公共文化项目中承包商机会主义行为演化博弈研究

发布时间：2018-09-04 11:49

【摘要】：近年来,政府对公共文化基础设施建设项目投入较多的资源,旨在实现文化强国的战略。在公共文化项目的建设过程中,建设单位和承包商掌握的信息不对称,承包商受利益的驱使可能会利用信息优势采取机会主义行为,损害建设单位的利益和公众享受公共文化的权益,甚至破坏公共项目建设市场。针对公共文化建设项目中承包商的机会主义行为,笔者大量阅读国内外相关的研究成果,在公共文化服务理论、委托代理理论和激励理论等基础理论指导下,通过构建演化博弈模型,得到在一般状态、惩罚机制和补偿机制三种状态下的演化博弈结果,通过对结果的分析比较得出,补偿机制能够有效的抑制承包商的机会主义行为。在一般状态下,政府建设单位对承包商的机会主义行为既不进行惩罚,也不对其诚信履约行为进行补偿,演化博弈稳定状态为建设单位不监管,承包商选择机会主义行为。在惩罚机制下,如果政府建设单位对承包商行为进行监管,且发现了承包商的机会主义行为,则将对其进行罚款,演化博弈稳定状态为承包商选择机会主义行为,建设单位是否进行监管取决于监管成本的高低。在补偿机制下,如果承包商不选择机会主义行为,则可获得建设单位一定的补偿金,演化博弈稳定状态为建设单位不监管,承包商是否采取机会主义行为取决于补偿金的多少。综合分析演化博弈结果,在公共文化项目中,惩罚机制并未对承包商的机会主义行为产生实质性的抑制作用,而补偿机制可以对承包商的机会主义行为产生实质性的抑制作用。由演化博弈结果,本文提出如下建议:建设单位与承包商通过建立长期的合作机制,共求长远利益;建立以名誉激励为主、金钱激励为辅的承包商激励机制;建立完善的、标准化的管理机制,采用多元化监管手段;扩大项目范围,逐渐建立公共项目系统管理平台。本文的创新点在于,在公共文化项目中,运用演化博弈的方法研究承包商机会主义行为的抑制机制,构建三种不同状态下的演化博弈模型,对演化结果进行分析对比,得出结论。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the government has invested more resources in the construction of public cultural infrastructure projects in order to realize the strategy of cultural power. In the process of the construction of public cultural projects, the information held by the construction units and contractors is asymmetric, and the contractor may take advantage of the advantage of information to take opportunistic behavior, driven by the interests of the contractors. Damage the interests of construction units and the public enjoy the rights and interests of public culture, and even destroy the construction market of public projects. In view of the opportunistic behavior of contractors in public cultural construction projects, the author has read a lot of relevant research results at home and abroad, under the guidance of basic theories such as public cultural service theory, principal-agent theory and incentive theory, etc. By constructing the evolutionary game model, the evolutionary game results are obtained under three states: general state, punishment mechanism and compensation mechanism. Through the analysis and comparison of the results, it is concluded that the compensation mechanism can effectively restrain the opportunistic behavior of the contractor. In general, the government construction unit neither penalizes the contractor's opportunistic behavior nor compensates its good faith performance behavior. The stable state of evolutionary game is that the construction unit does not supervise and the contractor chooses opportunism behavior. Under the penalty mechanism, if the government construction unit supervises the contractor's behavior and discovers the contractor's opportunistic behavior, it will be fined, and the stable state of evolutionary game will make the contractor choose opportunism behavior. Whether the construction unit carries on the supervision or not depends on the supervision cost. Under the compensation mechanism, if the contractor does not choose opportunistic behavior, he can obtain a certain amount of compensation from the construction unit. The stable state of evolutionary game is that the construction unit does not supervise, and whether the contractor adopts opportunistic behavior depends on the amount of compensation. Synthetically analyzing the result of evolutionary game, in the public cultural project, the punishment mechanism does not have the material inhibition function to the contractor's opportunism behavior, but the compensation mechanism can produce the material inhibition function to the contractor's opportunism behavior. According to the result of evolutionary game, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: the construction unit and the contractor seek long-term benefits by establishing long-term cooperation mechanism; establish the contractor incentive mechanism which is mainly based on reputation incentive, supplemented by money incentive; establish perfect, Standardized management mechanism, the adoption of diversified regulatory means, expand the scope of projects, gradually establish a public project management system platform. The innovation of this paper is that in public cultural projects, the evolutionary game method is used to study the restraining mechanism of contractor's opportunistic behavior, and the evolutionary game models under three different states are constructed, and the evolution results are analyzed and compared. come to conclusion
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：G249.2;F224.32

【相似文献】