我国第三方支付平台市场势力测度及其规制研究
本文选题:第三方支付平台 + 双边市场 ; 参考:《浙江工商大学》2017年硕士论文
【摘要】:近年来,随着互联网技术、移动信息技术的发展,传统商业活动由线下向线上转化,这直接带动了第三方支付平台的发展。2015年中国第三方支付的总规模达到了 31.2万亿元(包含第三方移动支付、互联网支付、预付卡、线下收单等业务),同比增长33.91%。作为典型的双边市场行业,电商交易是第三方支付行业发展的基础与摇篮,第三方支付平台是电商安全交易的保障。然而行业在短短十年里呈指数型扩张的同时,必然会产生诸如非理性价格竞争、垄断、沉淀资金安全、客户信息安全、政府监管缺失等产业问题。尤其近年来,支付宝长期占据市场近百分之五十的市场份额,支付宝、财付通、银联三家企业总计占据市场接近百分之八十的市场份额,根据《中华人民共和国反垄断法》第十九条规定:“一个经营者在相关市场的市场份额达到二分之一或者三个经营者在相关市场的市场份额合计达到四分之三的,可以推定经营者具有市场支配地位”。因此第三方支付行业基本形成了较强的垄断竞争格局。面对这种垄断倾向,研究第三方支付行业的市场势力的来源,用多种方法测度市场势力值,分析市场势力的影响,研究当局规制措施,测度规制效率格外具有现实意义。本文首先阐述了第三方支付的发展背景、研究意义,并对国内外的相关文献做了整合。然后对第三方支付产业的运行机制、市场势力的来源与测度方法、产业规制的必要性三个方面展开理论研究。紧接着用实际数据测度第三方支付行业的市场势力,研究我国、美国、欧盟的监管现状,运用数据包络法测度政府市场规制的效率,分析监管存在的问题。最后提出规制的建议与意见。研究得出以下结论:1、第三方支付市场是一个双边垄断竞争市场,定价模式为倾斜式定价,存在交叉补贴与掠夺性竞争。2、文本经过CRn、HHI、EI三个集中度指标与一个勒纳指数的测算,发现第三方支付市场存在巨大的市场势力,且其市场势力来自于规模经济效应、进入壁垒、产品差异化、客户忠诚度这四个方面。3、既然第三方支付的市场势力会给社会带来诸如降低资源配置效率、非正常价格竞争、违规经营等负面影响,于是我国政府自2010年来就经营许可管理、经营退出管理、消费者权益管理、备付金管理、防洗钱管理、价格管理这六个方面对该产业进行规制。4、运用超效率的DEA模型所计算的规制效率结果表明:我国规制效率尚不稳定,阶段性的规制“试错”特征较为显著,监管仍然处于探索阶段,监管态度谨慎稳健。同时规制的过程中还是存在不少问题,问题集中于法律层级过低、分业监管归属不够明确、用户权益难以切实得到保障、过高的准入门槛具有两面性、对价格规制几乎为零。5、最后本文借鉴了美国与欧洲的规制经验,提出如下政策建议:我国应该提升第三方支付政策的法律位阶、加强准入退出管理、完善信用评级体系、加强信息披露、加强备付金管理、加大惩罚力度、规范定价行为。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the development of Internet technology and mobile information technology, traditional business activities are transformed from line to line, which directly drives the development of the third party payment platform in.2015 years. The total size of China's third party payment reached 31 trillion and 200 billion yuan (including third party mobile payment, Internet payment, prepaid card, offline receipt and so on). The growth of 33.91%. as a typical bilateral market industry, e-commerce transaction is the basis and cradle of the development of the third party payment industry. The third party payment platform is the guarantee of the e-commerce security transaction. However, the industry is expanding exponentially in just ten years, and will inevitably produce such as irrational price competition, monopoly, deposit security, customer information. The security problem, the lack of government supervision industry. Especially in recent years, Alipay has long occupied the market nearly fifty percent market share, Alipay, caifutong, UnionPay three enterprises occupy the market close to eighty percent of the total market share of nineteenth, according to the anti-monopoly law > < People's Republic of China stipulates: "one of the operators in the relevant The market share of the market reach 1/2 or the three operators in the related market share the total market share of 3/4, can presumed that the operator has the market dominance. Therefore, the third party payment industry has formed a strong monopoly competition pattern. Facing this tendency, the market of the third party payment industry is studied. The source of power, measure the market forces by a variety of methods, analyze the influence of the market forces, study the regulatory measures of the authorities and measure the regulation efficiency. This paper first expounds the development background of the third party payment, the significance of the research, and the integration of Xiang Guanwen's contribution at home and abroad, and then the operating machine of the third party payment industry. The source and measure of market forces and the necessity of the industrial regulation are studied in three aspects. Then the market power of the third party payment industry is measured by the actual data, and the supervision status of our country, the United States and the EU is studied. The efficiency of the government regulation and regulation is measured by the data envelopment method, and the problems in the supervision are analyzed. Finally, the problems of the supervision are analyzed. The following conclusions are made. The following conclusions are drawn: 1, the third party payment market is a bilateral monopoly competition market, the pricing model is inclined pricing, there is cross subsidy and predatory competition.2, the text passes through the calculation of three concentration indexes and a Lerner number by CRn, HHI, EI, and finds that there is a huge market in the third party payment market. Field power, and its market power comes from the scale economic effect, entry barriers, product differentiation, customer loyalty, these four aspects.3. Since the market forces paid by the third party will bring to the society such negative effects as reducing the efficiency of resource allocation, abnormal price competition, illegal operation, and so on, our government has been operating license since 2010. Management, operation exit management, consumer rights and interests management, pay gold management, anti money laundering management, price management in the six aspects of the regulation of the industry.4, the use of ultra efficient DEA model of regulation efficiency calculated results show: China's regulation efficiency is not stable, the stage of the regulation "trial and error" characteristics are more significant, supervision is still in the exploration of At the same time, there are many problems in the process of regulation, and there are still many problems in the process of regulation. The problem concentrates on the low level of law, the ownership of the division supervision is not clear enough, the user's rights and interests are hard to be guaranteed, the high entrance threshold has two sides, the price regulation is almost zero.5, and the last article draws lessons from the regulation of the United States and Europe. Experience, put forward the following policy suggestions: our country should improve the legal position of the third party payment policy, strengthen the admittance exit management, improve the credit rating system, strengthen the information disclosure, strengthen the management of payment, strengthen the punishment and standardize the pricing behavior.
【学位授予单位】:浙江工商大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F724.6;F832.2
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