证券分析师关注对财务报告重大错报风险的影响研究

发布时间：2018-01-02 21:41

  本文关键词：证券分析师关注对财务报告重大错报风险的影响研究　出处：《吉林大学》2017年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

  更多相关文章： 证券分析师 分析师关注 财务报告 重大错报风险 会计监管

【摘要】：资本市场秩序的建立和保持需要具备真实可靠的信息,其中可靠的财务信息是投资者及其他利益关系人进行经济决策的基础,也是维持资本市场秩序和保证资本市场正常运行的关键。但由于我国资本市场存在监督机制不够完善、法律制度不足等问题,有些上市公司披露的财务报告中存在重大错报的信息,严重地误导了报表使用者的相关决策,使生产力发展和资源的有效配置受到了阻碍,损害了市场主体的合法权益。因此,寻找资本市场多方参与者的监督力量,提高中介机构的监督效力,降低上市公司财务信息重大错报风险成为了优化资本市场资源配置的重要基础。在信息经济学理论下,企业会计信息从内向外流动的过程形成了“信息生产——信息控制——信息鉴证——信息接收(披露)”的链条。在此链条中,上市公司、外部审计师、投资者、监管部门等各自起到了不同的作用。资本市场的制约体制包括注册分析师、会计准则、资本市场监管及反欺诈和内部交易的相关法律,有效的制约体制能够帮助防止和识别上市公司财务报告中存在的重大错报问题。但由于我国的监管力度较弱,投资者保护还不完善,除了健全现有的制约体制外,寻找其他资本市场的监督力量是保持资本市场有效运行、降低投资者与上市公司之间信息不对称程度的关键因素。作为资本市场的信息中介和上市公司的外部监督机制,证券分析师在资本市场信息监管体系中扮演了重要的角色。Dyck等(2010)通过对美国资本市场的会计欺诈案例进行搜集,发现证券分析师识别舞弊公司的效率要远远高于市场监管层及审计师。在我国近年来发生的财务造假事件中,证券分析机构“浑水”沽空公司对“辉山乳业”虚报资产的发现,以及证券分析师蒲某对“银广夏”夸大生产利润的跟踪和证实,都向市场揭露了财务报告中存在的重大错报信息,引起了监管层及投资者的注意。与注册会计师和政府监管相比,证券分析师可以从多渠道获取公司的信息,包括参加股东大会、电话会议和与管理层的私人谈话等,因此信息搜集的成本较低;与投资者相比,证券分析师具有更专业的背景知识,因此信息解析能力更强。尽管以往研究强调了分析师关注与会计信息质量之间的关系,但是研究结果并不一致。本文认为这是源自两个方面的原因:一是我国证券分析师行业尚处于发展阶段,政府部门对于中介机构的监管还不完善,因此导致研究结果受制度环境的影响;二是已有研究缺乏从会计信息传递链条的整个过程出发,对分析师关注问题进行研究,因此不能全面系统地针对分析师关注对上市公司披露会计信息的影响进行分析。本文借鉴以往研究和现有理论,从研究分析师对会计信息链的“制作(生产)——控制——鉴证——接收(披露)”流程各层面的影响作用入手,为分析师关注对财务报告重大错报风险的影响机理提出了新的解释框架。本文通过实证研究发现,分析师关注较高的上市公司,财务报告存在的重大错报风险较低。具体表现为:(1)在信息制作层面,本文从两个方面衡量了上市公司财务报告存在重大错报风险。一方面,重大错报在制作层面的直接表征为财务报告舞弊或财务报告重述。研究发现,分析师关注较高的公司,财务报告舞弊、及财务报告重述发生的概率越低。另一方面,重大错报在制作层面的间接表征为盈余管理信息风险。通过识别上市公司财务报告中与业绩波动相关的可操控应计部分,本文发现,分析师关注越高的上市公司,财务报告中存在的盈余管理信息风险及基本面信息风险越低。(2)在信息控制层面,本文认为,当上市公司的内部监督机制出现问题时,分析师可能会选择及时地发现并沟通,如果沟通没有达到有效提高内部控制的目的,分析师在避免发布负面预测的情况下会采取停止对企业跟踪的方式向市场传递信号。因此,在信息的“产品控制”阶段,分析师的关注有效提高了公司内部的治理环境,显著地降低了管理层舞弊的“合理化”因素,从而降低了财务报告中可能存在的重大错报风险。研究发现,分析师关注较高的公司,披露内部控制报告的可能性越高,内部控制的有效性越高,内部控制存在缺陷的概率越低。(3)在信息鉴证层面,通过前两个阶段分析师对信息制作和控制的关注,提高了企业的信息环境,完善了上市公司的内部监督机制,有效降低了财务报告舞弊或错报可能存在的概率,因此,减少了注册会计师需要投入的审计成本,同时增加上市公司被出具“清洁”审计意见的概率。本文主要的研究贡献如下:第一,构建了分析师关注对财务报告重大错报风险影响的新的解释框架,为分析师关注对会计信息传递的整个链条具有监督和改善的作用提供了理论依据。研究认为,会计信息是企业向外界披露的“产品”,从产品的制作到“消费者”手中,经历了“制作(会计报告的编制)——控制(企业内部控制)——鉴证(注册会计师审计)——接收(披露给报告使用者)”的一系列流程。但是,以往大量文献把焦点放在分析师关注对资本市场反应或财务报告盈余质量的影响,忽略了分析师作为资本市场信息中介和上市公司外部监督者对于会计信息流动各层面的影响作用。第二,根据会计信息传递链条的不同层面,构建了财务报告重大错报风险新的度量体系。以往文献主要以受到证监会处罚,或可操控应计利润作为公司财务报告存在重大错报风险的衡量变量,但此类替代变量存在局限性:一是没有受到违规处罚的公司并不意味着其披露的财务信息是“清洁的”(即完全不存在重大错报风险);二是由于盈余管理是中性的,可操控应计利润的高低并不能直接代表上市公司财务报告是否存在重大错报风险。因此本研究对重大错报风险的衡量根据会计信息的传递进行了多层面的量化,使研究结论更具有可靠性。第三,本文的研究结果着重强调了资本市场中介机构——证券分析师在市场信息传递中的重要作用。随着我国资本市场规模的不断增长,证券分析师从早期不规范的民间“股评师”,发展到截止2017年从事证券投资业务的2309人,他们对于上市公司披露会计信息质量的影响越来越重要。因此,本研究的主要现实意义在于引起监管层对如何利用分析师的职业特点和信息优势,提高上市公司会计信息质量,完善资本市场会计监管等问题的重视。研究结论以期为政府监管及资本市场利益相关者作为未来决策参考。
[Abstract]:The capital market in order to establish and maintain a need to have reliable information, the reliable financial information is the basis for investors and other stakeholders to make economic decisions, but also to maintain the order of the capital market and the key to ensure the normal operation of the capital market. But because of the existence of China's capital market supervision mechanism is not perfect, the legal system deficiencies. The material misstatement disclosure of some listed companies in the financial report information, seriously mislead the decision of the users of financial statements, the effective allocation of resources and the development of productive forces is hindered, damage the legitimate rights and interests of market players. Therefore, looking for the supervisory power of multi participants in the capital market, improve the supervision of intermediary effect, become the important basis for optimizing the capital market allocation of resources to reduce the financial information of listed companies the risk of material misstatement in the information economy theory. The theory, the process of accounting information flow from the inside the formation of the "information control information assurance information receiving information production (Disclosure)" of the chain. This chain, listed companies, external auditors, investors, regulators and other respective plays a different role. The capital market including the registration and control system analysts, accounting standards, capital market supervision laws and anti fraud and insider trading, to help prevent problems of material misstatement and recognition of financial reports of Listed Companies in the system to restrict the effective supervision of our country. But due to the weak investor protection is not perfect, in addition to the existing restriction system, supervision power look for other capital market is to maintain the effective operation of capital market, a key factor in reducing the information asymmetry between investors and listed companies in the capital market. The information intermediary and the external supervision mechanism of listed companies, securities analysts play an important role in.Dyck information supervision system in the capital market (2010) collected by the American capital market accounting fraud case, found that the efficiency of securities analyst identification fraud companies is much higher than the market regulators and auditors. In the event of China in recent years in the event of financial fraud, securities analysis agency muddy water short of Huishan company false assets and securities analysts "found a Po of" Yinguangxia "exaggerated production profit tracking and confirmed all revealed the material misstatement in the financial report information to the market, has attracted regulatory attention and investors. Compared with the CPA and the government supervision, the securities analyst can obtain company information from multiple channels, including telephone conferences and participate in the general meeting of shareholders, and The management of private conversation, so the information gathering and low cost; compared with investors, securities analysts have more professional background knowledge, so the information analysis ability. Although previous studies emphasize the relationship between analysts concerned with the quality of accounting information, but the results are not consistent. This paper argues that this is derived from two reasons a: China securities industry analyst is still in the stage of development, government departments for intermediary supervision is not perfect, resulting in the results affected by the institutional environment; the two is the lack of existing research from the whole process of accounting information transmission chain, conducts the research to the analyst concerns, therefore cannot systematically according to analysts concerned about the impact of accounting information disclosure of listed companies is analyzed. Based on the existing theory and previous research, from the research analyst for Production information chain "(production) - control - Verification - receiving (Disclosure)" with the influence process of each level, the influence mechanism of the financial report of the analyst for the risk of material misstatement concerning the proposed new framework. The empirical research shows that analysts pay attention to the higher of the listed companies, the existing financial report the risk of material misstatement is low. The specific performance: (1) in the information production level, this paper measures the risk of material misstatement of the financial report of listed companies from two aspects. On the one hand, the material misstatement in the characterization of the production level for financial reporting fraud or financial restatements. The study found that analysts focused on high the company, financial reporting fraud, and financial reporting restatements probability is lower. On the other hand, material misstatement in the indirect characterization of production levels for information risk of earnings management. Through the identification of listed companies Our financial report and performance fluctuation can be part of manipulation, this paper found that analysts look more listed companies, earnings management and risk information of basic information on risks of financial report is lower. (2) in the information control aspect, this paper argues that, when the internal supervision mechanism of listed company problems, the analyst may choose to promptly discover and communicate, if communication is not effectively improve the objective of internal control, to avoid the release of negative analyst in the case of prediction will be taken to stop the enterprise tracking method of transmitting a signal to the market. Therefore, in the information of the product control stage, analysts' attention to effectively improve the environmental governance within the company, significantly reduced the management fraud "rationalization" factors, thereby reducing the risk of material misstatement may exist in the financial report. The study found that analysts Pay attention to the higher, the possibility of disclosure of internal control report is high, the effectiveness of internal control is higher, the probability of internal control deficiencies is low. (3) in the information assurance level, through the first two stages of information analyst making and control attention, improve the enterprise information environment, perfecting the listed company the internal supervision mechanism, to effectively reduce the probability of financial reporting fraud or misstatement may exist therefore, reducing the need to invest in the CPA audit cost, and increase the probability of listed companies was issued by the "clean" audit opinions. The main research contributions are as follows: first, construct the analyst attention to financial report significant wrong at risk of a new framework, provides a theoretical basis for the analyst attention has supervision and improvement of accounting information transfer of the entire chain. Research shows that accounting information is Companies to disclose the "product", from the manufacture of products to consumers hands, experienced production (accounting report) - control (internal control) - Verification (CPA) - receiving (Disclosure of users to report) "a series of processes. However, the previous literatures focus in the analysts are concerned about the impact on the capital market reaction or financial reporting of earnings quality, ignoring the analyst as the capital market information intermediaries and listed companies external supervisors for the accounting information flow impact on all levels for second, according to the different level of accounting information transmission chain, constructs the financial report of the risks of material misstatement of the new measurement system. The previous literature mainly to the punishment by the CSRC, or manipulation of accruals as variables to measure the financial report of the company there is the risk of material misstatement, but such alternative The amount of limitations: one is not punishment, does not mean that the disclosure of financial information is "clean" (i.e. there is no risk of material misstatement); two is due to the earnings management is neutral and can be manipulated directly on behalf of isn't profit in the financial report of the company whether there the risk of material misstatement. Therefore the research on the risk of material misstatement measure according to the transfer of accounting information to quantify the level, so the conclusion is more reliable. Third, the results of this study emphasize the capital market intermediaries -- an important role in the transmission of information in the market. With the growing scale of securities analysts China's capital market, securities analysts from nonstandard folk "stock analysts" early, to 2309 by the end of 2017 to invest in securities business, they put to the listed company Effect of exposure of the quality of accounting information is more and more important. Therefore, the main significance of this research is caused by regulators on how to use the analyst's occupation characteristics and information advantage, improve the quality of accounting information of listed companies, improve the capital market accounting supervision and attention. The research conclusion in order to government regulation and capital market stakeholders as a future reference.

【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51
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