工程项目中引起合同价格调整的风险分担研究

发布时间：2018-04-20 15:36

本文选题：风险分担 + 不完全合同理论　；参考：《天津理工大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：合理的风险分担对项目管理绩效的促进作用已经在理论界与实务界得到共识。然而,工程实践中的风险分担仍存在着下列问题:(1)业主普遍认为在让承包商承担风险的过程中,给予其相匹配的经济收益就能保证其风险承担的积极性,却忽视了风险分担受风险承担者行为因素——风险偏好的影响;(2)大多数实际工作者都认为风险分担就是在缔约阶段将风险一次分担完备,而对由于工程项目合同不完全的原因而导致的项目执行过程中风险分担方案经常需要调整这一现象却较少考虑。上述问题的有效解决能够促使项目中更加科学、合理的风险分担的制定,对于减少我国建筑业由于发承包之间关于风险分担问题产生的纠纷具有重要意义。本文在文献研究的基础上,将7个引起合同价格调整的风险界定为研究对象,在风险分担方案的制定过程中,引入发承包双方的风险偏好,并制定了对于上述风险分担实施效率的保障制度,同时,对于事后各类原因引起的风险分担方案调整,确定了相对应的适合调整机制。本文主要研究内容包括以下三个方面:第一,在文献研究的基础上,确定了风险分担指标体系,运用模糊集理论与TOPSIS技术,开发了风险分担定量模型,运用模糊语义转化技术将业主方的风险偏好加入到风险分担方案进行过程中。同时,将本模型确定的各类风险的分担比例与业主合同类型选择建立了联系。通过具体案例展示了该模型的计算流程,证实了模型的有效性,并对项目参与方不同风险偏好水平下的风险分担方案进行了对比,为业主风险分担决策的制定提供建议。第二,提出发承包双方可以在合同谈判阶段加入具有激励性与约束性的条款保障风险分担方案实施的效率。通过对业主单位与承包商单位的共计17人进行访谈,收集了具有风险分担效率保障作用的激励性与约束性条款集。结果表明:(1)双方可以在合同谈判阶段加入经济激励类、基于承包商权利保障类的激励性条款正向保障风险分担的实施效率;(2)加入经济惩罚类、清晰界定合同内容类的约束性条款反向保障风险分担的实施效率。第三,通过对7个项目实施过程中发生风险分担调整的案例进行分析,识别了引起风险分担方案调整的常见原因,分析了风险分担的调整方式,建立了风险分担调整的引起原因与调整方式之间的联系,构建了风险分担调整策略。结果表明:(1)应首先采用承包商提出主动变更申请等方式避免受到状态变化的损失;(2)状态变化发生后,由于初始风险分担方案不适用或初始风险分担未规定导致风险分担方案需要调整,可采用包括变更方式、补充协议方式、索赔方式等的再谈判机制进行调整;(3)初始风险分担的规定不明确引起双方争议,可采用以协商和解为主的自我履行方式进行调整;(4)运用自我履约机制为未解决争议后,可采用第三方履行机制进行调整。研究成果将构建嵌入双方风险偏好的风险分担定量模型,同时形成风险分担效率保障制度策略集,从而形成更加科学与合理的风险分担方案;并建立发承包双方风险分担调整策略,进而有利于减少工程实际中由于风险分担调整产生的纠纷。
[Abstract]:The role of reasonable risk sharing in the promotion of project management performance has been recognized in both the theoretical and practical circles. However, the following problems still exist in the risk sharing in engineering practice: (1) the owners generally believe that in the process of making the contractor undertake the risk, it can guarantee the enthusiasm of the risk taking by giving it a matched economic benefit. It is ignored that risk sharing is affected by risk bearer's behavior factor - risk preference; (2) most of the actual workers think risk sharing is to share the risk in a contracting stage, and the risk sharing scheme often needs to be adjusted in the process of project execution due to incomplete project contract. The effective solution of the above problems can lead to more scientific and reasonable risk sharing in the project, which is of great significance for reducing the disputes arising from the risk sharing between the construction industry in China. On the basis of literature research, this paper will bring 7 risk circles that can cause the contract price to be adjusted. As the research object, in the process of risk sharing scheme, the risk preference of the two parties is introduced, and the guarantee system for the efficiency of the risk sharing is formulated. At the same time, the corresponding adjustment mechanism is determined for the adjustment of the risk sharing scheme caused by various reasons. The main contents of this paper include the main contents of this paper. The next three aspects: first, on the basis of literature research, the risk sharing index system is determined. Fuzzy set theory and TOPSIS technology are used to develop the risk sharing quantitative model. The fuzzy semantic transformation technology is used to add the risk preference of the owner to the risk sharing scheme. At the same time, the risk of the model is determined. The share ratio has established the connection with the type selection of the owner's contract type. The calculation flow of the model is demonstrated through a specific case, the validity of the model is confirmed, and the risk sharing scheme under different risk preference levels of the project participants is compared, and the proposal for the establishment of the owner's risk sharing decision is provided. Second, the two sides of the contract are put forward. The efficiency of guaranteeing the implementation of the risk sharing scheme can be guaranteed by adding incentive and restrictive clauses at the stage of the contract negotiation. Through interviews with 17 people in the employer and contractor units, the incentive and restrictive terms of the risk sharing efficiency are collected. The results show that: (1) both parties can negotiate in the contract. At the stage of economic incentive, the incentive clause based on Contractor's rights guarantee is positive to guarantee the efficiency of risk sharing; (2) join the economic punishment category, clearly define the restrictive clauses of the contract content category and ensure the efficiency of risk sharing. Third, through the case of risk sharing adjustment in the implementation of the 7 projects An example is made to identify the common reasons for the adjustment of the risk sharing scheme, analyze the adjustment methods of risk sharing, establish the connection between the causes of the risk sharing and adjustment, and construct the risk sharing adjustment strategy. The results show that: (1) first, the contractor should put forward the active change application and so on. To the loss of state change; (2) after the change of state, since the initial risk sharing scheme is not applicable or the initial risk sharing does not lead to the need to adjust the risk sharing scheme, the re negotiation mechanism, including the mode of change, the mode of supplemental agreement, the way of claim, and so on, can be adjusted. (3) the provisions of the initial risk sharing are not clear. The dispute can be adjusted by the way of self fulfillment based on negotiation and reconciliation. (4) the implementation mechanism of the third party can be adjusted by the implementation mechanism of self compliance. The research results will build a quantitative model of risk sharing in the risk preference of both sides, and form a risk sharing efficiency guarantee system strategy set at the same time. A more scientific and reasonable risk sharing scheme is formed, and the risk sharing adjustment strategy of the two parties is set up, which will help to reduce the disputes arising from the risk sharing and adjustment in the engineering practice.

【学位授予单位】：天津理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：TU723

【参考文献】