研发外包成果转化中服务商道德风险防范与激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-06-14 12:03

本文选题：研发外包 + 技术成果转化　；参考：《重庆理工大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着市场竞争日益激烈,服务外包不再局限于交易型服务,而是不断拓宽业务范围和提高价值层次,逐渐向知识密集型服务外包转移,其中最典型的知识密集型服务外包为研发外包。研发外包能帮助企业快速获取知识,但同时其显著的知识性特点通常使得企业很难独自顺利地进行研发成果转化,需要服务商协助才能提高产品化概率。因此,较为全面的研发外包实质上分为两个阶段:第一阶段为知识创造过程;第二阶段为技术成果转化过程。然而,自利的服务商会利用信息优势在协助过程中“搭便车”,导致技术成果转化依然达不到客户预期的效果。鉴于此,如何解决技术成果转化中的服务商道德风险防范问题,仍然是客户实行研发外包战略需要考虑的问题。本文以研发外包中技术成果转化为主线,在收益共享激励基础上,引入监督机制和审计机制,研究在服务商道德风险下的研发外包激励机制。主要从两个维度展开研究工作:第一,对非创新性知识技术成果转化中服务商道德风险防范与激励问题进行分析,构建合作奖励模型和非合作监督机制,其中合作奖励模型即为传统的利益分配激励,通过设定最优奖励报酬吸引服务商努力工作;而非合作监督机制则是对服务商实行确定性监督或随机监督,确定最优监督概率以确保服务商没有“偷懒”机会。随后对二者进行对比分析,确定各自适用环境,并通过算例验证。第二,对创新性知识技术成果转化中服务商道德风险防范与激励问题进行分析,构建事中监督机制和事后审计机制,其中“事中”和“事后”以技术成果转化结果为分界,通过对服务商行为进行事中或事后监控“迫使”服务商努力工作,并利用算例验证两种机制适用条件。研究结果表明:第一,在非创新性知识技术成果转化中,客户支付报酬对服务商有一定激励作用,但由于项目本身有一定概率成功,所以监督机制的引入很有必要,尤其是随机监督机制,不仅能增加项目成功概率,更提升了客户整体收益;第二,在创新性知识技术成果转化中,即使服务商努力工作,项目也不一定成功,因此事中监督机制中的随机监督机制会为服务商提供“搭便车”机会,所以这种情况下,依据监控成本和项目成功概率,选择事中监督机制中的确定性监督机制或事后审计机制可以达到客户收益最大化目标。本论文的研究,不仅丰富了研发外包中服务商道德风险防范监控领域理论,更完善了技术成果转化中服务商道德风险防范措施,并且为企业提供了有效的激励机制选择方案,推进技术成果产品化,实现客户企业收益最大化。
[Abstract]:With the increasingly fierce competition in the market, service outsourcing is no longer limited to transactional services, but expands the scope of business and enhance the level of value, and gradually transfer to knowledge-intensive service outsourcing. The most typical knowledge-intensive service outsourcing is R & D outsourcing. R & D outsourcing can help enterprises to acquire knowledge quickly, but at the same time, its remarkable knowledge characteristics usually make it difficult for enterprises to transform their R & D achievements independently and smoothly, and need the help of service providers to improve the probability of production. Therefore, the more comprehensive R & D outsourcing is essentially divided into two stages: the first stage is the process of knowledge creation and the second stage is the process of technology achievement transformation. However, self-profit service providers will take advantage of the information advantages in the assistance process "hitchhiking", resulting in the transformation of technical results still not achieve the desired results of customers. In view of this, how to solve the problem of how to prevent the moral hazard of service providers in the transformation of technological achievements is still a problem to be considered by customers in carrying out the strategy of R & D outsourcing. This paper focuses on the transformation of technology achievements in R & D outsourcing, introduces supervision mechanism and audit mechanism on the basis of revenue-sharing incentive, and studies the incentive mechanism of R & D outsourcing under the moral hazard of service providers. Mainly from two dimensions to carry out the research work: first, the non-innovative knowledge and technology achievements in the transformation of moral hazard prevention and incentive problems of service providers are analyzed, the establishment of cooperative reward model and non-cooperative supervision mechanism, The cooperative reward model is the traditional incentive of benefit distribution, which attracts the service provider to work hard by setting the optimal reward, while the non-cooperative supervision mechanism is to supervise the service provider by deterministic supervision or random supervision. Determine the optimal supervision probability to ensure that service providers do not have the opportunity to be lazy. Then the comparison and analysis of the two, determine the respective applicable environment, and through an example to verify. Secondly, the paper analyzes the moral hazard prevention and incentive problems of service providers in the transformation of innovative knowledge and technology achievements, and constructs the supervision mechanism and the ex post audit mechanism, in which "in the event" and "afterwards" are divided by the result of the transformation of the technological achievements. By monitoring the behavior of the service provider in the event or afterwards, the service provider is forced to work hard, and the application conditions of the two mechanisms are verified by an example. The results show that: first, in the transformation of non-innovative knowledge and technology achievements, customer payment has a certain incentive to service providers, but because the project itself has a certain probability of success, it is necessary to introduce the supervision mechanism. In particular, the random supervision mechanism can not only increase the probability of success of the project, but also enhance the overall income of the customer. Second, in the transformation of innovative knowledge and technology achievements, even if the service provider works hard, the project will not necessarily succeed. Therefore, the random supervision mechanism in the incident will provide the service provider with a "hitchhike" opportunity, so in this case, based on the monitoring cost and the project success probability, Choosing the deterministic supervision mechanism or the ex post audit mechanism in the supervisory mechanism can achieve the goal of maximizing customer income. The research of this paper not only enriches the theory of service providers' moral hazard prevention and control in R & D outsourcing, but also improves the measures of service providers' moral hazard prevention in the transformation of technological achievements, and provides an effective incentive mechanism for enterprises to choose. Promote the production of technical achievements to maximize the revenue of customer enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：重庆理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：B82-053;F752.68

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