分析师商业性动机与盈余预测偏差:来自融资融券的证据

发布时间：2018-01-23 06:45

本文关键词： 卖空限制鼓励交易动机盈余预测偏差证券分析师　出处：《财经研究》2017年07期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：证券分析师是否会为了商业性目的而牺牲专业性?文章利用融资融券制度检验了鼓励交易动机是否会导致分析师有意提供偏颇的股票分析报告。卖空交易使股票在下跌过程中也能增加交易佣金,促使证券分析师给出更加客观的盈余预测。文章采用经过股票价格调整的盈余预测误差绝对值,作为分析师盈余预测偏差的度量指标,发现相对于存在卖空限制的股票,分析师对融资融券标的股票的短期盈余预测偏差降低了约0.014,长期盈余预测偏差降低了约0.019,但平均月度换手率上升了约10.9%。公司业绩和盈余预测难度的变化不能解释这一现象。文章研究表明,鼓励交易动机会使分析师发布更加乐观的盈余预测报告,而允许卖空有助于矫正这种商业性动机,增强分析师的专业性。
[Abstract]:Will securities analysts sacrifice their professionalism for commercial purposes? The paper uses margin and margin system to test whether encouraging trading motivation will lead analysts to provide biased stock analysis report. Short selling can also increase the transaction commission in the process of falling stock. This paper adopts the absolute value of earnings forecast error adjusted by stock price as the measure of the deviation of earnings forecast. It is found that relative to the stocks with short selling restriction, the short-term earnings forecast deviation of the stocks with margin margin is reduced by about 0.014, and the long-term earnings forecast deviation is reduced by about 0.019. However, the average monthly turnover rate has risen by about 10.9%. The change in company performance and earnings forecasting difficulty cannot explain this phenomenon. Encouraging trading incentives would lead analysts to release more optimistic earnings forecasts, while allowing short selling would help correct this commercial motivation and increase analysts' professionalism.
【作者单位】：上海财经大学金融学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71302074) 上海财经大学创新团队支持计划的资助
【分类号】：F275;F832.51
【正文快照】： 一、引言2017年2月10日,在全国证券期货监管工作会上,中国证监会主席刘士余怒斥股市黑嘴“语不惊人死不休”。为什么存在股市黑嘴?一个重要因素是经济动机的驱使。无论是在国内还是国外,为了能够带来更多的交易,证券公司通常将证券分析师的报酬与佣金收入联系起来(Cowen等,200

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