当前位置:主页 > 经济论文 > 股票论文 >

管理者过度自信对企业过度投资影响的实证研究

发布时间:2018-01-26 18:54

  本文关键词: 管理者过度自信 企业过度投资 企业自由现金流 出处:《南京理工大学》2017年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:公司投资活动是公司发展的重要活动,作为公司成长的基础,能够促进未来现金流的增长,公司的价值在很大程度上受到管理者的投资行为的影响,但是企业在日常的经营活动中经常会发生非效率投资,越来越多的实证研究发现,在现实的企业经营中,理性人的严格假设是不存在的,随着研究的深入,认知心理学的理论被引入了财务研究领域,经过几十年的研究产生了行为金融科学理论,该理论在研究非效率投资的过程中,进一步研究了管理者非理性这一概念。所以,本文从不同的视角,即过度自信心理偏差的方向,探讨心理偏差对企业过度投资行为的影响,在此研究的基础上,研究公司自由现金流是否会对过度投资产生影响,并且将总样本的公司分为国有和非国有上市公司两个样本,研究两种不同上市公司的区别,最后将企业自由现金流为正的样本的公司分为高低两个公司治理程度的样本,探讨公司治理对过度投资产生的影响。本文首先阅读并整理了国内外学者的相关文献,采用合适的指标来定义管理者过度自信与企业过度投资,文章选取2011-2015年沪深A股所有的上市公司作为实证样本,根据研究的需要对样本数据进行筛选,研究管理者过度自信对公司过度投资的影响。通过研究国内外学者的相关文献和实证数据的结果证实:第一,上市公司过度自信的管理者会导致企业过度投资,管理者自我认知水平不准确,认为自身的能力高于常人,同时过高估计投资项目的成功率,引发过度投资行为;第二,当企业存在充裕的现金流时,为了节约现金流的成本,降低现金流水平,管理者想利用充足的现金流来提高企业效益,因此充足的现金加强了管理者的过度自信偏差,越容易导致过度投资的发生;第三,与非国有上市公司相比,国有上市公司过度自信的管理者更倾向于过度投资;第四,公司治理水平的高低会制约管理者的过度自信偏差,对企业的投资行为产生影响,在治理水平较高的公司中,管理者受到的约束较多,过度自信的影响有所减弱,进而减少其过度投资情况,在治理水平较低的公司中,过度自信管理者会加重过度投资的倾向。最后整理相关研究结论,根据理论基础及实证研究结果提出建议,期望对企业投资效率的提高提供有益的贡献和参考。
[Abstract]:Corporate investment is an important activity of the development of the company, as the basis of the growth of the company, it can promote the growth of future cash flow, and the value of the company is greatly affected by the investment behavior of the managers. However, enterprises often have inefficient investment in their daily business activities. More and more empirical studies have found that the strict assumption of rational people does not exist in the real business operation, with the deepening of the research. The theory of cognitive psychology has been introduced into the field of financial research. After decades of research, behavioral financial science theory has emerged, which is in the process of studying inefficient investment. Further study the concept of irrational managers. Therefore, this paper from different perspectives, that is, the direction of overconfidence psychological bias, to explore the impact of psychological bias on corporate over-investment behavior, on the basis of this study. To study whether the free cash flow will have an impact on overinvestment and to divide the total sample into state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies to study the differences between the two different listed companies. Finally, the companies with positive free cash flow are divided into two samples of corporate governance. This paper first reads and collates the relevant literature of scholars at home and abroad, and uses appropriate indicators to define managers' overconfidence and corporate overinvestment. This paper selects all the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares from 2011-2015 as the empirical sample, and selects the sample data according to the need of the research. Through the study of scholars at home and abroad related literature and empirical data confirmed that: first, overconfident managers of listed companies will lead to corporate overinvestment. The self-cognition level of managers is not accurate, they think that their ability is higher than ordinary people, and overestimate the success rate of investment projects, which leads to excessive investment behavior; Second, when there is abundant cash flow, in order to save the cost of cash flow and reduce the level of cash flow, managers want to use sufficient cash flow to improve the efficiency of the enterprise. Therefore, sufficient cash strengthens managers' overconfidence bias, and the more likely it is to lead to overinvestment; Third, compared with non-state-owned listed companies, overconfident managers of state-owned listed companies tend to overinvest; In 4th, the level of corporate governance will restrict the overconfidence deviation of managers, and have an impact on the investment behavior of enterprises. In the companies with higher governance level, managers are subject to more constraints. The influence of overconfidence has weakened, and then reduce its overinvestment, in the low level of governance companies, overconfident managers will increase the tendency to overinvest. Finally, collate the relevant research conclusions. Based on the theoretical basis and empirical research results, the author puts forward some suggestions, hoping to provide useful contribution and reference to the improvement of enterprise investment efficiency.
【学位授予单位】:南京理工大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F275;F832.51

【参考文献】

相关期刊论文 前8条

1 毕晓方;张俊民;李海英;;产业政策、管理者过度自信与企业流动性风险[J];会计研究;2015年03期

2 李婉丽;谢桂林;郝佳蕴;;管理者过度自信对企业过度投资影响的实证研究[J];山西财经大学学报;2014年10期

3 胡国柳;姜岩磊;;贷款投放量、高管过度自信与企业过度投资[J];海南大学学报(人文社会科学版);2014年03期

4 谢园;;投资者情绪和管理者过度自信对企业投资异化的影响——基于2009-2012中国A股上市企业的实证研究[J];财经界(学术版);2014年09期

5 赵岩;陈金龙;;高管政治联系、过度投资与负债融资治理效应[J];福建论坛(人文社会科学版);2014年03期

6 李世刚;;女性高管、过度自信与上市公司融资偏好——来自中国资本市场的经验证据[J];经济经纬;2014年02期

7 章细贞;张欣;;管理者过度自信、公司治理与企业过度投资[J];中南大学学报(社会科学版);2014年01期

8 张大为;孙福明;;管理者过度自信与企业投融资决策研究述评[J];哈尔滨商业大学学报(社会科学版);2014年01期



本文编号:1466337

资料下载
论文发表

本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/jingjilunwen/jinrongzhengquanlunwen/1466337.html


Copyright(c)文论论文网All Rights Reserved | 网站地图 |

版权申明:资料由用户47925***提供,本站仅收录摘要或目录,作者需要删除请E-mail邮箱bigeng88@qq.com