政府干预、股权激励及其对企业业绩的影响

发布时间：2018-01-04 01:29

本文关键词：政府干预、股权激励及其对企业业绩的影响　出处：《大连理工大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着公司股权的日益分散,所有权与控制权分离的现象在世界各国企业越来越突出,引发了委托—代理问题。为了解决经理人和股东之间的利益矛盾,合理激励公司管理层人员,很多公司开始采取股权激励的方式。股权激励已经成为现代企业维持持续发展和竞争力的重要手段和措施。在此背景下,针对我国的股权分置改革背景,提出以下问题：我国上市公司的股权激励行为主要受什么因素制约?上市公司股权激励是否对企业业绩产生了积极的影响? 首先,在对股权激励基本概念和主要模式分析的基础上,回顾了股权激励的主要相关理论基础,并对我国上市公司股权激励现状进行了分析,揭示我国上市公司股权激励中存在的主要问题。在此基础上,构建了政府干预、股权激励与企业业绩关系的分析框架,通过对政府干预与上市公司股权激励的关系、上市公司股权激励与企业业绩的关系进行理论分析,提出了相应的研究假设。其次,立足于中国情境,以我国深沪两市A股实施股权激励计划的上市公司为研究样本,运用计量经济学方法对政府干预与上市公司股权激励、上市公司股权激励与企业业绩的关系进行了回归分析,从而对上市公司股权激励行为及其对企业业绩的影响进行了实证研究,主要得到以下结论。 (1)政府干预对上市公司的股权激励行为具有一定的抑制作用。上市公司所处地区的政府干预程度越强,上市公司股权激励的水平就越低。结果表明,上市公司股权激励的推出在中国有其特殊的制度背景,上市公司管理者多任务目标的存在影响了股权激励的强度。政府干预的存在使得上市公司并不完全是一个价值最大化者,因此上市公司没有采取股权激励的强烈动机。 (2)我国的上市公司股权激励对企业业绩提升起到积极地促进作用,股权激励与公司的经营绩效明显正相关,股权激励可以通过激励管理层更加努力,从而实现促进我国上市公司业绩的目的。这表明即使我国资本市场还不够成熟,上市公司实施股权激励仍能起到积极的激励作用,但要想提高股权激励的效果,还应进一步完善我国资本市场。最后,在理论和实证研究的基础上,从减弱政府干预、加强市场调节机制以及完善公司内部治理结构的角度出发,提出减弱政府干预,加强资本市场和人才市场调节、规范企业内部治理结构,强化企业业绩考核标准的政策建议,从而有助于股权激励机制的完善和作用发挥。
[Abstract]:With the increasing dispersion of corporate equity, the separation of ownership and control rights is becoming more and more prominent in the world, which leads to the principal-agent problem in order to solve the conflicts between managers and shareholders. Many companies begin to adopt the way of equity incentive, which has become an important means and measures to maintain the sustainable development and competitiveness of modern enterprises. In this context, many companies begin to adopt equity incentives. In view of the background of the split share structure reform in China, this paper puts forward the following questions: what factors restrict the equity incentive behavior of listed companies in China? Does the equity incentive of listed companies have a positive impact on the performance of enterprises? First of all, on the basis of analyzing the basic concepts and main modes of equity incentive, this paper reviews the main theoretical basis of equity incentive, and analyzes the current situation of equity incentive of listed companies in China. This paper reveals the main problems existing in the equity incentive of listed companies in China. On this basis, it constructs an analytical framework of the relationship between government intervention, equity incentive and enterprise performance. Based on the theoretical analysis of the relationship between government intervention and equity incentive of listed companies, and the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance, the corresponding research hypotheses are put forward. Secondly, based on the situation in China, taking the listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets as the research samples, the econometrics method is applied to the government intervention and the equity incentive of listed companies. Based on the regression analysis of the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance, this paper makes an empirical study on the behavior of equity incentive and its influence on the performance of listed companies. The main conclusions are as follows. The higher the degree of government intervention, the lower the level of equity incentive of listed companies. The introduction of equity incentive of listed companies has its special institutional background in China. The existence of multi-task objectives of managers in listed companies affects the intensity of equity incentive. The existence of government intervention makes the listed companies not a value maximizer. Therefore, listed companies do not have a strong incentive to adopt equity incentives. Equity incentive plays a positive role in promoting corporate performance. Equity incentive is positively related to company performance, and equity incentive can be used to encourage management to make more efforts. This shows that even if the capital market in China is not mature, the implementation of equity incentives can still play a positive role, but want to improve the effect of equity incentives. Should also further perfect our country capital market. Finally, on the basis of theoretical and empirical research, from the perspective of weakening the government intervention, strengthening the market regulation mechanism and perfecting the corporate internal governance structure, the paper proposes to weaken the government intervention. Strengthening the regulation of capital market and talent market, standardizing the internal governance structure of enterprises, and strengthening the policy recommendations of enterprise performance evaluation standard are helpful to the perfection and function of equity incentive mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：大连理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.5

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