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土地财政对房地产价格影响的实证研究

发布时间:2018-01-05 15:26

  本文关键词:土地财政对房地产价格影响的实证研究 出处:《西南财经大学》2014年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


  更多相关文章: 土地财政依赖 房价 博弈


【摘要】:近年来,我国商品房价格逐年上涨,同时地方政府对于土地财政的依赖也呈现出不断增强的趋势。商品房是作为城市化进程中的刚性需求,因此,商品房价格的上涨与地方政府对于土地财政的依赖是否存在联系,以及有多大程度的联系,引起了学术界和社会大众的广泛关注。 分税制改革所带来的结果是地方政府财政收入权力上移,而事权责任下放,地方政府没有长期稳定的税源,态度也转向消极负面,开始将财政收入增长的重心转移到寻求预算外资金的新增长。再加上20世纪80年代开始的改革开放带来国家工作重心的转移,造成了所谓的“GDP政绩观”,这种唯GDP论再加上任期制度的限制使得地方政府官员都将追求GDP的高速增长作为工作的目标和动力,由此导致地方政府热衷于土地审批和土地开发,甚至不惜顶风作案,违抗中央政府的政策和法令。从收入来源来看,此类资金的主体是土地开发和土地转让有关的收入,也就是俗称的“土地财政”。 本文通过理论分析和构建计量经济学模型,以及建立博弈模型等多种研究方法试图分析分税制改革以后地方政府对土地财政的依赖是否会导致房地产价格上涨,以及有多大程度的影响。全文尝试着回答下面四个问题。(1)土地财政的定义及构成、成因、现状分析。(2)构建面板数据回归模型,分析地方政府对土地财政的依赖和商品房价格上涨是否存在正向相关的关系,以及相关程度有多大。(3)构建博弈模型,分析地方政府是否存在机会主义的侥幸心态,冒着被中央政府惩罚的风险,忽视行为外部的不经济结果,作出“杀鸡取卵”、“涸泽而渔”的短期不计后果的机会主义行为。(4)根据论文论证得出的问题,提出相应的政策建议。 本文首先研究了土地财政的定义及构成、成因和现状分析。本文认为从收入角度看,可以从狭义和广义两个层面去理解土地财政。狭义上的土地财政收入仅仅是指国有土地使用权出让金等地租性质的收入。广义上的土地财政收入可以涵盖一切与土地密切相关的政府性收入,大致包括租、税、费、债四个部分。接来来对土地财政的成因进行了分析,财政竞争和政绩显示的需要,使地方政府依赖以土地出让金为主的非正式资金来源,以此获得更多的可支配收入。最后对土地财政的现状进行了分析,认识到土地出让成交价款整体呈快速上升趋势,并且不同用地类型、不同出让方式的土地成交价格差异明显。 其次,本文尝试通过构建面板数据回归模型,以土地财政依赖度作为模型分析的关键变量,试图解析地方政府对土地财政的依赖程度是否与当地商品房价格的上涨存在正相关关系,以及相关程度有多大。并且构建博弈模型,分析当中央政府出台相关的土地调控政策措施时,地方政府是否基于地方财政收入的角度考虑,在机会主义的侥幸心态下,为了保障其收益,不愿看到房地产价格下跌,对中央政府的政策采取变通执行的策略,通过各种手段维持或者推动房地产价格的上涨。 最后,针对地方政府对土地财政依赖产生的对房地产行业的影响,提出相关的政策建议。(1)通过加快财政体制的改革,本文具体包括明确中央政府和地方政府间事权和支出责任的划分、进一步完善转移支付制度、规范政府间收入的划分和加强财政体制法制化建设等;(2)规范土地出让金收入的分配和管理,具体包括建立具有投资性质的土地收益基金、将土地出让金收支纳入正式预算管理范围等。(3)改革制度设置,具体包括任期制度、考核制度、监督制度。
[Abstract]:In recent years, China's commercial housing prices rose year by year, while the local government for the land finance dependence is also showing a growing trend. As the city commercial housing is in the process of rigid demand, therefore, commercial housing prices and local government to land finance according to the link between LAI and whether, to what extent the contact, caused widespread concern in the academia and the public.
The results brought by the reform of the tax system is the local government revenue power shift, and responsibility decentralization, local governments do not have long-term stable sources, also turned to negative attitude, start a new growth will be the focus of fiscal revenue growth to seek extrabudgetary funds transfer. Coupled with the beginning of 1980s's reform and opening up has the focus of national work the result of the so-called "GDP performance concept, the rapid growth of this only on the GDP plus tenure system due to the restriction of local government officials will pursue GDP as the goal and motive force, the local government is keen to land approval and land development caused by this, even against crime, defy the policies of the central government and the law. From the sources of income, such funds is the main land development and land transfer income, also known as the" land finance ".
In this paper, by constructing econometric models and theoretical analysis, and the establishment of the game model and other research methods to analyze the tax system after the reform of local government reliance on land finance will lead to real estate prices, and the extent of the impact. This paper try to answer the following four questions. (1) the definition of land finance and a cause analysis of the status quo. (2) to construct a panel data regression model, analysis of local government reliance on land finance and real estate prices are positive correlation, and the correlation extent. (3) to build a game model, analysis of whether the local government opportunism luck and risk the central government to punish, don't neglect the external economic results, make "goose", "opportunistic behavior brutal" short-term reckless. (4) according to the Discuss the problems and put forward the corresponding policy suggestions.
This paper studies the definition of land finance and composition, analysis of causes and the current situation. This paper argues that from the revenue perspective, to understand the land finance from two broad and narrow sense. The narrow sense of the land revenue only refers to the nature of rent leasing state-owned land use rights income. Land revenue can be generalized everything is closely related with the land of government revenue, including rent, taxes, fees, bonds of four parts. Then to analyze the causes of land finance, fiscal competition and performance shows, so that local governments rely on informal sources in land leasing mainly, in order to obtain more disposable income finally on the present situation of land finance is analyzed, to realize land transaction price overall is increasing rapidly, and with different types, different ways to sell the land price The difference of the lattice is obvious.
Secondly, this paper attempts to construct a panel data regression model, the degree of financial dependence on the land as a key variable of the model analysis, attempts to analyze the local government's dependence on land finance is positively correlated with local commercial housing prices, and extent. And constructs the game model analysis, when the central government issued land the regulation of the relevant policies and measures, whether the local government fiscal revenue based on the perspective of consideration, in opportunistic luck, in order to protect their benefits, do not want to see the real estate prices, take alternative implementation of the policy of the central government's policy, maintain or through a variety of means to promote the real estate prices.
Finally, according to the local government reliance on land finance have impacts on the real estate industry, and puts forward relevant policy suggestions. (1) to accelerate the reform of financial system, the clear division between central government and local government powers and expenditure responsibilities, to further improve the transfer payment system, the division of government income and to strengthen the legal construction of financial system; (2) the distribution and management of gold income for land transfers, including the establishment of an investment nature of the land revenue fund, land transfer payments into the formal budget management scope. (3) the reform of the system settings, including the tenure system, evaluation system, supervision system.

【学位授予单位】:西南财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F301;F812;F299.23

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