信用再担保体系中主体的收益与风险分担研究
本文关键词:信用再担保体系中主体的收益与风险分担研究 出处:《江苏大学》2017年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
更多相关文章: 信用再担保 经济主体 收益 风险分担 演化博弈
【摘要】:中小企业在中国经济的发展中发挥了非常重要的作用,然而在现实中却面临融资难融资贵的困境。为了缓解该现状,信用担保、信用再担保相继开始出现。然而随着信用再担保在我国的发展,出现了许多问题,其中比较突出的问题之一便是再担保体系中主体的收益与风险分担存在不均等的现象。本文正是在此背景下展开的,希望通过对信用再担保体系中主体的收益与风险分担的研究,提出相应的对策建议,从而在一定程度上促进再担保体系更好的发展。本文主要研究内容如下:首先阐述了信用再担保相关的理论基础以及相关概念的界定。然后,分析了我国信用再担保体系中主体收益与风险分担的现状。接着,在对再担保体系中主体收益影响因素研究的基础上,构建了再担保体系中主体的收益模型。通过收益模型的分析得出了影响经济主体收益的关键因素,然后通过控制变量法,分别研究了随着关键影响因素的变化,经济主体收益变化的情况。然后,在经济主体收益模型分析的基础上,构建了“担保机构—再担保机构—协作银行”三方之间的演化博弈模型。在分析三者在不同策略组合下各自成本和收益的基础上,研究了三者的博弈关系,对演化博弈模型进行求解确立各方行为策略选择趋于稳定状态的条件。最后,根据前文的研究提出改善信用再担保体系中主体收益和风险分担的对策和建议。本文主要得到以下结论:(1)再担保体系中主体的收益与风险不对等,其中信用放大倍数、信用担保资金、银行存款利率、代偿率、反担保物变现后占代偿金额的比例、风险分担比例是影响协作银行、担保机构和再担保机构收益与风险的关键因素。(2)在其他条件不变的前提下,随着风险分担比例的变化,信用再担保经济主体——协作银行、担保机构和再担保机构会作出不同的策略选择。而每一个主体在作出自己策略选择的时候,所能够承担的风险比例都有一个临界点。此外,通过改变部分参数,可以促使担保机构、再担保机构和协作银行的策略选择的改变。(3)有效地降低年平均代偿率、提高反担保物变现后占代偿金额的比例、实施合理的风险分担机制、适当地提高信用放大倍数和银行存款利率,能够在一定程度上改善再担保体系中主体的收益与风险分担。
[Abstract]:Small and medium-sized enterprises play a very important role in the development of Chinese economy, but in reality it is facing financing difficulties financing difficulties. In order to alleviate this situation, credit guarantee, credit guarantee have appeared. However, with the development of credit guarantee in our country, there are many problems, one of the more prominent the problem is there are inequalities in income and risk guarantee system the main share. This paper is launched under this background, I hope that through research the income and risk of credit re guarantee system in the main share, put forward the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions, so as to promote the development of re guarantee system better to a certain extent in this paper. The main contents are as follows: firstly, the definition of credit re guarantee the relevant theoretical basis and related concepts. Then, analysis of China's credit guarantee system in the main revenue The status quo and risk sharing. Then, on the basis of the main factors to guarantee the system of the income effect, construct income model and guarantee system of the subject. Through the analysis of income model that the key factors affecting the economic subject of income, and then through the control variable method, were studied with the key factors affecting the change the change of income, economic subject. Then, based on the analysis of economic main body income model, build a "guarantee institutions guarantee - evolutionary game model between the mechanism of cooperative bank" three party. In the analysis of the three different strategies based on their costs and benefits, studies the game relationship between the three the evolution of the game model to establish each behavior strategy choice to the steady state conditions. Finally, the author put forward to improve the credit guarantee system of subject Return and risk sharing countermeasures and suggestions. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) to the main income and risk guarantee system is not equal, the credit amplification, credit guarantee funds, bank deposit rates, compensation rate, cash collateral after accounting for the proportion of the amount of compensation, risk sharing ratio is affecting the bank the key factors, guarantee institution and re guarantee institutions to return and risk. (2) when the other conditions remain unchanged, with the change of risk sharing proportion, credit guarantee economic entity cooperative banks, guarantee agencies and guarantee agencies will make a different selection strategy. Each subject when making their own strategies choose, can bear the risk ratio has a critical point. In addition, by changing some parameters, to guarantee institutions, re guarantee institution and bank strategy choice (3) have changed. Effectively reduce the average annual compensation rate, improve the liquidity of collateral after accounting for the proportion of the amount of compensation, the implementation of reasonable risk sharing mechanism, increasing credit magnification and bank deposit rates, to a certain extent, improve the income and risk of re guarantee system in the main share.
【学位授予单位】:江苏大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F832.39
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 汪辉;邓晓梅;杨伟华;冯珂;;中小企业信用再担保体系演化稳定条件分析[J];中国管理科学;2016年07期
2 韩骏;;安徽政银担“4321”分险模式研究[J];中小企业管理与科技(下旬刊);2016年03期
3 吴建成;黄建;;再担保体系建设对中小微企业金融服务的影响问题研究[J];江苏社会科学;2014年05期
4 梅强;许红珍;;再担保体系内银保风险共担研究——基于系统动力学[J];技术经济与管理研究;2014年02期
5 于孝建;徐维军;;中小企业信用再担保各合作方的风险和收益分析[J];系统工程;2013年05期
6 薛钰显;王东超;;中小企业信用再担保机构的风险分担比例研究[J];内蒙古社会科学(汉文版);2013年03期
7 马国建;蔡静;陆钻;;中小企业信用再担保及其风险控制体系的构建[J];重庆社会科学;2012年09期
8 马国建;陆钻;段登;;基于计算实验的再担保业收益及风险研究[J];金融理论与实践;2012年07期
9 薛菁;侯敬雯;;中小企业融资信用担保体系参与主体利益冲突与均衡分析[J];商业研究;2012年06期
10 沈丽萍;马义飞;郭本海;;基于演化博弈的区域高能效型产业市场准入机制研究[J];经济问题探索;2011年11期
相关博士学位论文 前1条
1 秦默;我国中小企业信用再担保体系研究[D];江苏大学;2008年
相关硕士学位论文 前4条
1 何柳琬;电子废弃物回收商经营策略的演化博弈研究[D];杭州电子科技大学;2015年
2 郭紫文;再担保体系经济主体的收益与风险分担研究[D];北京交通大学;2012年
3 陈实;基于拟生灭过程的多群体演化博弈[D];清华大学;2008年
4 黄楠;中小企业信用再担保机构构建研究[D];中南大学;2007年
,本文编号:1372143
本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/jingjilunwen/huobiyinxinglunwen/1372143.html