基于代理问题的高管期权激励对资本结构动态调整的影响研究

发布时间：2018-01-18 14:40

本文关键词：基于代理问题的高管期权激励对资本结构动态调整的影响研究　出处：《吉林大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：自现代企业诞生以来,委托代理问题一直是公司治理理论中的讨论核心。改善所有者与代理人之间的利益目标不一致问题是解决委托代理问题的必要环节,因此股权激励历来被视为解决委托代理问题的有效工具。在股权激励计划中大多数企业选择了股票期权激励方式,这种方式使得所有者和代理人之间的利益目标相趋同,促使经营者真正从企业发展和股东利益的角度出发来努力工作。它能够促使管理层调整企业资本结构,以实现企业价值最大化目标;但其造成的管理者利用职权谋取私利的现象屡见不鲜又使得人们对激励效果存疑。本文结合了股票期权激励与资本结构动态调整两方面的内容,以及股权集中度、两职合一对二者的调节作用,以期为我国股票期权激励实践提供一定的理论支持。本文首先阐述了股票期权激励与资本结构理论的研究背景和研究意义,并对以往相关研究结论进行回顾;其次,界定了股票期权激励和资本结构的概念内涵,并对本文所应用的期权价值理论、权衡理论、委托代理理论进行了细致阐述;再次,基于文献综述和理论回顾提出了本文的假设,实证检验了股票期权激励的实施对资本结构调整速度的影响;最后,分析了本文的研究结论,并提出五条基于实践层面的建议。本文的主要研究结论如下:第一,股票期权激励计划的实施在一定程度上提高了资本结构调整成本,加大了调整资本结构的困难程度,增加了实际资本结构与目标资本结构之间的距离。第二,股权较为集中时,期权激励对资本结构调整速度的抑制程度减弱;而股权较为分散时,会增强这种负向影响。第三,当总经理和董事长为一人时,会加强期权激励对资本结构的调整速度的负向影响;当总经理和董事长分任情况时,期权激励对资本结构动态调整速度的抑制程度减弱。第四,企业规模、成长性、盈利性、资产担保价值以及账面市值比均会对企业的资本结构调整行为产生影响,而且影响效果具有一定的稳健性。总之,本文的研究结果表明,股票期权激励的实施对资本结构调整的作用逐渐显现,但在执行过程中仍不可避免地存在一些问题。通过改善资本市场环境、规范信息披露、增强内部监督等手段,才能确保股票期权激励对资本结构调整的正面积极作用。
[Abstract]:Since the birth of modern enterprises, the principal-agent problem has been the core of the theory of corporate governance. Therefore, equity incentive has always been regarded as an effective tool to solve the principal-agent problem. In this way, the interests of owners and agents converge, and the managers work hard from the perspective of the development of the enterprise and the interests of the shareholders, and it can promote the management to adjust the capital structure of the enterprise. To realize the goal of maximizing enterprise value; However, the phenomenon that managers make use of their power to seek private interests is common and makes people doubt the incentive effect. This paper combines the two aspects of stock option incentive and dynamic adjustment of capital structure. As well as the ownership concentration, the two positions in one of the two of the regulatory role of the two. In order to provide some theoretical support for the practice of stock option incentive in China. Firstly, this paper expounds the research background and significance of stock option incentive and capital structure theory, and reviews the previous relevant research conclusions. Secondly, it defines the concept connotation of stock option incentive and capital structure, and elaborates the option value theory, trade-off theory and principal-agent theory applied in this paper. Thirdly, based on the literature review and theoretical review, this paper puts forward the hypothesis, and empirically tests the impact of the implementation of stock option incentive on the speed of capital structure adjustment; Finally, this paper analyzes the conclusions of this paper, and puts forward five suggestions based on practice. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: first. To a certain extent, the implementation of stock option incentive plan increases the cost of capital structure adjustment, increases the difficulty of adjusting capital structure, and increases the distance between actual capital structure and target capital structure. When the equity is concentrated, the inhibition degree of option incentive on the speed of capital structure adjustment is weakened. Third, when the general manager and chairman are one person, the negative effect of option incentive on the speed of capital structure adjustment will be strengthened. When the general manager and the chairman of the board of directors are divided, the inhibition of option incentive on the speed of dynamic adjustment of capital structure is weakened. 4th, enterprise size, growth, and profitability. Asset guarantee value and book market value ratio will have an impact on the corporate capital structure adjustment behavior, and the effect has a certain robustness. In short, the results of this paper show that. The effect of stock option incentive on the adjustment of capital structure appears gradually, but there are still some unavoidable problems in the process of implementation. Through improving the capital market environment, we can standardize the information disclosure. Only by strengthening internal supervision can we ensure the positive effect of stock option incentive on the adjustment of capital structure.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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