董事长与CEO任期交错治理效用分析——基于抑制股价崩盘风险视角的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-09 11:15

本文关键词：董事长与CEO任期交错治理效用分析——基于抑制股价崩盘风险视角的实证研究　出处：《商业研究》2017年08期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：管理团队任期的异质性导致管理层成员之间产生价值目标差异,董事长与CEO任期交错可以缓解代理问题,避免无效投资的发生。本文以股价崩盘风险为视角分析董事长与CEO任期交错的公司治理效用,并比较不同情景下其治理效果的强弱。研究发现董事长与CEO任期交错可以抑制股价崩盘风险,大股东持股会影响董事长与CEO任期交错与股价崩盘风险之间的关系;当大股东持股比例较高时,二者任期交错对股价崩盘风险无抑制作用;当大股东持股比例较低时,其对股价崩盘风险的抑制效果明显;企业的产权性质会影响董事长与CEO任期交错对股价崩盘风险的抑制作用,该效果在国有企业中比较显著,但在民营企业中并不显著。这表明董事长与CEO任期交错具有正面的治理作用,但该作用的发挥具有情景效应。
[Abstract]:The heterogeneity of the tenure of the management team leads to the difference of value objectives among the members of the management team. The interleaving of the chairman and the CEO tenure can alleviate the agency problem. To avoid the occurrence of invalid investment. This paper analyzes the corporate governance utility of the chairman and CEO from the perspective of the risk of stock price collapse. The study found that the staggered tenure of chairman and CEO can restrain the risk of stock price collapse. Large shareholder shareholding will affect the relationship between chairman and CEO tenure and the risk of stock price collapse; When the proportion of large shareholders is high, the staggered tenure of the two has no effect on the risk of stock price collapse; When the shareholding ratio of large shareholders is low, the inhibition effect on the risk of stock price collapse is obvious. The nature of the property rights of the enterprise will affect the chairman and CEO tenure staggered on the risk of stock price collapse, this effect is more significant in state-owned enterprises. This indicates that the staggered tenure of chairman and CEO has a positive governance effect, but the exertion of this role has a situational effect.
【作者单位】：东北财经大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金重点项目“基于大数据的金融风险度量理论与应用研究”,项目编号:14AZD089
【分类号】：F271;F275;F832.51
【正文快照】： 经典的“委托-代理”两层代理理论是现代公司治理研究的主要分析框架之一[1],然而董事制度的引入在缓解股东与经理人之间的代理问题的同时,又导致了股东与董事之间的代理问题,提高管理团队任期异质性是缓解董事与经理人合谋的途径之一。本文以抑制股价崩盘风险为研究视角,考察

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