多维晋升激励对地方政府举债行为的影响

发布时间：2017-12-31 20:26

本文关键词：多维晋升激励对地方政府举债行为的影响　出处：《中国工业经济》2017年07期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文考察了多维晋升激励对地方政府举债行为的影响及其机理,以及"向上负责"与"向下负责"机制偏差造成的地方政府举债行为扭曲及其对居民福利的影响。研究表明,增长绩效晋升激励对地方政府举债规模具有扩张性影响,财政可持续晋升激励可以遏制地方政府债务规模膨胀但会抑制地方政府发展经济的积极性,而民生性公共服务晋升激励的影响不明确。提高债务公共投资转换率既可直接遏制地方政府举债规模膨胀,也有利于弱化增长绩效晋升激励对地方政府举债行为的扩张性影响;提高共享税的地方分成比例会促使地方政府增加举债规模,但倾向于弱化增长绩效晋升激励的债务扩张效应;民生性专项转移支付具有类似影响,一般性转移支付则具有相反作用,生产性专项转移支付既会促使地方政府增加举债规模也会强化增长绩效晋升激励的债务扩张效应。分析还表明,只有当晋升激励决定的地方政府偏好与居民偏好相符时,地方政府的最优举债行为才会提升居民福利,意味着"向上负责"和"向下负责"机制的有机融合可以从根本上规范地方政府举债行为。这对于优化完善中国地方政府治理体系以规范地方政府举债行为、实现财政经济的可持续发展具有重要启示。
[Abstract]:This paper investigates the influence and mechanism of multi-dimensional promotion incentive on local government's borrowing behavior. As well as the "upward responsibility" and "downward responsibility" mechanism bias caused by the distortion of local government borrowing behavior and its impact on the welfare of residents. Growth performance promotion incentive has an expansionary effect on the local government borrowing scale. Fiscal sustainable promotion incentive can restrain the local government debt expansion but will inhibit the enthusiasm of local government to develop the economy. But the influence of the promotion incentive of the people's livelihood public service is not clear. Raising the conversion rate of debt public investment can directly curb the local government borrowing expansion. It also helps to weaken the expansionary influence of the promotion incentive of growth performance on the borrowing behavior of local government; Increasing the local share ratio of shared tax will promote the local government to increase the scale of borrowing, but tend to weaken the debt expansion effect of growth performance promotion incentive; People's livelihood special transfer payment has a similar impact, general transfer payment has the opposite effect. Productive special transfer payments will not only encourage local governments to increase the scale of borrowing but also strengthen the debt expansion effect of growth performance promotion incentives. Only when the preference of local government in promotion incentive decision is consistent with the preference of residents, the optimal borrowing behavior of local government will improve the welfare of residents. It means that the organic combination of "upward responsibility" and "downward responsibility" mechanism can fundamentally regulate the borrowing behavior of local governments, which can optimize and perfect the local government governance system in China to regulate the borrowing behavior of local governments. The realization finance economy sustainable development has the important enlightenment.
【作者单位】：中国人民大学财政金融学院、中国财政金融政策研究中心;中国人民大学财政金融学院;中央财经大学财经研究院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“财政可持续性研究”(批准号14JJD790003) 国家自然科学基金面上项目“基于中国实践的财政分权理论”(批准号71673279)
【分类号】：F812.5
【正文快照】： 一、问题提出改革开放以来,中国经济保持了近40年的高速增长,创造了世界经济奇迹。很多学者认为,晋升激励驱动下的地方政府“为增长而竞争”是其中的一个重要原因(周黎安,2007;徐现祥和王贤彬,2010;Li and Zhou,2005;Xu,2011)。然而,随着地方政府间竞争愈演愈烈,过度竞争的负

【参考文献】