环境规制下企业清洁生产博弈分析

发布时间：2019-06-13 10:39

【摘要】：随着经济的快速发展,环境污染日益严重,为了防止环境污染的恶化,清洁生产作为环境污染治理的一种有效方式被政府大力推行。文章运用博弈方法,分析了环境规制下企业与企业之间实施清洁生产时的完全信息静态博弈均衡和动态演化博弈均衡。研究发现,当企业实施清洁生产时的净收益大于不实施清洁生产的净收益时,企业会选择清洁生产策略;当企业实施清洁生产时的净收益小于不实施清洁生产的净收益时,企业会选择不实施清洁生产策略。企业实施清洁生产的收益、成本、政府监督并发现企业未实施清洁生产的概率及给予企业的惩罚力度均是影响企业是否采取清洁生产策略的因素。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy, environmental pollution is becoming more and more serious. In order to prevent the deterioration of environmental pollution, cleaner production has been vigorously promoted by the government as an effective way to control environmental pollution. In this paper, the game method is used to analyze the static game equilibrium and dynamic evolutionary game equilibrium of complete information and dynamic evolution between enterprises under environmental regulation. It is found that when the net income of cleaner production is greater than the net income of cleaner production, the enterprise will choose cleaner production strategy, and when the net income of cleaner production is less than the net income of cleaner production, the enterprise will choose not to implement cleaner production strategy. The income and cost of cleaner production, the probability of failure to implement cleaner production and the punishment given to enterprises are all the factors that affect whether the enterprise adopts cleaner production strategy.
【作者单位】：重庆师范大学经济与管理学院;北京交通大学中国产业安全研究中心;重庆大学;重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社科项目“多阶段群体决策的博弈过程分析与偏好信息集结”(项目号:13YJC630252) 中国博士后科学基金“有限理性下产学研合作研发防合谋激励机制设计”(项目号:2012M511909)
【分类号】：X38;F273;F224.32

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