审计师“旋转门”与上市公司费用粘性

发布时间：2018-01-07 23:30

本文关键词：审计师“旋转门”与上市公司费用粘性　出处：《中国注册会计师》2017年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】："旋转门"现象发生前,跳槽审计师与客户公司的潜在雇佣关系会降低审计师的独立性,加剧上市公司的费用粘性。本文以2001年至2014年我国沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证研究审计师与客户公司的潜在雇佣关系对上市公司费用粘性的影响。结果表明"旋转门"现象发生前,跳槽审计师审计未来雇主时,潜在雇佣关系会损害审计师的独立性,不利于降低代理问题引起的费用粘性;在区分大事务所(国际四大或国内八大)和小事务所(非国际四大且非国内八大)样本后,发现当跳槽审计师来自小事务所时,其独立性较差,更不利于降低代理问题引起的费用粘性。
[Abstract]:Before the "revolving door" phenomenon occurs, the potential employment relationship between the auditor and the client company will reduce the auditor's independence. This paper takes the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as the sample from 2001 to 2014. The empirical study shows that the potential employment relationship between auditors and client companies affects the cost stickiness of listed companies. The results show that before the phenomenon of "revolving door" occurs, when auditors switch jobs to audit prospective employers. The potential employment relationship will damage the auditor's independence and reduce the cost stickiness caused by the agency problem. After distinguishing the samples of big firms (international big four or domestic big eight) and small firms (non-international big and non-domestic big), we found that when the job-hopping auditors came from small firms, their independence was poor. It is more disadvantageous to reduce the cost stickiness caused by agency problem.
【作者单位】：上海大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目“应计异象、定期披露与会计信息定价效率”(71202043) 上海市哲学社会科学规划项目商业银行信贷资产证券化与公司信用债券定价效率研究:基于主承销商视角(2016EGL003)
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F239.4
【正文快照】： 一、引言在现代企业制度中,经营权与所有权的分离给企业带来了资源的优化配置、经营效率的大幅提升,但也导致出现委托代理冲突。代理问题若反映到企业的费用管理方面,则表现为企业管理层基于自利动机而刻意保持或调整成本费用,导致费用粘性的出现。管理层为了最大程度地控制企

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