基于信息的转售价格维持与零售服务问题研究

发布时间：2018-06-07 19:53

本文选题：不完全信息 + 消费者搜寻　；参考：《江西财经大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：在反垄断司法实践中,转售价格维持(Resale Price Maintenance,RPM)的违法性越来越多得通过“合理推定”原则来判定,“合理推定”原则的判定依据就是转售价格维持会促进市场效率还是损害市场效率,即对整体社会福利大小会产生正的还是负的影响。转售价格维持的零售商服务理论就是“合理推定”原则的理论依据之一,即转售价格维持可以促进零售服务的提供、提高整体社会福利、提升市场效率。而消费者信息是完全的还是不完全的这一假设,是转售价格维持的零售商服务理论的重要假设之一,会影响消费者搜寻策略,进而影响最终的市场效率,左右司法判决结果。本文就是基于信息的视角,对转售价格维持和零售服务二者之间的关系进行了分析。基于前人关于转售价格维持的零售商服务理论和信息对市场行为影响的相关文献研究,本文设置了一个霍特林模型进行分析。分别假定了消费者信息完全和消费者信息不完全两种情况来分析转售价格维持。首先,不引入转售价格维持,分析两种信息情况对消费者搜寻策略的影响,消费者搜寻策略又会与零售商、生产商二者相互作用,这个相互作用的过程决定了均衡中零售商是否会提供服务以及是否会影响生产商、零售商、消费者的福利,这三者的福利变化之和就是整体社会福利变化;接着,引入转售价格维持,运用相同的模型分析方法,得出此时两种信息状况下整体社会福利会产生什么样的变化。最终,得出两个结论:消费者信息完全时,转售价格维持能解决零售服务搭便车问题,提高了社会福利、促进市场效率,但是其他的纵向合约就达不到这个效果;消费者信息不完全时,转售价格维持和其他纵向合约都能解决“搭便车”问题,促进零售服务的提供,提高社会福利、促进市场效率。这些结论为转售价格维持在反垄断司法程序中的“合理推定”原则提供了更为充分的经济学依据。
[Abstract]:In the practice of antitrust judicial practice, the illegality of resale Price MaintenanceRPMs is more and more determined by the principle of "reasonable presumption". The principle of "reasonable presumption" is based on whether the maintenance of resale price will promote market efficiency or damage market efficiency, that is, whether it will have a positive or negative impact on the overall social welfare. The retail service theory of resale price maintenance is one of the theoretical bases of the principle of "reasonable presumption", that is, resale price maintenance can promote the provision of retail service, improve the overall social welfare and promote market efficiency. The assumption that the consumer information is complete or incomplete is one of the important assumptions in the retail service theory of resale price maintenance, which will affect the consumer search strategy, and then affect the final market efficiency, and influence the judicial decision results. This paper analyzes the relationship between resale price maintenance and retail service from the perspective of information. Based on the previous literatures on the influence of resale price maintenance on retail service and the influence of information on market behavior, this paper sets up a Hotling model to analyze it. The resale price maintenance is analyzed under the assumption of complete consumer information and incomplete consumer information. First of all, we do not introduce resale price maintenance, and analyze the impact of the two kinds of information on the consumer search strategy. The consumer search strategy will interact with retailers and manufacturers. This process of interaction determines whether retailers in equilibrium provide services and whether they affect the welfare of producers, retailers, and consumers, and the sum of these three welfare changes is the change in overall social welfare; then, The resale price maintenance is introduced and the same model analysis method is used to get the change of the whole social welfare under the two kinds of information conditions. Finally, two conclusions are drawn: when consumer information is complete, resale price maintenance can solve the problem of free rider in retail service, improve social welfare and promote market efficiency, but other vertical contracts can not achieve this effect; When consumer information is incomplete, resale price maintenance and other vertical contracts can solve the problem of "hitchhiking", promote the provision of retail services, improve social welfare and promote market efficiency. These conclusions provide a more sufficient economic basis for the "reasonable presumption" principle of resale price maintenance in antitrust judicial proceedings.
【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F724.2

【参考文献】