网络零售平台垄断势力的经济学分析

发布时间：2018-05-07 10:16

本文选题：网络零售平台 + 电子商务　；参考：《北京交通大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：当前网络零售平台发展迅猛,阿里巴巴平台与京东平台所占市场份额之和达到80%以上。网络零售产业已经处于高度集中的格局。按照传统产业组织理论中的相关概念,这种高度集中的市场是需要规制的。然而当前全球范围内,没有对网络零售平台进行过任何形式的规制或反垄断调查。前人针对垄断势力的研究多偏向于竞争者之间垄断行为分析和市场势力测量,对于垄断势力的来源以及网络零售环境特点的关注较为缺乏。在此背景下,本文提出了核心研究问题:网络零售平台是否拥有垄断势力。本文首先从零售模式的历史演进出发,结合网络零售模式的特点,提炼出零售平台相对于其供应侧和消费侧的主要关系与决策变量。并以此为基础提出了零售平台垄断势力分析框架。框架指出,零售平台垄断势力的本质是基于时空整合能力和时空转化效率,对平台两侧或多侧施加影响的能力。文章基于博弈论的方法对分析框架进行了论证,分类讨论了处于不同市场结构的自营类零售平台的垄断势力。文章总结指出自营类零售平台通过对时空范围内稀缺购买力的控制,获得了垄断势力,在一定条件下造成了社会总福利的下降,产生强者愈强,弱者愈弱的马太效应。该条件取决于供应侧和零售平台所处的市场结构、消费侧的需求价格弹性以及通道费和软件服务费的收费水平。服务类平台方面,文章以阿里巴巴零售平台为例,分析了垄断势力的来源、行为及影响。研究发现阿里巴巴以强大的消费侧群体为筹码,利用买卖双方匹配中非常稀缺的屏幕资源和消费者注意力,采用拍卖形式收取营销服务费用。该行为通过完全价格歧视,剥夺了全部供货商剩余,但并未造成社会福利的无谓损失。文章最后利用MIMIC模型,以阿里巴巴零售平台为例,对本文提出的垄断势力分析框架进行了实证分析。结果显示垄断势力分析框架是有效的,且利用参数估计结果可以测算出垄断势力变化趋势。计算结果表明,阿里巴巴存在垄断势力,但从时间序列上来看并未大幅提升。全文重点探讨了网络零售平台垄断势力的来源、行为和测量方法,构建了垄断势力分析框架,给出了垄断势力导致社会福利变化的影响条件,提出了政策建议,为反垄断机构、其他政府部门及相关企业提供了重要参考。
[Abstract]:At present, the online retail platform is developing rapidly, Alibaba platform and JingDong platform account for more than 80% of the market share. Network retail industry has been in a highly concentrated pattern. According to the related concepts of traditional industrial organization theory, this highly centralized market needs to be regulated. However, there has not been any regulation or antitrust investigation on online retail platforms worldwide. Previous studies on monopoly power tend to focus on the analysis of monopoly behavior among competitors and the measurement of market power. However, there is a lack of attention to the source of monopoly power and the characteristics of network retail environment. Under this background, this paper puts forward the core research question: whether the network retailing platform has monopoly power. Starting from the historical evolution of the retail model and combining the characteristics of the online retail model, this paper abstracts the main relationship and decision variables of the retail platform relative to its supply-side and consumer-side. On this basis, the paper puts forward the analysis framework of monopoly power of retail platform. The framework points out that the essence of monopoly power of retail platform is the ability to exert influence on both sides or sides of the platform based on space-time integration ability and space-time conversion efficiency. Based on the game theory, this paper demonstrates the framework of the analysis, and discusses the monopoly power of self-owned retail platforms in different market structures. This paper concludes that the proprietary retail platform gains monopoly power by controlling the scarce purchasing power in time and space. Under certain conditions, it results in the decline of total social welfare and the Matthew effect that the stronger the stronger and the weaker the weak. This condition depends on the market structure of the supply side and the retail platform, the demand price elasticity on the consumer side and the level of the channel fee and software service charge. In the aspect of service platform, taking Alibaba retail platform as an example, this paper analyzes the origin, behavior and influence of monopoly power. It is found that Alibaba takes a strong consumer side group as a bargaining chip, takes advantage of the very scarce screen resources and consumers' attention in the matching of the buyers and sellers, and collects the marketing service fees by way of auction. Through total price discrimination, this behavior deprives all suppliers of surplus, but does not result in meaningless loss of social welfare. Finally, by using MIMIC model and taking Alibaba retail platform as an example, the paper makes an empirical analysis on the framework of monopoly power analysis proposed in this paper. The results show that the analytical framework of monopoly power is effective and the trend of monopoly power can be measured by using the parameter estimation results. The results show that Alibaba has monopoly power, but in time series, it has not been greatly improved. This paper mainly discusses the origin, behavior and measurement methods of monopoly power in network retail platform, constructs the analysis framework of monopoly power, gives the influence conditions of monopoly power to social welfare change, and puts forward policy recommendations, which is an antitrust agency. Other government departments and related enterprises provide important reference.
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F724.6

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