机构投资者、终极控股股东对盈余稳健性影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-10 02:29

本文关键词：机构投资者、终极控股股东对盈余稳健性影响的实证研究　出处：《浙江工商大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：公司治理是现代企业理论的核心体系之一,而盈余稳健性是公司治理框架中的一个重要环节。我国会计准则强调的稳健性,经历了从质疑到强化的过程。目前,我国在盈余稳健性方面的研究主要关注盈余稳健性的存在性、衡量方法及存在的动因,而对盈余稳健性影响机理的研究尚不够全面,尤其是从公司内部控股股东和外部股东的角度。公司内部控股股东主要是指通过“金字塔”持股和交叉持股等方式,以较低现金流权获得公司较高控制权的终极控股股东,其凭借自身控制权优势,侵占公司资产,损害中小股东利益,并可能通过操纵公司盈余来掩盖其不合理行为。而外部股东主要是指机构投资者,从理论上,其作为公司外部监督者,在一定程度上,能缓解公司内部控制人侵害与操纵行为,提高公司盈余稳健性。因此,机构投资者是公司盈余稳健性的重要供给者,是提高公司盈余稳健性的重要力量。而由于我国资本市场发展尚不成熟,中小投资者法律保护体系不够完善,导致公司终极控股股东凭借其高控制权优势,侵害中小股东利益,操纵公司盈余行为更加严重。因此,在这样的背景下,本文一方面从公司内部控制人角度,研究了公司终极控股股东控制对盈余稳健性的影响,为盈余稳健性影响因素的研究提供实证依据；另一方面,本文引入外部股东机构投资者,检验了其能否缓解终极控股股东控制权侵害行为对盈余稳健性的影响,同时本文在最后添加了机构投资者差异化对盈余稳健性影响的研究,以更全面的考察机构投资者的外部股东作用,从而为如何提高我国上市公司盈余稳健性,缓解终极控股股东控制权结构问题提供参考依据,同时也为机构投资者在目前公司治理中能否发挥其外部监督作用提供了参考依据。本文参考Basu(1997)盈余反转模型,选取2009～2013年间我国非金融类A股上市公司作为研究样本,以非平衡面板固定效应回归模型进行了实证研究。研究结果表明：(1)终极控股股东控制权侵害行为降低了公司盈余稳健性,从而表明我国终极控股股东存在操纵公司盈余的行为；(2)机构投资者整体持股降低了公司盈余稳健性,且机构投资者整体持股并不能缓解终极控股股东控制行为对盈余稳健性的影响；(3)同时机构投资者分类实证研究表明,投资基金、证券公司和保险公司持股均降低了公司盈余稳健性程度,投资基金和证券公司均并不能缓解上市公司控股股东控制权结构问题对盈余稳健性的影响,而保险公司持股对此并没有形成显著的结果。总体表明,在本文研究阶段,我国机构投资者并没有在盈余稳健性影响中发挥积极的外部监督作用。
[Abstract]:Corporate governance is one of the core systems of modern enterprise theory, and earnings conservatism is an important link in the framework of corporate governance. Our country mainly pays attention to the existence, the measurement method and the reason of the earnings conservatism in the aspect of earnings conservatism, but the research on the influence mechanism of earnings conservatism is not comprehensive enough. Especially from the perspective of internal controlling shareholders and external shareholders, the internal controlling shareholders of the company mainly refer to the way of holding shares through "pyramid" and cross-shareholding. The ultimate controlling shareholder who obtains the company's higher control right by the right of lower cash flow encroaches on the assets of the company and damages the interests of the minority shareholders by virtue of its own advantages of control. External shareholders mainly refer to institutional investors, in theory, as corporate external supervisors, to a certain extent. Therefore, institutional investors are important suppliers of corporate earnings stability and an important force to improve earnings robustness. As the development of capital market in China is not mature and the legal protection system of small and medium investors is not perfect, the ultimate controlling shareholder of the company has the advantage of high control right and infringes on the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders. Therefore, under this background, this paper studies the effect of ultimate controlling shareholder control on earnings robustness from the perspective of internal controller. To provide the empirical basis for the study of the influencing factors of earnings robustness; On the other hand, this paper introduces external shareholder institutional investors to test whether it can alleviate the impact of ultimate controlling shareholder control on earnings robustness. At the same time, this paper adds a study on the influence of institutional investor differentiation on earnings robustness in order to investigate the external shareholder role of institutional investors in order to improve the earnings robustness of listed companies in China. At the same time, it provides a reference basis for institutional investors to play their role of external supervision in the current corporate governance. This paper refers to the earnings inversion model of Basu 1997 and selects the non-financial A-share listed companies as the research samples from 2009 to 2013. The empirical study is carried out with the non-equilibrium panel fixed effect regression model. The results show that the ultimate controlling shareholder's control right infringement reduces the company's earnings robustness. It shows that the ultimate controlling shareholder of our country has the behavior of manipulating the company's earnings. (2) Institutional investors' overall shareholding reduces the company's earnings robustness, and the institutional investor's overall shareholding does not alleviate the influence of ultimate controlling shareholder's controlling behavior on earnings robustness; At the same time, the empirical study of institutional investor classification shows that investment funds, securities companies and insurance companies all reduce the degree of corporate earnings soundness. Investment funds and securities companies can not alleviate the control structure of the controlling shareholders of listed companies on the impact of earnings robustness, but the insurance company ownership has no significant results. In the research stage of this paper, institutional investors in China did not play an active role in external supervision of earnings robustness.
【学位授予单位】：浙江工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F271;F275;F832.51

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