项目制下地方债务的扩张行为及其对资本回报率的影响

发布时间：2018-01-22 19:47

本文关键词： 地方债务政治资源项目制资本回报率　出处：《华侨大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近年来地方债务的迅速扩张引起了学术界的高度重视,由于地方债务涉及到房地产、基础设施等多个领域,对维持经济健康发展有着至关重要的作用,因此,弄清楚地方债务扩张行为的内在机制对中国的经济发展显得尤为重要。本文以项目制治理模式为出发点,探究了专项补助对地方债务扩张行为的影响,并进一步讨论了近年来资本回报率下降与地方债务扩张现象之间的联系。根据2003年到2014年30个省份的面板数据,分析项目制下地方债务的扩张行为以及资本回报率的影响而得出结论:第一,项目制虽契合了地方政府追求GDP增长和官员晋升的需要,充分调动了地方政府项目投资的积极性,但是,项目制所带有的竞争和配套机制还造成了地方政府沉重的债务。并且,在项目制的激励下,专项资金的增量越大,地方投资经营的范围就越广,地方债务扩张的力度也越大。第二,由于项目的支配权掌握在中央各部门手中,地方官员所拥有的的政治资源,会影响本地区获得的项目资金,也会影响到上级部门对于城投债发行的审批。因此,政治资源降低了地方政府的融资成本,并扭曲了地方政府的投资行为。随着地方政府的支配权力越来越大,政治资源禀赋必然会影响项目制与地方债务之间的动态关系。第三,项目制治理模式下,我国高额的投资规模间接上由地方债务支撑,地方债务的高速膨胀,会推动投资率的上升,造成资本大量积累、产能过剩加剧等问题,对整个社会的资本回报率产生不利的影响。第四,尽管地方债务投资对中国经济存在着一定的促进作用,在一定程度上有助于挖掘经济增长潜力,但是由于债务资金大量投资到基础设施项目,而基础设施所需资金流量大,回报周期很长,短期内造成的资源配置效率损失,是其较为长期的正外部性效应很难弥补的,最终还是会抑制整体的资本回报率。第五,在地方政府干预下,国有企业可能获得更多的银行贷款支持,使得民营企业的股权融资和债务融资相对较难,从而扭曲了资源配置效率。与此同时,地方债务的大规模扩张又使得银行信贷资源被过多占用,并不利于要素的优化配置和使用,强化了政府干预对资本回报率的影响。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the rapid expansion of local debt has attracted great attention of the academic community. Because local debt involves real estate, infrastructure and other fields, it plays a vital role in maintaining the healthy development of the economy. To understand the internal mechanism of local debt expansion behavior is particularly important to the economic development of China. This paper takes the project governance model as the starting point to explore the impact of special subsidies on the local debt expansion behavior. The relationship between the decline in the return on capital and the phenomenon of local debt expansion in recent years is further discussed. According to panel data of 30 provinces from 2003 to 2014. Analysis of the expansion of local debt under the project system and the impact of the return on capital comes to the conclusion: first, the project system meets the needs of local governments in pursuit of GDP growth and the promotion of officials. Fully mobilize the enthusiasm of local government project investment, but the project system with competition and supporting mechanism also caused a heavy debt of local governments. And, under the incentive of the project system. The larger the increment of special funds, the wider the scope of local investment and operation, and the greater the intensity of local debt expansion. Second, because the control of projects is in the hands of the central departments. The political resources owned by local officials will affect the project funds obtained in the region, and will also affect the approval of the city investment bond issuance by the higher authorities. As a result, the political resources will reduce the financing costs of local governments. It distorts the investment behavior of the local government. With the increasing power of the local government, political resource endowment will inevitably affect the dynamic relationship between the project system and local debt. Third, under the project governance model. The high investment scale of our country is indirectly supported by the local debt, and the rapid expansion of the local debt will promote the increase of investment rate, resulting in a large amount of capital accumulation, the aggravation of overcapacity and other problems. It has a negative impact on the return on capital of the whole society. 4th, although the local debt investment has a certain role in promoting the Chinese economy, to a certain extent, it helps to tap the potential of economic growth. However, due to the large amount of debt funds invested in infrastructure projects, and the large amount of capital needed for infrastructure, the return cycle is very long, the efficiency of resource allocation is lost in the short term. Is its longer term positive externality effect is very difficult to make up for, will eventually suppress the overall return on capital. 5th, under the local government intervention, state-owned enterprises may get more bank loan support. The equity financing and debt financing of private enterprises are relatively difficult, thus distorting the efficiency of resource allocation. At the same time, the large-scale expansion of local debt makes the bank credit resources become too much. It is not conducive to the optimal allocation and use of elements, and strengthens the impact of government intervention on the return on capital.
【学位授予单位】：华侨大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F812.5

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