CVC资本对珠海中富的掏空行为研究

发布时间：2018-11-13 19:27

【摘要】：随着新兴资本市场的发展,我国已成为国际私募基金投资最多的地区之一。高盛收购双汇,新桥并购深发展、CVC资本控股珠海中富等私募基金并购案引起了社会的广泛关注。但我国私募股权并购投资还处于起步阶段,并未形成成熟的监管体系,缺乏强有力的行业协会引导,导致这种股权投资有可能演变成利益侵占行为。首先,当私募基金的风险控制意识不足且未达到预期投资收益时,身为大股东的私募基金完全有动机通过利益输送的方式减少损失。其次,我国资本市场法律监管环境的不完善也使私募基金有能力利用关联交易等掏空方式获取收益。虽然我国《公司法》在限制大股东行为方面设置了相关法律制度,但是掏空行为的隐蔽性与多样性使得相关部门的监管条例与惩治措施往往滞后于掏空行为的发生,难以对大股东的利益攫取形成有效限制。只有强化私募基金的风险控制意识、不断完善针对掏空行为的法律法规,才能减少利益侵占行为的发生。本文对CVC资本掏空珠海中富的行为进行案例研究。通过对掏空方式的分析,明晰了CVC资本进行利益攫取的手段;运用经济增加值分析法与财务指标分析法,全面评价掏空行为对企业绩效与公司价值的消极影响;通过对掏空行为的动因分析,发现CVC资本风险控制意识不足、上市公司股权结构存在缺陷、公司内外部治理机制不完善是导致CVC资本轻而易举掏空珠海中富的直接影响因素。通过本案例的研究,有助于政策制定部门引导私募股权投资行业协会制定规范的示范合同,强化私募基金的风险控制意识。同时有助于监管部门进一步完善相关法律法规来监督和制约大股东的利益侵占行为,保障我国资本市场的良性发展。
[Abstract]:With the development of emerging capital market, China has become one of the most investment regions of international private equity funds. The acquisition of Shuanghui by Goldman Sachs, the deep development of Xinqiao merger and the acquisition of private equity funds such as CVC Capital Holdings Zhuhai Zhongfu have attracted widespread attention in the society. However, the private equity M & A investment in China is still in its infancy, which has not formed a mature regulatory system and lacks the guidance of strong industry associations, which may lead to the development of this kind of equity investment into an encroachment of interests. Firstly, when the risk control consciousness of the private equity fund is insufficient and the investment return is not up to the expected, the private equity fund, as a major shareholder, is completely motivated to reduce the loss by the way of interest transmission. Secondly, the imperfect legal regulatory environment of China's capital market also enables private equity funds to gain income by tunneling related transactions. Although the Company Law of our country has set up the related legal system in restricting the behavior of the large shareholders, the concealment and diversity of the tunneling behavior make the supervision regulations and punishment measures of the relevant departments often lag behind the occurrence of the tunneling behavior. It is difficult to form effective restrictions on the interests of major shareholders. Only by strengthening the risk control consciousness of private equity funds and perfecting the laws and regulations for tunneling can the occurrence of interest encroachment be reduced. This paper makes a case study on the behavior of CVC capital tunneling in Zhuhai Zhongfu. Through the analysis of the way of tunneling, the paper clarifies the means of CVC capital's profit grabbing, evaluates the negative influence of tunneling behavior on enterprise performance and company value by using the method of economic added value analysis and financial index analysis. Based on the analysis of the causes of tunneling, it is found that the lack of awareness of CVC capital risk control, the defect of equity structure of listed companies, and the imperfect internal and external governance mechanism of the company are the direct factors that cause the CVC capital to empty easily in Zhuhai. Through the study of this case, it is helpful for the policy-making department to guide the private equity investment industry association to establish the standard model contract, and to strengthen the risk control consciousness of the private equity fund. At the same time, it is helpful for the regulatory authorities to further improve the relevant laws and regulations to supervise and restrict the interests of major shareholders, and to ensure the healthy development of the capital market in China.
【学位授予单位】：兰州理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.39

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