基于委托代理理论的政府投资项目激励监督机制研究

发布时间：2018-01-06 03:31

本文关键词：基于委托代理理论的政府投资项目激励监督机制研究　出处：《南京财经大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：自2004年国务院提出加快推行和实施政府投资项目以来,经过十余年的发展,政府投资项目已成为国内政府投资项目,特别是基础设施建设的典型模式之一。国内学界和实务界关于政府投资项目的概念、内涵、不足的认识也经历了由争论到统一的过程,从国内政府投资项目模式管理实践的现状来看,激励机制不完善、监管体系不健全是政府投资项目模式长远发展所面临的主要问题。本文在深入研究投融资理论、制度经济理论、公共管理理论、博弈论等理论学科的基础之上,对政府投资项目的内涵、主体关系以及关键内容进行了界定,并详细分析其中的委托代理关系和机制机理。在方法上,除了定性的理论阐述,本项目同时注重模型、量化方法的使用,通过构建多层级的委托代理模型来对参与主体的利益机制进行分析。本文以国内政府投资项目模式实践中存在的主要问题为背景,把政府部门作为委托人,项目管理公司作为代理人,分别基于完全理性和有限理性的假设构建了委托代理框架下的激励-监督模型。从分析的结果来看,激励机制和监督机制是影响代理人(项目管理公司)行为的重要因素,完善的激励报酬和较严格的监督体系能够促进项目管理公司尽职尽责的按照合同的要求开展管理工作；反之,较低的报酬和松懈的监管都有可能导致项目管理公司谋取私利的行为。同时,当政府部门的监管较为严格时,项目管理公司在和政府部门签订代建合同时会要求分享更多比例的提成。当考虑项目管理公司具有追求公平偏好的“互惠性”行为时,政府可以额外给予其更多的优惠政策,作为回报,项目管理公司会付出更多的努力行动开展代建工作。另外,相对于传统委托代理理论框架的监督成本,融入公平偏好的模型能够在一定程度上节约政府的监督成本；同时,与传统委托代理框架下政府的期望收益相比,考虑公平偏好的条件下,政府能否得到更大的收益取决于项目公司的“互惠性”行为强度,项目公司的“互惠性”心理越强,政府获得额外收益的可能性也就越大。本文的研究为政府部门和项目管理公司之间的激励契约设计、监管机制提供了新的思路和理论借鉴。
[Abstract]:Since 2004 the State Council put forward to accelerate the implementation of government investment projects, after more than ten years of development, the government investment projects has become the domestic government investment projects, especially one of the typical mode of infrastructure construction. The domestic scholars and practitioners about the concept of government investment project connotation, lack of understanding has undergone a debate to unity the process, from the current situation of management practice of domestic government investment projects, the incentive mechanism is not perfect, imperfect supervision system is the main problem facing the government investment project mode of long-term development. The theory of investment and financing in the in-depth study, theory of institutional economics, public management theory, based on the game theory, the connotation of government investment project, the main contents and key relationships were defined, and a detailed analysis of the principal-agent relationship and the mechanism in the method, In addition to qualitative analysis theory, this project also focused on model, using quantitative methods, through the principal-agent model to multi level benefit mechanism to participate in the main analysis. Based on the main problems existing in domestic practice mode of government investment projects, the government departments as the principal, the Project Manage Company as an agent, were completely and limited rationality hypothesis is constructed under the framework of principal-agent incentive model based on supervision. From the results of the analysis, incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism is the important factor affecting the agent (Project Manage Company) behavior, improve incentives and a strict supervision system can promote the due diligence of the Project Manage Company to carry out management work according to the requirements of the contract on the other hand, low reward; and lax regulation are likely to lead to a Project Manage Company for personal gain Behavior. At the same time, when the government departments more stringent regulation, Project Manage Company and government departments signed agent contracts will be required to share more of the Commission. When considering the Project Manage Company with the pursuit of fairness preference "reciprocal" behavior, the government can give the additional more preferential policies, in return, the Project Manage Company will pay more efforts to carry out on behalf of the building work. In addition, compared with the traditional cost supervision framework of principal-agent theory, fairness theory model can save the government to a certain extent the supervision cost; at the same time, compared with the traditional principal government agency under the framework of the expected revenue, considering the fairness preference under the condition that the government can get bigger income depends on the item company's "reciprocal" behavior strength, item company "reciprocal" mentality is stronger, the government to get extra income The possibility is greater. The research in this paper provides a new idea and theoretical reference for the design of incentive contracts between government departments and Project Manage Company.

【学位授予单位】：南京财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F281

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