处方药市场技术转让问题研究
发布时间：2019-01-12 17:37
【摘要】：现如今,艾滋病毒和结核病等传染性疾病已成为严重影响人类健康的公共问题。尤其发展中国家和欠发达国家受到疾病困扰尤为严重。但是,药物专利却影响着药物的可获得性,使得药品的价格在发展中国家和欠发达国家反而比在发达国家更高。强制许可的应用虽然一定程度上缓解了上述问题,但是同时也会引发一系列社会问题,如发达国家专利药制造商市场竞争削弱,其利润降低,竟而影响其创新研究的动力,相应吸引投资能力降低、最终导致制药工业水平滞后等。虽然专利药制造商可以获取一定的补偿,但是国际也没有统一的合适的标准可以参考。因此药品研发与保证以可承受价格获得药品之间的冲突没能很好地得到解决。为了解决这个冲突,本文对于发达国家专利药和发展中国家制造商之间的自愿转让做了相关研究。在处方药市场下,本文构建了一个双寡头模型。我们考虑两种创新方式(质量提高型和成本降低型)和三种不同的技术转让合同机制(即固定费用合同,特许权合同和两部收费合同),分析比较没有发生转让的市场和不同转让合同下的市场中发达国家专利药生产商家以及本土生产普通药生产企业的利润,分析每一种创新方式下的每一种转让合同实施要满足的条件,以及发达国家专利药生产商家的最优决策和最优利润。同时对进口国的病人剩余和社会福利的相关情况进分析,并对强制许可的补偿标准提供一个合理的参考。通过本文研究发现:产品差异化和医生代理行为对发达国家企业的技术转让决策有很大的影响。(1)在质量提高型以及成本降低的非重大创新情况下,当技术创新相对不高时,发达国家制造商可以采用任何合同机制来发生技术转让。(2)在使用不同的技术转让合同时,我们发现只要发生固定费用,特许权使用费和两部收费合同,就可以增加患者剩余,但专利权合同和两部收费合同可能会减少进口国的社会福利。(3)若创新类型为质量提高型,在一定条件下,两部收费合同同将等于固定费用或特许权使用费合同。若创新类型为成本降低型,在一定条件下,两部收费合同同将等于固定费用。(4)在成本降低的重大创新情况下,与以往文献结论很不一样,传统文献认为由于重大创新造成垄断而不愿意再发生技术转让,现在发现由于医生代理行为的差异,使得发达国家制造商在一定条件下也愿意进行技术授权。本文研究结论对发达国家制造商的最优转让策略的选择,和发展中国家合理引进先进技术,以及相关政策的制定和完善都具有很重要的管理启示意义和政策含义。
[Abstract]:Nowadays, infectious diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis have become a serious public problem affecting human health. In particular, developing countries and less developed countries suffer from the disease is particularly serious. However, drug patents affect the availability of drugs, making drug prices higher in developing and less developed countries than in developed countries. Although the application of compulsory licensing alleviates the above problems to some extent, it will also lead to a series of social problems, such as the weakening of market competition and the decline of profits of patent drug manufacturers in developed countries, thus affecting the impetus for innovation and research. Accordingly, the ability to attract investment is reduced, resulting in the level of pharmaceutical industry lagging behind and so on. Although patented drug manufacturers can get some compensation, there is no uniform international standard to refer to. Therefore, the conflict between drug development and guaranteed access to drugs at affordable prices has not been well resolved. In order to resolve this conflict, this paper studies the voluntary transfer of patent drugs between developed countries and manufacturers in developing countries. In the prescription drug market, this paper constructs a duopoly model. We consider two innovative approaches (quality improvement and cost reduction) and three different mechanisms for technology transfer contracts (i.e. fixed cost contracts, concession contracts and two fee contracts), Analyzing and comparing the profits of the developed countries' patent drug producers and local producers of common medicines in the markets where there is no transfer and markets under different transfer contracts. This paper analyzes the conditions to be satisfied in the implementation of each transfer contract under each innovative mode, and the optimal decision and profit of the patent pharmaceutical manufacturers in developed countries. At the same time, the author analyzes the patient surplus and social welfare in importing country, and provides a reasonable reference to the compensation standard of compulsory license. In this paper, we find that product differentiation and doctor-agent behavior have great influence on the technology transfer decision of developed country enterprises. (1) in the case of non-significant innovation of quality improvement and cost reduction, When technological innovation is relatively low, manufacturers in developed countries can use any contractual mechanism to transfer technology. (2) when using different technology transfer contracts, we find that as long as there is a fixed cost, Royalties and two fee contracts can increase patient surplus, but patent contracts and two fee contracts may reduce social welfare in importing countries. (3) if the innovation type is quality-enhancing, under certain conditions, Both fee contracts will be equal to fixed fees or royalties contracts. If the innovation type is cost reduction, under certain conditions, the two fee contracts will be equal to the fixed cost. (4) in the case of significant innovation with lower cost, it is very different from the previous literature conclusion. Traditional literature holds that technology transfer is unwilling to occur because of monopoly caused by major innovation. Now it is found that due to the difference of doctors' agency behavior, manufacturers in developed countries are willing to license technology under certain conditions. The conclusion of this paper is of great significance to the choice of optimal transfer strategy for manufacturers in developed countries, the reasonable introduction of advanced technology to developing countries, and the formulation and improvement of relevant policies.
【学位授予单位】：中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F416.72;F713.584
本文编号：2408029
[Abstract]:Nowadays, infectious diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis have become a serious public problem affecting human health. In particular, developing countries and less developed countries suffer from the disease is particularly serious. However, drug patents affect the availability of drugs, making drug prices higher in developing and less developed countries than in developed countries. Although the application of compulsory licensing alleviates the above problems to some extent, it will also lead to a series of social problems, such as the weakening of market competition and the decline of profits of patent drug manufacturers in developed countries, thus affecting the impetus for innovation and research. Accordingly, the ability to attract investment is reduced, resulting in the level of pharmaceutical industry lagging behind and so on. Although patented drug manufacturers can get some compensation, there is no uniform international standard to refer to. Therefore, the conflict between drug development and guaranteed access to drugs at affordable prices has not been well resolved. In order to resolve this conflict, this paper studies the voluntary transfer of patent drugs between developed countries and manufacturers in developing countries. In the prescription drug market, this paper constructs a duopoly model. We consider two innovative approaches (quality improvement and cost reduction) and three different mechanisms for technology transfer contracts (i.e. fixed cost contracts, concession contracts and two fee contracts), Analyzing and comparing the profits of the developed countries' patent drug producers and local producers of common medicines in the markets where there is no transfer and markets under different transfer contracts. This paper analyzes the conditions to be satisfied in the implementation of each transfer contract under each innovative mode, and the optimal decision and profit of the patent pharmaceutical manufacturers in developed countries. At the same time, the author analyzes the patient surplus and social welfare in importing country, and provides a reasonable reference to the compensation standard of compulsory license. In this paper, we find that product differentiation and doctor-agent behavior have great influence on the technology transfer decision of developed country enterprises. (1) in the case of non-significant innovation of quality improvement and cost reduction, When technological innovation is relatively low, manufacturers in developed countries can use any contractual mechanism to transfer technology. (2) when using different technology transfer contracts, we find that as long as there is a fixed cost, Royalties and two fee contracts can increase patient surplus, but patent contracts and two fee contracts may reduce social welfare in importing countries. (3) if the innovation type is quality-enhancing, under certain conditions, Both fee contracts will be equal to fixed fees or royalties contracts. If the innovation type is cost reduction, under certain conditions, the two fee contracts will be equal to the fixed cost. (4) in the case of significant innovation with lower cost, it is very different from the previous literature conclusion. Traditional literature holds that technology transfer is unwilling to occur because of monopoly caused by major innovation. Now it is found that due to the difference of doctors' agency behavior, manufacturers in developed countries are willing to license technology under certain conditions. The conclusion of this paper is of great significance to the choice of optimal transfer strategy for manufacturers in developed countries, the reasonable introduction of advanced technology to developing countries, and the formulation and improvement of relevant policies.
【学位授予单位】：中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F416.72;F713.584
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