination. Third, The optimization and coordination decision of O2O supply chain under online subsidy under demand disturbance is studied in this paper. The pricing and production decision of the O2O supply chain composed of single manufacturer and single retailer is studied under the condition of demand disturbance. The demand for each channel is a linear function of the retail price and the subsidy price, The influence of demand disturbance on the pricing and decision of centralized and decentralized O2O supply chain is analyzed. By solving the optimization problem, the optimal pricing and production decision of O2O supply chain with different range of demand disturbance are obtained.
【学位授予单位】：东华大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274;F724.2

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