绿色创新下电子废弃物处理中制造商与处理商合作问题研究

发布时间：2018-08-28 11:05

【摘要】：作为“城市矿山”的电子废弃物中不仅具有多种可资源化再利用的材料,还含有对环境及人类健康造成威胁的有害物质。因此,电器电子产品制造商与处理商的绿色创新合作有助于促进资源循环利用,减少二次污染,实现电子废弃物源头治理。现有关于电子废弃物治理的研究集中于回收的模式选择与激励,基于回收价格的逆向供应链协调等方面,鲜有关注制造商与处理商通过合作以激励制造商电子产品绿色创新的研究。基于以上背景,本文运用博弈论与委托代理理论在以往学者研究的基础上,针对制造商电子产品绿色创新,处理商与其在电子废弃物回收处理中合作的激励问题进行研究,主要从以下几方面展开:(1)绿色创新下制造商与处理商合作激励契约设计。首先,处理商设计收益共享契约激励制造商提升产品绿色度,但是在最优的收益分享比例下,逆向供应链未达到系统最优。因而,在此基础上引入虚拟第三方,通过设计双向激励契约,同时激励双方提高电子产品绿色度和对电子废弃物拆解处理水平,消除企业个体与逆向供应链系统利益的冲突,实现系统整体收益最大化。(2)绿色创新下考虑双边道德风险的制造商与处理商合作契约设计。由于信息的非对称,双方合作中存在双边道德风险。为此,首先设计了单周期的正式契约,确定最优的支付合同,以提升双方各自的努力程度。由于双方的努力投入未达到系统最优水平,因而在正式契约的基础上,增加处理商“自我实施”约束条件弥补正式契约的不足,构建关系契约,激励制造商与处理商同时提高努力水平达到系统最优,促进双方达成长期合作。(3)绿色创新下考虑政府补贴的制造商与处理商激励契约设计。现阶段我国电子废弃物回收处理体系尚未成熟,制造商与处理商的合作需要政府的扶持和引导,因此研究了制造商与处理商在不同博弈关系下政府激励契约的设计,分析了政府与企业的最优策略,为政府制定对企业的补贴政策提供理论参考。
[Abstract]:As a "city mine", the electronic waste not only has a variety of materials that can be reused, but also contains harmful substances that pose a threat to the environment and human health. Therefore, the green innovation cooperation between manufacturers and processors of electrical and electronic products is helpful to promote the recycling of resources, reduce secondary pollution and realize the source treatment of electronic wastes. The current research on e-waste management focuses on the selection and incentive of recycling mode, reverse supply chain coordination based on recovery price, etc. Little attention has been paid to research on collaboration between manufacturers and processors to stimulate green innovation in manufacturers' electronic products. Based on the above background, this paper uses game theory and principal-agent theory to study the incentive problem of cooperation between manufacturers and electronic waste recycling, based on previous scholars' research, aiming at green innovation of electronic products of manufacturers. The main contents are as follows: (1) Design of incentive contract between manufacturer and processor under green innovation. Firstly, the manufacturer designs the revenue-sharing contract to encourage the manufacturer to improve the green degree of the product, but under the optimal revenue-sharing ratio, the reverse supply chain does not reach the optimal system. On the basis of this, virtual third party is introduced, and by designing two-way incentive contract, both sides are encouraged to improve the green degree of electronic product and the level of dismantling and disposing of electronic waste, so as to eliminate the conflict between enterprise individual and the interests of reverse supply chain system. To maximize the overall income of the system. (2) under the green innovation considering the bilateral moral hazard of the manufacturer and deal with the contract design. Due to asymmetric information, there is a bilateral moral hazard in bilateral cooperation. For this purpose, a single cycle formal contract is first designed to determine the optimal payment contract to enhance the efforts of both parties. Because the efforts of both sides have not reached the optimal level of the system, on the basis of the formal contract, we increase the constraint conditions of "self-implementation" of the processor to make up for the deficiency of the formal contract, and construct the relationship contract. Incentive manufacturers and processors simultaneously improve the level of effort to reach the optimal system, promote long-term cooperation between the two sides. (3) under green innovation, manufacturers and processors considering government subsidies incentive contract design. At present, the system of electronic waste recovery and treatment in China is not mature, and the cooperation between manufacturers and processors needs the support and guidance of the government. Therefore, the design of government incentive contracts between manufacturers and processors under different game relations is studied. The optimal strategy of government and enterprise is analyzed to provide theoretical reference for government to formulate subsidy policy to enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：河南师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274;F426.6;F713.2

【参考文献】