中央官员的地方偏爱效应：来自信贷资源分配的证据

发布时间：2018-10-14 18:04

【摘要】：本文利用“一行三会”金融监管机构高官出生地信息以及地级城市金融机构人民币贷款数据,验证了信贷资源分配的地方偏爱效应。金融高官在任期间,其出生地城市相比非出生地城市获得了更多的贷款,而其籍贯地以及第一工作地贷款并未增加。进一步分析发现,出生地偏爱行为并不存在空间扩散效应,金融高官出生地城市所在省份、同省其他城市以及相邻城市并未获得更多贷款。对不同类别贷款分析发现,出生地偏爱促进经济增长的特点明显,其主要增加了金融高官出生地城市的工业贷款,并未影响农业、商业贷款。本文从金融机构信贷分配角度进一步丰富了地方偏爱文献,并对我国中央政府干预金融资源分配提供了证据。
[Abstract]:In this paper, the local preference effect of credit resource allocation is verified by using the information of the birthplace of senior officials of the financial supervision agency and the RMB loan data of prefecture-level city financial institutions. While senior financial officials received more loans from their native cities than non-birthplace cities, their native and first workplace loans did not increase. Further analysis shows that there is no spatial diffusion effect in birthplace preference behavior, and financial officials' birthplace cities in provinces, other cities in the same province and neighboring cities have not received more loans. Through the analysis of different kinds of loans, it is found that birthplace's preference for promoting economic growth is obvious, which mainly increases the industrial loan of the city where the senior financial officials were born, and does not affect the agricultural and commercial loans. This paper further enriches the literature of local preference from the perspective of credit allocation of financial institutions and provides evidence for the intervention of the central government in the allocation of financial resources.
【学位授予单位】：暨南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.4

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