网络外部性下考虑用户行为的B2B平台投资决策建模与仿真研究

发布时间：2018-03-07 12:48

本文选题：B2B平台　切入点：投资决策　出处：《南京理工大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：B2B电子中介平台作为互联网中为企业提供平台服务的第三方企业,已成为电子商务中极具活力、发展迅速的市场主体。随着信息技术的快速发展,B2B电子中介行业的竞争也在不断加剧,通过IT投资来提高平台的技术水平和服务质量是平台企业吸引和维系用户的重要手段,而科学的投资决策方法在企业进行IT投资决策过程中发挥重要作用,对企业长期利润和竞争优势的保持具有重要意义。B2B电子中介平台具有典型的网络外部性特征,网络外部性下双边平台用户显示出丰富的行为特征,通过理论建模讨论网络外部性下考虑用户行为的B2B平台的IT投资决策具有一定的理论与实践意义。本文的研究对象B2B电子中介平台是在互联网中为交易双方提供交易相关服务的第三方平台企业,本文在研究网络外部性的基础上同时考虑平台用户的行为特征对于B2B平台投资决策的影响,首先通过文献调研的方法对与本文研究问题相关的理论和研究进行综述,在理论研究的基础上,结合B2B平台市场的网络外部性特征和平台用户的感知偏好异质性以及质量、价格敏感性等特征,并将转移成本视作内生的投资策略,运用实物期权和博弈论建模方法,分析不同市场结构下B2B电子中介平台的价格、用户规模和投资收益等情况,进一步探讨在转移成本和信息技术进步等因素综合影响下B2B电子中介的最优投资策略选择;在理论建模的基础上设计反映B2B电子中介市场竞争环境的计算机仿真系统,通过仿真计算实验,揭示网络外部性下B2B平台IT投资决策行为的变化机理并分析网络外部性对B2B平台投资决策的影响。理论建模和仿真实验结果显示,考虑网络外部性和IT成本下降影响因素的双寡头B2B平台IT投资策略只存在同时投资均衡和序列均衡两种结果,且两种投资均衡的出现由IT成本下降程度和网络外部性的共同影响。在双寡头平台同时投资博弈模型中,平台竞争的结果是质量降到最低,双方进行价格竞争平台竞争产生完全对称的均衡价格,最终平分市场分额。在序贯投资博弈中,后进入市场的平台有完全兼容和完全不兼容两种策略选择,先进入平台在预计后进入者的策略选择下会选择合适大小的转移成本来维持平台的先动优势。当后进入平台成功采取与先进入平台完全兼容的进入策略时,后进入平台能够凭借更高的平台质量吸引用户、占据更大的市场份额,在竞争中抢占优势地位。本文的研究结论有助于提高电子商务平台企业的管理者投资决策的科学性,可以为其提供决策借鉴,以期促进B2B电子中介的生存能力和市场竞争力的提升。
[Abstract]:B2B electronic intermediary platform, as a third party enterprise providing platform service for enterprises in the Internet, has become very dynamic in electronic commerce. With the rapid development of information technology, the competition of B2B electronic intermediary industry is also increasing. It is an important means for platform enterprises to attract and maintain users through IT investment to improve the technical level and service quality of the platform. The scientific investment decision method plays an important role in the process of IT investment decision, and has the typical network externality characteristic to the enterprise long-term profit and the competitive advantage maintenance. The B2B electronic intermediary platform has the typical network externality characteristic. Under the network externality, the users of bilateral platform show rich behavior characteristics. It is of certain theoretical and practical significance to discuss the IT investment decision of B2B platform considering user behavior under network externality through theoretical modeling. The research object of this paper is B2B electronic intermediary platform, which is provided to both parties in the Internet. Third-party platform enterprises trading related services, Based on the study of network externality, this paper considers the influence of the behavior characteristics of platform users on the investment decision of B2B platform. Firstly, the paper summarizes the theory and research related to the research of B2B platform by the method of literature research. On the basis of theoretical research, combined with the characteristics of network externality of B2B platform market, heterogeneity of perceived preference, quality and price sensitivity of platform users, transfer cost is regarded as an endogenous investment strategy. By using real option and game theory modeling method, this paper analyzes the price, user size and investment return of B2B electronic intermediary platform under different market structure. The optimal investment strategy selection of B2B electronic intermediary is discussed under the influence of transfer cost and information technology progress, and the computer simulation system reflecting the competitive environment of B2B electronic intermediary market is designed on the basis of theoretical modeling. Through the simulation calculation experiment, the change mechanism of IT investment decision-making behavior of B2B platform under network externality is revealed, and the influence of network externality on B2B platform investment decision is analyzed. Considering the influence factors of network externality and IT cost decrease, there are only two results of dual oligopoly B2B platform IT investment strategy: simultaneous investment equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. And the emergence of two kinds of investment equilibrium is influenced by the decrease of IT cost and the network externalities. In the model of duopoly platform, the result of platform competition is that the quality is the lowest. In the sequential investment game, the platform after entering the market has two strategic choices: completely compatible and completely incompatible. The first-entry platform will select the appropriate size of the transfer cost to maintain the first-mover advantage of the platform under the strategy choice of the expected later entrant. When the post-entry platform successfully adopts an entry strategy that is fully compatible with the first-entry platform, After entering the platform, it can attract users with higher platform quality, occupy a larger market share and occupy a dominant position in the competition. The conclusion of this paper is helpful to improve the scientific nature of the investment decision of the managers of e-commerce platform enterprises. It can be used for decision-making in order to promote the viability and market competitiveness of B2B electronic intermediary.
【学位授予单位】：南京理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F724.6

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