第三方安全管理参与下工程安全监管博弈分析

发布时间：2018-06-19 23:20

本文选题：第三方安全管理 + 监管博弈　；参考：《华中科技大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：安全监管是工程建设安全管理问题中的重要部分,工程建设过程中各参与主体都追求利益最大化,其利益诉求不同并且相互影响,而安全监管问题具备长周期性,这使得安全监管问题具备复杂系统和动态变化的特性,同时也使监管效果的预测并不准确。现阶段的工程建设领域管理不够规范,监理单位由于自身懈怠或在利益驱使等因素下在施工现场的监管不够严格。基于此种情况,完全独立于传统安全,在保证其公正性与公信力的前提下对施工现场进行突击检查(称为“飞检”)的第三方安全管理模式的出现,有助于形成良好的安全文化与安全氛围,也对施工单位、监理单位起到了一定的约束作用,从而促进了安全管理工作。现有的大多数研究讨论的是两个参与方的博弈稳定策略的存在性并进行分析,而实际的工程建设过程中是存在不同类型参建方,对于超过两方的多方博弈问题研究甚少。鉴于这样的现状,本文尝试分析在第三方安全管理参与下施工现场的三方监管博弈。本文首先对工程建设安全管理的现状进行分析,引出第三方安全管理的必要性,并分别针对广义上的第三方安全管理和上海中环线施工路段的第三方安全检查小组给出了描述与总结。其次,从施工现场第三方安全管理与施工单位、监理单位的多方博弈关系入手,建立了混合战略博弈模型,针对模型求解后的问题,进一步将混合战略博弈与系统动力学计算机仿真手段相结合,通过仿真结果分析各参与主体的策略变化并进行总结。最后,在考虑到传统博弈论具备的“完全理性”条件与现实并不匹配,将三个参与主体进行监管演化博弈,通过模型求解说明了演化稳定均衡难以达到,并从侧面反映出尽管有第三方安全管理的参与,当今社会安全监管问题依然在一个较长周期过程处于不稳定与波动之中。
[Abstract]:Safety supervision is an important part of the safety management of engineering construction. In the process of engineering construction, all the participants pursue the maximization of interests, and their interest demands are different and affect each other, and the safety supervision problem has a long period of time. This makes the problem of safety regulation have the characteristics of complex system and dynamic change, but also makes the prediction of regulatory effect inaccurate. At present, the management in the field of engineering construction is not standardized enough, and the supervision unit is not strict enough in the construction site because of its slack or interest driven factors. Based on this situation, completely independent from the traditional safety, under the premise of ensuring its impartiality and credibility, the third party safety management mode of the construction site surprise inspection (called "flying inspection") appears. It helps to form a good safety culture and safety atmosphere, and also plays a binding role on the construction units and supervision units, thus promoting the safety management work. Most of the existing studies discuss the existence and analysis of the game stability strategy of two participants, but in the actual construction process, there are different types of participants, but there is little research on the multi-party game problem of more than two parties. In view of this situation, this paper tries to analyze the tripartite supervision game in the construction site with the participation of third party safety management. Firstly, this paper analyzes the present situation of engineering construction safety management, and leads to the necessity of third party safety management. The third party safety management in the broad sense and the third party safety inspection group in the construction section of Shanghai Central Ring Line are described and summarized respectively. Secondly, starting with the multi-game relationship between the third party safety management and the construction unit and the supervision unit, the mixed strategy game model is established, aiming at the problems after the model is solved. Furthermore, the hybrid strategy game is combined with the computer simulation method of system dynamics, and the strategy changes of the participants are analyzed and summarized through the simulation results. Finally, considering that the "perfect rationality" condition of traditional game theory does not match with reality, the three participants are involved in the supervisory evolution game, and the solution of the model shows that the evolutionary stable equilibrium is difficult to achieve. It also reflects that, despite the participation of third-party safety management, the social safety supervision problem is still in a long period of instability and fluctuation.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：TU714

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