基于博弈论的我国发电企业竞价策略研究

发布时间：2018-01-02 23:27

本文关键词：基于博弈论的我国发电企业竞价策略研究　出处：《哈尔滨理工大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：电力工业改革首先在发电领域引入竞争，目的在于提高电力生产效率，促进电力工业的发展。发电企业成为独立的经济实体，在发电侧市场竞争中进行策略性报价，争取获得企业的最大化收益。因此，研究当前电力市场环境下发电企业的最优竞价策略问题，是我国发电企业面临的重要课题。发电企业的竞价策略研究，具有重要的理论价值和现实意义，，有助于分析竞价行为，能够为企业参与竞价提供科学的理论指导，使其有效参与市场竞争，在竞争中立于不败之地。本文首先介绍了电力市场的特征、结构和运行模式，从交易模式、交易类型、结算方式和竞价模式方面，分析我国电力市场的运行现状，指出我国电力市场运行中存在的问题，并对我国电力市场的发展趋势进行分析。通过对现有竞价方法的比较，将博弈论作为本文研究我国发电企业竞价策略的方法。分析竞价上网规则，并对我国发电企业参与电力市场竞价上网的过程进行了详细分析。由于电力市场是不完全信息下的寡头垄断竞争市场，且普遍采用密封报价拍卖方式，所以发电企业的竞价是不完全信息静态博弈。运用博弈论中的暗标拍卖原理构建暗标拍卖的贝叶斯博弈模型，通过求解贝叶斯纳什均衡得出我国发电企业的最优竞价策略，并研究了我国发电企业在有约束条件下的最优竞价策略选择；讨论了我国发电企业如何在竞价中进行竞争与合作。最后，文章提出我国发电企业应对竞价上网的策略。
[Abstract]:The reform of electric power industry firstly introduces competition in the field of power generation in order to improve the efficiency of electric power production and promote the development of electric power industry. Power generation enterprises become independent economic entities. In order to maximize the profit of the power generation enterprises, the paper studies the optimal bidding strategy of power generation enterprises in the current electricity market environment. The research on bidding strategy of power generation enterprises has important theoretical value and practical significance, and it is helpful to analyze bidding behavior. It can provide scientific theoretical guidance for enterprises to participate in bidding, make them participate in market competition effectively and remain invincible in competition. This paper first introduces the characteristics, structure and operation mode of the electricity market, and analyzes the current situation of the electricity market in our country from the aspects of the transaction mode, the transaction type, the settlement mode and the bidding mode. This paper points out the problems existing in the operation of our country's electricity market, and analyzes the development trend of our country's electricity market. This paper takes the game theory as the method to study the bidding strategy of power generation enterprises in China and analyzes the bidding rules. The paper also makes a detailed analysis on the process of Chinese power generation enterprises participating in the bidding process of electricity market. Because the electricity market is an oligopoly competitive market with incomplete information, sealed bidding auction is widely used. Therefore, the bidding of power generation enterprises is incomplete information static game. Using the theory of hidden auction in game theory, the Bayesian game model of hidden auction is constructed. By solving Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the optimal bidding strategies of Chinese power generation enterprises are obtained, and the optimal bidding strategies of Chinese power generation enterprises under constrained conditions are studied. This paper discusses how Chinese power generation enterprises compete and cooperate in bidding. Finally, the paper puts forward some strategies for Chinese power generation enterprises to deal with bidding.
【学位授予单位】：哈尔滨理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F426.61;F224.32

【引证文献】