基于经济学视角的商业欺诈防范问题研究

发布时间：2018-01-08 18:18

本文关键词：基于经济学视角的商业欺诈防范问题研究　出处：《陕西师范大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：古语曰：“民无信不立”、“人而无信,不知其可也”。诚信美德一直是中国的优良传统。但在21世纪的今天,市场却面临着诚信危机。商业领域不断曝出弄虚作假、隐瞒真相的欺诈事件,欺诈手段层出不穷、欺诈花样也不断翻新,欺诈之风盛行已被视为常态,社会公众与监管部门的底线在不断被突破。从商品买卖的质量欺诈、价格欺诈到商品流通环节的合同欺诈、信用证欺诈,再到商业投资中的特许经营欺诈,欺诈行为已贯穿市场交易的各个阶段,不仅严重的破坏了经济秩序,还彻底打击了人们对市场的信任。破坏社会主义市场经济秩序案件依旧每年呈增长趋势,其中涉及食品安全的欺诈甚至危害到人们的生命安全。商业欺诈形式多样,范围极广,搜集数据时滞性大,统计难,监管部门疏漏防范,欺诈的市场包容力也在不断扩大,建立有效的商业欺诈防范路径刻不容缓。本文首先对国内外现有的文献综述进行整理和总结,基于商业欺诈内涵,从信息不对称理论、制度经济学理论和博弈论三个理论基础分析了防范商业欺诈的理论可行性。其次分析了商业欺诈表现形式、特征和成因,从经济视角对商业欺诈本质进行更深的探索。在此基础上,本文构建了商业欺诈的成本收益模型和欺诈者与政府的演化博弈矩阵。在成本收益分析中得出单次欺诈净收益公式和多次欺诈的欺诈半径极值,认为受害者容忍度和欺诈者信誉是降低商业欺诈范围的关键因素。在欺诈者和监管者的演化博弈分析中,通过政府和欺诈者之间的博弈矩阵建立复制动态方程,结合实际情况分析了欺诈者和政府间的三个策略稳定点和监管状态的意义所在。根据我国商业欺诈防范的现状,发现仍存在诸多问题,如监管主体欠缺职能执行力度,监管领域混乱；缺少信息共享平台、信息传递机制效率低；反商业欺诈的相关立法不完善；反商业欺诈动力不足；防范机制中缺少利益相关体参与等等。那么结合模型结论,本文认为：监管部门应建立欺诈信息库,对各种类型欺诈分类监管,设定处罚标准；短期内加大监管成本,长期内降低并维持稳定的监管成本；约束监管者行为,制定激励机制。而市场力量应重在,明确产权制度,塑造信誉经济；提升信誉机制,扩大信誉传递效应；提高声誉效益,优化监管策略；加大市场约束效力。同时市场交易者需降低对欺诈的包容度,增强受害保护意识。对商业欺诈的理论研究是为了更好的了解商业欺诈的动机、现状和如何防范商业欺诈行为,从而落实到解决实际的防范问题上。本文期望通过经济学理论的规范分析方法,从新的视角解读商业欺诈的经济本质,为反商业欺诈路径提供一些建议。
[Abstract]:As the old saying goes, "the people have no faith and no faith." the virtue of good faith has always been a fine tradition in China, but today in 21th century. However, the market is facing a crisis of integrity. The commercial field has been exposed fraud, hide the truth of fraud, fraud means emerge in endlessly, fraud patterns are constantly renovated, the prevailing trend of fraud has been regarded as the normal. The bottom line of the public and the supervision department is constantly broken through, from quality fraud of commodity sale, price fraud to contract fraud in commodity circulation, letter of credit fraud, to franchise fraud in commercial investment. Fraud has run through the various stages of market transactions, not only seriously undermine the economic order, but also a thorough blow to the trust of the market. Damage to the socialist market economic order cases are still growing every year. Among them, the fraud involving food safety even endangers people's life safety. Commercial fraud has a variety of forms, very wide scope, large data collection delay, difficult statistics, regulatory oversight oversight to prevent. The market tolerance of fraud is also expanding, it is urgent to establish effective commercial fraud prevention path. Firstly, this paper summarizes the existing literature review at home and abroad, based on the connotation of commercial fraud, from the information asymmetry theory. This paper analyzes the theoretical feasibility of preventing commercial fraud on the basis of institutional economics theory and game theory. Secondly, it analyzes the manifestation, characteristics and causes of commercial fraud. From the economic point of view, the essence of commercial fraud is further explored. On this basis. In this paper, the cost-benefit model of commercial fraud and the evolutionary game matrix between fraudster and government are constructed. In the cost-benefit analysis, the formula of single fraud net income and the fraud radius extremum of multiple fraud are obtained. It is considered that victim tolerance and fraudster reputation are the key factors to reduce the scope of commercial fraud. In the evolutionary game analysis of fraudsters and regulators, the replicating dynamic equation is established through the game matrix between the government and the fraudster. Combined with the actual situation analysis of the fraudster and the government between the three strategic stability points and the significance of regulatory status. According to the current situation of commercial fraud prevention in China, we find that there are still many problems. For example, the main body of supervision lacks the enforcement of functions, and the supervision field is chaotic; Lack of information sharing platform, low efficiency of information transmission mechanism; The relative legislation of anti-commercial fraud is not perfect; Lack of motivation to counter commercial fraud; Based on the conclusion of the model, the author thinks that the supervision department should establish the fraud information base, classify the various types of fraud, and set up the punishment standard; Increase the supervision cost in the short term, reduce and maintain the stable supervision cost in the long run; Restrain the behavior of the supervisor, establish the incentive mechanism, and the market power should lay stress on, clear the property right system, mold the credit economy; Enhance the reputation mechanism and expand the credit transfer effect; Improving reputation benefit and optimizing supervision strategy; At the same time, market traders should reduce their tolerance to fraud and enhance their awareness of victimization and protection. The theoretical study of commercial fraud is to better understand the motives of commercial fraud, the current situation and how to prevent commercial fraud. This paper hopes to analyze the economic essence of commercial fraud from a new angle of view through the normative analysis method of economic theory and provide some suggestions for the path of anti-commercial fraud.
【学位授予单位】：陕西师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D922.294;F203

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