市场经济下行业垄断性与政府持股的理论与实证研究

发布时间：2017-12-31 20:22

  本文关键词：市场经济下行业垄断性与政府持股的理论与实证研究　出处：《清华大学》2015年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

  更多相关文章： 市场化行为 行业垄断性 政府持股 产业组织理论 国有企业

【摘要】：由于市场摩擦、进入成本、商品特性等因素,经济中大多数行业都很难达到完全竞争状态。在具有垄断性的行业中,企业会关注自身利润的最大化,而不会考虑行业垄断性带来的负外部性与消费者剩余,从而降低了市场的效率,因此政府的适当干预可以提升社会福利。市场经济的运行环境中,政府干预企业运行的方式是有限的,持股和税收补贴是主要的方式,但预算约束会给政府的干预行为带来额外的限制。本文首先以单一产品垄断性行业为基准模型,讨论了完全垄断市场中政府预算平衡约束条件下的政府的最优干预模式。当企业成本函数是边际成本递增时,政府可以通过将持股分红所得收入补贴企业生产的方式实现社会最优的结果,此时政府的最优选择既不是完全控股,也不是企业完全民营化。对于允许企业自由进入、但是存在准入门槛的寡头垄断市场,我们发现单一的补贴政策虽然促进了企业生产,但是企业会过度进入;单一的税收政策虽然抑制了企业进入,但是同时抑制了企业生产。因此,单一的补贴或税收政策均无法实现社会最优的结果,此时政府实现社会最优的方法是限制企业进入,同时对于企业的生产给予比例补贴,并通过持股获取收入的方式平衡预算约束。本文接下来将单一产品垄断性行业模型拓展为差异化产品垄断竞争模型。引入推测变分概念后的垄断竞争模型均衡结果表明,政府不干预的情况下,企业过度进入还是企业进入不足取决于差异化效应与商业盗窃效应的相对大小关系;政府可以通过持股并补贴生产来提升社会福利,随着行业竞争性强度的增加,政府会降低持股比例,并选择部分持股,产品差异化并不是造成政府对不同行业持股比例不同的原因。本文对上述理论研究的结论也进行了实证检验,由于美国行业的集中度可以较好的反映行业在自然状态下的垄断性,可以作为一个外生变量来使用,因此为了解决内生性问题,本文以该指标作为中国行业垄断性的工具变量,分别从行业层面和企业层面检验了行业垄断性与政府持股比例的关系。实证研究的结果证明了行业垄断性与政府持股比例之间的因果关系:即行业垄断性越高,政府持股比例越高,垄断性是因,政府持股是果。本文的研究成果对于混合所有制下政府的持股比例选择具有重要的参考价值。
[Abstract]:Due to market friction, entry costs, commodity characteristics and other factors, most industries in the economy are very difficult to achieve complete competition. In monopolistic industries, enterprises will pay attention to maximize their own profits. It does not consider the negative externality and consumer surplus brought by the monopoly of the industry, thus reducing the efficiency of the market. Therefore, the appropriate government intervention can promote social welfare in the operating environment of the market economy. Government intervention in the operation of enterprises is limited, holding shares and tax subsidies are the main way. However, budget constraints will bring additional restrictions to the government's intervention behavior. Firstly, this paper takes the single-product monopolistic industry as the benchmark model. This paper discusses the optimal intervention mode of the government under the condition of government budget balance constraint in the complete monopoly market, when the enterprise cost function is marginal cost increment. The government can realize the social optimal result by subsidizing the enterprise's production by the income from the shareholding and dividends. At this time, the optimal choice of the government is neither fully controlled. For the oligopoly market that allows enterprises to enter freely, but there are barriers to entry, we find that a single subsidy policy can promote the production of enterprises, but enterprises will over-enter; Although a single tax policy inhibits the entry of enterprises, it also inhibits the production of enterprises. Therefore, a single subsidy or tax policy can not achieve the best result of the society. At this time the government to achieve the best way to achieve social is to restrict the entry of enterprises, at the same time to give proportional subsidies for the production of enterprises. In this paper, the monopolistic industry model of single product is extended to the monopolistic competition model of differentiated products. The equilibrium model of monopoly competition model after the introduction of the concept of speculated variation is introduced. The fruit shows. In the case of non-intervention by the government, the relationship between the difference effect and the commercial theft effect depends on whether the enterprises enter excessively or not. The government can improve social welfare by holding shares and subsidizing production. With the increase of competitive intensity in the industry, the government will reduce the proportion of shares and choose some of them. Product differentiation is not the reason why the government holds different shares in different industries. The conclusions of the above theoretical research are also tested empirically in this paper. Because the concentration degree of American industry can better reflect the monopoly of the industry under the natural state, it can be used as an exogenous variable, so in order to solve the endogenous problem. This paper takes this index as the tool variable of Chinese industry monopoly. Respectively from the industry level and the enterprise level to test the relationship between the industry monopoly and the proportion of government shareholding. The empirical results prove the causal relationship between the industry monopoly and the proportion of government ownership: that is, the higher the industry monopoly. The higher the proportion of government shareholding is, the more monopolistic is the reason and the result is government shareholding. The research results of this paper have important reference value for the selection of government shareholding proportion under mixed ownership.
【学位授予单位】：清华大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D630;F123.9;F203
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本文编号：1361326