公司治理特征与应计盈余管理关系的实证研究

发布时间：2024-07-03 02:04

　　根据委托代理理论,所有权和控制权分离会导致经营者为追求自身利益的最大化而牺牲所有者权益,从而呈现机会主义的行为倾向(詹森,梅克林,1976)。而这种机会主义行为给管理者提供了操纵公司财政信息的机会,由此谋取个人利益。为了保护利益相关者的权益,建立能够有效控制财务信息不对称问题的公司治理机制显得至关重要。因此,国际上兴起了建立与实施有效的公司治理机制的热潮,以遏制管理者的机会主义行为,进而完善财务报告披露。本文以与英美国家制度、法律方面显著不同的中国为研究对象,检验深沪两市上市公司的公司治理特征对盈余管理的抑制效果。通过广泛的考察中国公司治理体系的制度、法律及法规,有助于了解中国公司治理的发展进程以及未来改革的主要目标。中国有大量的文献对公司治理在限制盈余管理方面体现的监控作用进行了研究,研究结论证实了中国确实存在严重的盈余管理(例如,阿哈龙尼等,2000；陈和袁,2004)。中国上市公司进行盈余管理的主要目的是为了发行新股份或避免被摘牌。本文用异常的营运资金应计项目作为盈余管理的代理变量,用修正的琼斯模型来计算操控性应计,以2002-2006年4年间1009家上市公司为样本进行实证研究...

【文章页数】：141 页

【学位级别】：博士

【文章目录】：
摘要
Abstract
Table of Contents
List of Tables
List of Figures
1 Introduction
    1.1 Motivation and Objectives of the study
    1.2 Findings of the Study
    1.3 Practical importance of the study
    1.4 Uniqueness of the study
    1.5 Structure of the dissertation
2 Review of Literature
    2.1 Earnings Management
    2.2 Corporate Governance
    2.3 Corporate Governance in China
        2.3.1 Introduction
        2.3.2 Agency problems in China
        2.3.3 Development Phases
        2.3.4 External Control Environment
        2.3.5 Internal Control Structure
    2.4 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management
        2.4.1 Board Composition
        2.4.2 CEO Duality
        2.4.3 Board Size
        2.4.4 Number of Board Meetings
        2.4.5 Managerial Share Ownership
        2.4.6 Gender-Based Difference
        2.4.7 Audit Committee
        2.4.8 Concentrated Ownership
3 Data, Variables and Research Methodology
    3.1 Data Description
    3.2 Research Questions
    3.3 Research Hypotheses
    3.4 Research Variable Conceptual and Operational Definitions
    3.5 Validity and Reliability
    3.6 Data Analysis Methodology
    3.7 Assumptions
    3.8 Limitations
4 Empirical Results
    4.1 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in All Chinese Listed Firms (Shanghai & Shenzhen stock exchange)
    4.2 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Shanghai Stock Exchange Listed Firms in China
    4.3 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Shenzhen Stock Exchange Listed Firms in China
    4.4 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in State Owned Enterprises in China
    4.5 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Private Enterprises in China
5 Discussion on Empirical Results
    5.1 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in All Chinese Listed Firms (Shanghai & Shenzhen stock exchange)
    5.2 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Shanghai Stock Exchange Listed Firms in China
    5.3 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Shenzhen Stock Exchange Listed Firms in China
    5.4 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in State Owned Enterprises in China
    5.5 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Private Enterprises in China
6 Summary and Conclusions
Acknowledgement
References
Publications



本文编号：4000357