政府补助、剩余侵占与企业投资支出——基于信息不对称视角的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-21 12:07

本文关键词： 信息不对称政府补助剩余侵占投资支出门槛面板模型　出处：《财会通讯》2017年33期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：政府补助能缓解上市公司面临的融资约束问题,有助其在最优或逼近最优的投资水平上安排投资支出,而信息不对称背景下的政企剩余行为对补助多少又有显著影响,故政企双方的剩余侵占结果会通过影响补助决定对企业投资支出产生间接影响。文章基于上市公司的样本数据,使用门槛面板模型实证分析了这一间接影响。研究表明:企业剩余侵占量越大,或政府剩余侵占量越小,或政企双方综合净剩余较小时,企业获取补助水平越高,政府补助对上市公司投资支出才有显著正影响,反之则没有。
[Abstract]:Government subsidies can alleviate the financing constraints faced by listed companies and help them to arrange investment expenditure at the optimal or near-optimal investment level. Under the background of asymmetric information, the residual behavior of government and enterprise has a significant impact on the amount of subsidies. Therefore, the residual encroachment result of both government and enterprise will have indirect influence on the enterprise investment expenditure through the influence of subsidy decision. The article is based on the sample data of listed company. Empirical analysis of this indirect impact using threshold panel model. The study shows that: the larger the amount of enterprise surplus encroachment, or the smaller the amount of government surplus encroachment, or the government and enterprise comprehensive net surplus is small. The higher the level of corporate subsidies, the more significant the government subsidy has a positive impact on the investment expenditure of listed companies, whereas the other is not.
【作者单位】：合肥工业大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学青年基金项目(项目编号:71303073) 教育部人文社科基金项目(项目编号:13YJC630030)的阶段性研究成果
【分类号】：F275;F812.45;F832.51
【正文快照】： 一、引言在完美资本市场中,企业投资决策仅受其面临投资机会的影响,即企业面临投资机会越多,其投资支出也会越多,因为企业可以不受限制地筹措到其投资所需资金(Modigliani,F and Miller,M H,1958)。然而现实资本市场中存在着信息不对称等摩擦,导致企业常常无法筹措到其投资

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