管理层激励与上市公司业绩的关系研究

发布时间：2018-01-13 01:37

本文关键词：管理层激励与上市公司业绩的关系研究　出处：《甘肃政法学院》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：现代公司的一个主要特征就是所有者与经营者的两权分离,这一特征使上市公司的代理成本增加。为了降低委托代理成本,公司的所有者不断学习和更新公司的内部治理方法--管理层激励机制,将管理层的自身利益与公司利益结合起来。管理层激励能否提高上市公司业绩一直是该领域研究的热点。我国学者对管理层激励理论领域的文献研究起步较晚,管理层激励机制现在还很不健全,尤其是在股权激励机制方面。最近几年,公司治理理念的不断更新以及资本市场的蓬勃发展,为完善我国管理层激励机制提供了良好的契机。关于管理层激励的研究也逐渐增多,我国学者对管理层激励理论有了更加深入的认识。本文是立足于前人研究的基础对管理层激励与公司经营业绩之间的关系进行研究,期望为完善我国管理层激励机制理论献上微薄之力。本文在对管理层激励、上市公司业绩的影响因素和二者的关系进行文献梳理的基础上,根据文献的研究成果和理论基础,提出了四个研究假设。文章以我国上市公司2010-2014年的数据作为研究样本,分别从管理层货币薪酬激励、股权激励这两个方面研究其与上市公司业绩之间的关系。在选择上市公司的公司规模、股权结构以及财务杠杆为控制变量的基础上,通过构建多元回归模型对管理层货币薪酬激励与上市公司业绩之间的关系进行实证研究;运用PSM分析法来分析管理层股权激励与上市公司业绩之间的关系。通过实证研究发现,对管理层进行货币薪酬激励和股权激励都能提高公司的经营业绩。关于产权性质的研究,国有控股公司的管理层货币薪酬激励的效果好于民营;而民营控股公司的管理层股权激励的效果好于国有。对不同股权激励方式进行对比,发现限制性股票激励的效果要好于股票期权激励。考虑股权集中度的影响,发现股权集中度越高,股权激励效果越差。文章的实证结果在一定程度上可以为上市公司选择合适的管理层激励机制提供借鉴,使上市公司将管理层的自身利益与公司的长期利益结合起来,以提高公司的经营业绩。
[Abstract]:One of the main characteristics of modern companies is the separation of owners and managers, which makes the agency cost of listed companies increase, in order to reduce the cost of principal-agent. The owner of the company is constantly learning and updating the internal governance method of the company-management incentive mechanism. Combining the self-interest of the management with the interests of the company. Whether the management incentive can improve the performance of listed companies has been a hot topic in this field. The management incentive mechanism is not perfect, especially in the equity incentive mechanism. In recent years, the concept of corporate governance has been updated and the capital market is booming. It provides a good opportunity for perfecting the incentive mechanism of management in our country, and the research on the incentive of management is also increasing gradually. Chinese scholars have a deeper understanding of the management incentive theory. This paper is based on the previous research on the relationship between management incentive and corporate performance. In order to improve the theory of management incentive mechanism, this paper reviews the literature on the management incentive, the factors affecting the performance of listed companies and the relationship between them. According to the research results and theoretical basis of the literature, this paper puts forward four research hypotheses. This paper takes the data of Chinese listed companies from 2010-2014 as the research sample, respectively from the management monetary compensation incentive. This paper studies the relationship between equity incentive and the performance of listed companies, on the basis of choosing the size, ownership structure and financial leverage of listed companies as control variables. An empirical study on the relationship between management monetary compensation incentive and the performance of listed companies is carried out by constructing a multiple regression model. PSM analysis method is used to analyze the relationship between management equity incentive and listed company performance. Monetary compensation incentive and equity incentive can improve the performance of the company. The research on the nature of property right shows that the effect of monetary compensation incentive of state-owned holding company is better than that of private company. The effect of management equity incentive of private holding company is better than that of state-owned. By comparing different equity incentive methods, we find that the effect of restricted stock incentive is better than stock option incentive. Consider the effect of equity concentration. It is found that the higher the degree of equity concentration, the worse the effect of equity incentive. The empirical results of this paper can provide a reference for the listed companies to choose the appropriate incentive mechanism of management to a certain extent. In order to improve the company's operating performance, the listed company combines the self-interest of the management with the long-term interest of the company.
【学位授予单位】：甘肃政法学院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92

【参考文献】